arXiv subjects

Saskia Laura Schröer

Publications and source records attributed to Saskia Laura Schröer.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Exploiting AI for Attacks: On the Interplay between Adversarial AI and Offensive AI

As Artificial Intelligence (AI) continues to evolve, it has transitioned from a research-focused discipline to a widely adopted technology, enabling intelligent solutions across various sectors. In security, AI's role in strengthening organizational resilience has been studied for over two decades. While much attention has focused on AI's constructive applications, the increasing maturity and integration of AI have also exposed its darker potentials. This article explores two emerging AI-related threats and the interplay between them: AI as a target of attacks (`Adversarial AI') and AI as a means to launch attacks on any target (`Offensive AI') -- potentially even on another AI. By cutting through the confusion and explaining these threats in plain terms, we introduce the complex and often misunderstood interplay between Adversarial AI and Offensive AI, offering a clear and accessible introduction to the challenges posed by these threats.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Elephant in the Room: Dissecting and Reflecting on the Evolution of Online Social Network Research

Billions of individuals engage with Online Social Networks (OSN) daily. The owners of OSN try to meet the demands of their end-users while complying with business necessities. Such necessities may, however, lead to the adoption of restrictive data access policies that hinder research activities from "external" scientists -- who may, in turn, resort to other means (e.g., rely on static datasets) for their studies. Given the abundance of literature on OSN, we -- as academics -- should take a step back and reflect on what we have done so far, after having written thousands of papers on OSN. This is the first paper that provides a holistic outlook to the entire body of research that focused on OSN -- since the seminal work by Acquisti and Gross (2006). First, we search through over 1 million peer-reviewed publications, and derive 13,842 papers that focus on OSN: we organize the metadata of these works in the Minerva-OSN dataset, the first of its kind -- which we publicly release. Next, by analyzing Minerva-OSN, we provide factual evidence elucidating trends and aspects that deserve to be brought to light, such as the predominant focus on Twitter or the difficulty in obtaining OSN data. Finally, as a constructive step to guide future research, we carry out an expert survey (n=50) with established scientists in this field, and coalesce suggestions to improve the status quo such as an increased involvement of OSN owners. Our findings should inspire a reflection to "rescue" research on OSN. Doing so would improve the overall OSN ecosystem, benefiting both their owners and end-users and, hence, our society.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2025

The Dark Side of the Web: Towards Understanding Various Data Sources in Cyber Threat Intelligence

Cyber threats have become increasingly prevalent and sophisticated. Prior work has extracted actionable cyber threat intelligence (CTI), such as indicators of compromise, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), or threat feeds from various sources: open source data (e.g., social networks), internal intelligence (e.g., log data), and ``first-hand'' communications from cybercriminals (e.g., underground forums, chats, darknet websites). However, "first-hand" data sources remain underutilized because it is difficult to access or scrape their data. In this work, we analyze (i) 6.6 million posts, (ii) 3.4 million messages, and (iii) 120,000 darknet websites. We combine NLP tools to address several challenges in analyzing such data. First, even on dedicated platforms, only some content is CTI-relevant, requiring effective filtering. Second, "first-hand" data can be CTI-relevant from a technical or strategic viewpoint. We demonstrate how to organize content along this distinction. Third, we describe the topics discussed and how "first-hand" data sources differ from each other. According to our filtering, 20% of our sample is CTI-relevant. Most of the CTI-relevant data focuses on strategic rather than technical discussions. Credit card-related crime is the most prevalent topic on darknet websites. On underground forums and chat channels, account and subscription selling is discussed most. Topic diversity is higher on underground forums and chat channels than on darknet websites. Our analyses suggest that different platforms may be used for activities with varying complexity and risks for criminals.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

SoK: On the Offensive Potential of AI

Our society increasingly benefits from Artificial Intelligence (AI). Unfortunately, more and more evidence shows that AI is also used for offensive purposes. Prior works have revealed various examples of use cases in which the deployment of AI can lead to violation of security and privacy objectives. No extant work, however, has been able to draw a holistic picture of the offensive potential of AI. In this SoK paper we seek to lay the ground for a systematic analysis of the heterogeneous capabilities of offensive AI. In particular we (i) account for AI risks to both humans and systems while (ii) consolidating and distilling knowledge from academic literature, expert opinions, industrial venues, as well as laypeople -- all of which being valuable sources of information on offensive AI. To enable alignment of such diverse sources of knowledge, we devise a common set of criteria reflecting essential technological factors related to offensive AI. With the help of such criteria, we systematically analyze: 95 research papers; 38 InfoSec briefings (from, e.g., BlackHat); the responses of a user study (N=549) entailing individuals with diverse backgrounds and expertise; and the opinion of 12 experts. Our contributions not only reveal concerning ways (some of which overlooked by prior work) in which AI can be offensively used today, but also represent a foothold to address this threat in the years to come.

cs.CR↗