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Sarthak Choudhary

Publications and source records attributed to Sarthak Choudhary.

12 recordsLinked to original sources

Dependency-Aware Privacy for Multi-turn Agents

LLM agents release private data across multi-service interactions. Existing prompt sanitizers based on metric differential privacy treat each release independently, so adversaries combining releases across turns can recover private attributes; privacy degrades with every release. This degradation is fundamental: when private attributes are the \emph{roots} of a computation graph, independently noising a derived value amplifies the root's distinguishability by up to the deriving function's Lipschitz constant $L$, which can far exceed the nominal privacy parameter for nonlinear functions in medical and financial workflows. RootGuard sanitizes root values once and computes subsequent releases deterministically from the noised roots. By the post-processing theorem, the privacy guarantee depends only on the initial root sanitization, regardless of the adversary's functions or number of turns, and derived values inherit privacy at zero marginal cost. RootGuard further exploits structural domain knowledge (e.g., BMI from height and weight, or a known target function) to allocate budget across roots, improving the privacy-utility tradeoff. A worst-case adversary forcing $t$ turns increases the total budget $B = t \cdot \varepsilon$. RootGuard distributes this larger budget across roots, while independent noising spends $\varepsilon$ per release and gives the adversary $t$ observations to combine via MAP reconstruction. This yields a \emph{double asymmetry}: more turns aid RootGuard while weakening independent noising. On eight NHANES medical diagnostic templates, RootGuard achieves $2.6\times$ lower target error than independent noising at $\varepsilon = 0.1$ (7.8\% vs.\ 20.3\% wMAPE at $B = (2k{+}1)\varepsilon$). Under MAP reconstruction, more queries strengthen attacks against independent noising while RootGuard remains invariant.

cs.CR

The Darkside-20k Data Acquisition System

DarkSide-20k is a WIMP search experiment using liquid argon as a target, designed to perform a background-free search for dark matter with unprecedented sensitivity, and is currently under construction at INFN Laboratori Nazionali del Gran Sasso, Italy. The detector comprises a dual-phase Time Projection Chamber complemented with external veto systems and is equipped with a total of 2720 SiPM-based readout channels. This work presents the DAQ system designed for DarkSide-20k. The system is capable of continuous, triggerless digitisation of the waveforms with high single-photoelectron detection efficiency and online processing, ensuring data reduction for long-term storage. The DarkSide-20k DAQ system employs commercial CAEN VX2745 digitisers with custom FPGA firmware implementation. Timing and synchronisation across all 48 digitisers are provided by custom Global and Crate Data Manager boards distributing a phase-aligned clock derived from a disciplined rubidium standard. Waveform segments are processed in real time by Front End Processor machines. Data are organised into collections containing whole detector information and distributed across a farm of Time Slice Processors for event reconstruction, classification, and further reduction before storage and offline analysis. A full "Quadrant" of the system, corresponding to one quarter of the final DAQ, has been assembled and validated at TRIUMF laboratory in Canada. The Quadrant has been stress-tested with simultaneous pulses and demonstrated sustained digitizer readout exceeding expected physics rates and stable long-term performance.

physics.ins-det

Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions

We present Sparse Backdoor, a supply-chain attack that plants a provably undetectable backdoor in pre-trained image classifiers, including convolutional networks and Vision Transformers. The attack injects a structured sparse perturbation along a randomly chosen direction into a small subset of columns at each fully connected layer, propagating a trigger signal to an adversary-chosen target class, and masks the perturbation with an independent isotropic Gaussian dither. The dither serves a single technical purpose: it induces a clean reference distribution anchored at the pre-trained weights, against which undetectability can be formalized. Under a mild margin condition on the pre-trained classifier, we show that the dithered reference is functionally equivalent to the original classifier. We prove that distinguishing the backdoor-injected model from this reference is at least as hard as Sparse PCA detection, which is computationally infeasible under standard hardness assumptions. The guarantee holds against any probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher with white-box access to the parameters.

