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Saranyan Senthivel

Publications and source records attributed to Saranyan Senthivel.

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First Steps, Lasting Impact: Platform-Aware Forensics for the Next Generation of Analysts

The reliability of cyber forensic evidence acquisition is strongly influenced by the underlying operating systems, Windows, macOS, and Linux - due to inherent variations in file system structures, encryption protocols, and forensic tool compatibility. Disk forensics, one of the most widely used techniques in digital investigations, faces distinct obstacles on each platform. Windows, with its predominantly NTFS and FAT file systems, typically supports reliable disk imaging and analysis through established tools such as FTK Imager and Autopsy/Sleuth Kit. However, encryption features frequently pose challenges to evidence acquisition. Conversely, Linux environments, which rely on file systems like ext4 and XFS, generally offer greater transparency, yet the transient nature of log retention often complicates forensic analysis. In instances where anti-forensic strategies such as encryption and compression render traditional disk forensics insufficient, memory forensics becomes crucial. While memory forensic methodologies demonstrate robustness across Windows and Linux platforms forms through frameworks like Volatility, platform-specific difficulties persist. Memory analysis on Linux systems benefits from tools like LiME, snapshot utilities, and dd for memory acquisition; nevertheless, live memory acquisition on Linux can still present challenges. This research systematically assesses both disk and memory forensic acquisition techniques across samples representing Windows and Linux systems. By identifying effective combinations of forensic tools and configurations tailored to each operating system, the study aims to improve the accuracy and reliability of evidence collection. It further evaluates current forensic tools and highlights a persistent gap: consistently assuring forensic input reliability and footprint integrity.

cs.CR

PP3D: An In-Browser Vision-Based Defense Against Web Behavior Manipulation Attacks

Web-based behavior-manipulation attacks (BMAs) - such as scareware, fake software downloads, tech support scams, etc. - are a class of social engineering (SE) attacks that exploit human decision-making vulnerabilities. These attacks remain under-studied compared to other attacks such as information harvesting attacks (e.g., phishing) or malware infections. Prior technical work has primarily focused on measuring BMAs, offering little in the way of generic defenses. To address this gap, we introduce Pixel Patrol 3D (PP3D), the first end-to-end browser framework for discovering, detecting, and defending against behavior-manipulating SE attacks in real time. PP3D consists of a visual detection model implemented within a browser extension, which deploys the model client-side to protect users across desktop and mobile devices while preserving privacy. Our evaluation shows that PP3D can achieve above 99% detection rate at 1% false positives, while maintaining good latency and overhead performance across devices. Even when faced with new BMA samples collected months after training the detection model, our defense system can still achieve above 97% detection rate at 1% false positives. These results demonstrate that our framework offers a practical, effective, and generalizable defense against a broad and evolving class of web behavior-manipulation attacks.

cs.CR