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Semil Eminovic

Publications and source records attributed to Semil Eminovic.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Weight-Space Programming for Medical Imaging: Do We Still Need Training Data?

Can a large language model (LLM) write the parameters of a medical image classifier from medical knowledge alone, without any training data? Such classifiers normally require labelled images, which are costly and often unavailable. We investigate this question through weight-space programming (WSP), in which an LLM writes or adapts the weights and biases of a neural network directly, without optimisation on training data. Claude Opus 5.5 and GPT-6 Astra each generate the parameters of a small LeNet-style CNN in a single reply, without tool use and without access to any image. We compare these networks against zero-shot MedSigLIP and against the same architecture trained on labels using the Adam optimiser, across 7 classification tasks in four modalities: chest X-ray, breast ultrasound and abdominal CT (all from MedMNIST), and pelvic MRI (SynthUterus). The LLM-written networks perform above chance on all six MedMNIST tasks, with a mean test AUC of 0.719 for Opus and 0.711 for Astra. Both models outperform MedSigLIP on 5 of 6 tasks while using more than 10,000 times fewer parameters. However, the same network trained with Adam on only 256 labelled images achieves a higher AUC on every MedMNIST task (mean AUC 0.828). On SynthUterus, Opus attains an AUC of 0.764, whereas Astra falls below chance (AUC 0.136) owing to a systematic error. These results show that LLMs can write functional medical classifiers, but that they do not yet replace training data. We release the protocol, logs and all generated weights at https://github.com/MaximilianLindholz/weight-space-programming-medical.

cs.CV↗

Safeguarding Agentic AI in Radiology Workflows: A Multimodel Evaluation of Rule-based and Large Language Model-based Verification

Purpose: To estimate how often tool-using large language model (LLM) agents record clinically relevant false or unsupported information in simulated radiology documentation and how much safeguards applied before each action reduce these errors. Materials and Methods: In this simulation study (October 2026), 48 synthetic, radiologist-reviewed base scenarios covered finding communication, tumor board preparation and follow-up management. Forty-three also had a misleading-information variant (91 variants). Six LLM agents (Claude Sonnet 5.5, GPT-6.1-Sol, GLM-5.3, MiniMax M3, Gemma-4-31B, Qwen3.8-27B) completed each variant with permissions only, deterministic rules, and rules plus a locally run LLM checker (1638 episodes). The primary outcome was at least one executed high-severity violation per episode. Risk differences were estimated per agent at base-scenario level and, exploratorily, pooled across agents, with analyses of document access and blocks. Results: With permissions only, 7.3%-27.1% of episodes had a high-severity violation (pooled across agents, 19.4%). Pooled, it was 16.7% with rules (-2.8 percentage points; 95% CI: -6.1, 0.5) and 13.2% with rules plus the LLM checker (-6.2; 95% CI: -9.5, -3.0). Adding the LLM checker to rules changed it by -3.5 (95% CI: -6.3, -0.7). No difference between agents was detected (P = .43), and task success did not decrease detectably. In misleading variants, agents opened the altered document in 83% of episodes regardless of error, and 58% of erroneous statements cited it. Most blocked actions (64%-68%) would not have caused a violation and were returned for revision. Conclusion: Layered safeguards reduced but did not prevent high-severity errors. Errors after misleading information reflected misjudged rather than missed information.

cs.AI↗