cs.CR

Through the Stealth Lens: Attention-Aware Defenses Against Poisoning in RAG

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to attacks that inject poisoned passages into the retrieved context, even at low corruption rates. We show that existing attacks are not designed to be stealthy, allowing reliable detection and mitigation. We formalize a distinguishability-based security game to quantify stealth for such attacks. If a few poisoned passages control the response, they must bias the inference process more than the benign ones, inherently compromising stealth. This motivates analyzing intermediate signals of LLMs, such as attention weights, to approximate the influence of different passages on the response. Leveraging attention weights, we introduce the $\textbf{Normalized Passage Attention Score}$ (NPAS) and a lightweight $\textbf{Attention-Variance Filter}$ (AV Filter) that flags anomalous passages. Our method improves robustness, yielding up to $\sim$ $\textbf{20%}$ higher accuracy than baseline defenses. We also develop adaptive attacks that attempt to conceal such anomalies, achieving up to $\textbf{35%}$ success rate and underscoring the challenges of achieving true stealth in poisoning RAG systems.

cs.CR

Agent Security is a Systems Problem

We take the position that agent security must be approached as a systems problem: the AI model powering the agent must be treated as an untrusted component, and security invariants must be enforced at the system level. Through this lens, efforts to increase model robustness (the dominant viewpoint in the community) are insufficient on their own. Instead, we must complement existing efforts with techniques from the systems security domain. Based on our experience as cybersecurity researchers in operating systems, networks, formal methods, and adversarial machine learning, we articulate a set of core principles, grounded in decades of systems security research, that provide a foundation for designing agentic systems with predictable guarantees. As evidence, we analyze eleven representative real-world attacks on agents and discuss how systems principles, if realized, could have prevented these attacks. We also identify the research challenges that stand in the way of implementing these principles in agents.

cs.CR

Formal Policy Enforcement for Real-World Agentic Systems

Security policy enforcement in contemporary agentic systems predominantly consists of embedding natural-language policies within an agent's system prompt and delegating compliance to the agent's reasoning. This approach admits no formal enforcement guarantee and cannot express policies whose satisfaction depends on the causal history of an execution, a gap that becomes acute in multi-agent systems, where enforcement must reason across agents. We argue that policy enforcement in agentic systems is most naturally understood as a cross-cutting concern, and propose a framework grounded in aspect-oriented programming that specifies policies independent of the agent's reasoning and enforces them at every policy-relevant decision. Policies are written in Datalog over a set of abstract predicates describing the execution context, an observability service governed by a formal assume/guarantee contract maintains these predicates, and a reference monitor consults the policy at each action to produce an enforcement decision. When the environment contract holds, enforcement decisions coincide with the policy's intended semantics. We adopt Datalog as the policy language, a natural fit because it supports declarative rule specification, admits recursion for policies over transitive relationships, and yields deterministic enforcement. Datalog further admits tractable static analyses for contradiction, redundancy, subsumption, and conditional reachability, enabling authors to verify policy intent and surface ambiguities inherent in natural-language specifications. We realize the framework in FORGE, which enforces policies over agentic deployments without modification to the underlying agents. We evaluate FORGE on three case studies: information flow policies for prompt injection defense, approval workflows in a multi-agent pharmacovigilance system, and organizational policies for customer service.

cs.CR

Systems Security Foundations for Agentic Computing

In recent years, agentic artificial intelligence (AI) systems are becoming increasingly widespread. These systems allow agents to use various tools, such as web browsers, compilers, and more. However, despite their popularity, agentic AI systems also introduce a myriad of security concerns, due to their constant interaction with third-party servers. For example, a malicious adversary can cause data exfiltration by executing prompt injection attacks, as well as other unwarranted behavior. These security concerns have recently motivated researchers to improve the safety and reliability of agentic systems. However, most of the literature on this topic is from the AI standpoint and lacks the system-security perspective and guarantees. In this work, we begin bridging this gap and present an analysis through the lens of classic cybersecurity research. Specifically, motivated by decades of progress in this domain, we identify short- and long-term research problems in agentic AI safety by examining end-to-end security properties of entire systems, rather than standalone AI models running in isolation. Our key goal is to examine where research challenges arise when applying traditional security principles in the context of AI agents and, as a secondary goal, distill these ideas for AI practitioners. Furthermore, we extensively cover 11 case studies of real-world attacks on agentic systems, as well as define a series of new research problems that are specific to this important domain.

cs.CR

How Not to Detect Prompt Injections with an LLM

LLM-integrated applications and agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where adversaries embed malicious instructions within seemingly benign input data to manipulate the LLM's intended behavior. Recent defenses based on known-answer detection (KAD) scheme have reported near-perfect performance by observing an LLM's output to classify input data as clean or contaminated. KAD attempts to repurpose the very susceptibility to prompt injection as a defensive mechanism. We formally characterize the KAD scheme and uncover a structural vulnerability that invalidates its core security premise. To exploit this fundamental vulnerability, we methodically design an adaptive attack, DataFlip. It consistently evades KAD defenses, achieving detection rates as low as $0\%$ while reliably inducing malicious behavior with a success rate of $91\%$, all without requiring white-box access to the LLM or any optimization procedures.

cs.CR

Quality control of PEN wavelength shifters for DarkSide-20k veto

Efficient Wavelength Shifters (WLS) are crucial for Liquid Argon (LAr) dark matter detectors. As they grow larger in volume, the scalability of WLS becomes an important concern. Tetraphenyl butadiene (TPB), the most common WLS in use, requires to be deposited with vacuum evaporation, impractical for detectors with very large surface area due to its high cost and energy requirements. The neutron veto of the DarkSide-20k detector will utilize nearly 200 m^2 of polyethylene naphthalate (PEN) wavelength shifter, available in the form of large format polymeric foils. In order to assess the quality of PEN sheets in the DarkSide-20k production batch, multiple samples will be tested at cryogenic temperatures. For this purpose, a new Argon Gas Setup (ArGSet) has been recently commissioned. In this setup, we exploit the Argon scintillation light (128 nm) as excitation for measuring the wavelength shifting efficiency of the samples. In this work, we will present the results of the first measurements performed at cryogenic temperature with this setup.

physics.ins-det

Attacking Byzantine Robust Aggregation in High Dimensions

Training modern neural networks or models typically requires averaging over a sample of high-dimensional vectors. Poisoning attacks can skew or bias the average vectors used to train the model, forcing the model to learn specific patterns or avoid learning anything useful. Byzantine robust aggregation is a principled algorithmic defense against such biasing. Robust aggregators can bound the maximum bias in computing centrality statistics, such as mean, even when some fraction of inputs are arbitrarily corrupted. Designing such aggregators is challenging when dealing with high dimensions. However, the first polynomial-time algorithms with strong theoretical bounds on the bias have recently been proposed. Their bounds are independent of the number of dimensions, promising a conceptual limit on the power of poisoning attacks in their ongoing arms race against defenses. In this paper, we show a new attack called HIDRA on practical realization of strong defenses which subverts their claim of dimension-independent bias. HIDRA highlights a novel computational bottleneck that has not been a concern of prior information-theoretic analysis. Our experimental evaluation shows that our attacks almost completely destroy the model performance, whereas existing attacks with the same goal fail to have much effect. Our findings leave the arms race between poisoning attacks and provable defenses wide open.

cs.CR

Scalable Neural Network Training over Distributed Graphs

Graph neural networks (GNNs) fuel diverse machine learning tasks involving graph-structured data, ranging from predicting protein structures to serving personalized recommendations. Real-world graph data must often be stored distributed across many machines not just because of capacity constraints, but because of compliance with data residency or privacy laws. In such setups, network communication is costly and becomes the main bottleneck to train GNNs. Optimizations for distributed GNN training have targeted data-level improvements so far -- via caching, network-aware partitioning, and sub-sampling -- that work for data center-like setups where graph data is accessible to a single entity and data transfer costs are ignored. We present RETEXO, the first framework which eliminates the severe communication bottleneck in distributed GNN training while respecting any given data partitioning configuration. The key is a new training procedure, lazy message passing, that reorders the sequence of training GNN elements. RETEXO achieves 1-2 orders of magnitude reduction in network data costs compared to standard GNN training, while retaining accuracy. RETEXO scales gracefully with increasing decentralization and decreasing bandwidth. It is the first framework that can be used to train GNNs at all network decentralization levels -- including centralized data-center networks, wide area networks, proximity networks, and edge networks.

cs.LG

The optical simulation model of the DarkSide-20k Veto detector

DarkSide-20k is a rare-event search experiment aimed at finding signals of dark matter particles. It is a dual-phase detector that registers ionisation and scintillation signals originating from the particles interacting with the liquid argon detector medium. It is enclosed in a single-phase liquid argon neutron veto tank, equipped with Gd-loaded panels for capturing neutrons. Since vetoing and particle identification are carried out using the light signal, it is crucial to maximise the light yield. Light collection efficiency depends on optical properties of the detector and particularly for the veto detector, which has a photosensor coverage of the order of a per cent, the reflectivity of the walls has a big impact. To quantify the amount of collected light, a comprehensive Geant4 simulation is performed, which uses optical characterisation data. In this work, a detailed description of the optics model for the veto of the experiment will be discussed.

physics.ins-det