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Senran Lin

Publications and source records attributed to Senran Lin.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

First-Principles Simulation of Electron-Ion Collisional Transport in Magnetized and Unmagnetized Plasmas

Accurate electron-ion collision models are central to predicting transport in fusion and space plasmas, yet most practical formulations rely on binary-collision assumptions and impact-parameter cutoffs whose quantitative accuracy is difficult to assess directly. We develop a first-principles simulation framework for collisional transport by solving the Newton-Lorentz equations for test electrons in the many-body electric field of a Debye-screened ion background, without imposing binary-collision closures or artificial lower cutoffs. The method combines explicit force summation within a Debye sphere, a volume-preserving particle pusher, and adaptive time stepping, enabling stable and scalable simulations in both unmagnetized and magnetized plasmas. Using simulation-based measures of momentum relaxation and cross-field diffusion, we recover the classical scalings for the electron-ion collision frequency and perpendicular diffusion coefficient, namely $\nu_{ei} \propto v_{th}^{-3}$ and $D_\perp \propto B^{-2}$. Within the parameter range studied, both simulated coefficients are lower than their corresponding classical estimates by approximately 15-25%. These regime-specific benchmark results indicate that classical transport theory captures the leading scaling behavior, but that the corresponding quantitative prefactors can remain sensitive to many-body and near-field effects in the simulated regime. The framework therefore provides a computational benchmark for testing and improving reduced collision operators and transport models.

physics.plasm-ph

Norm-Relevant Messages under Uncertainty

Social-information messages are widely used to influence norm perceptions and norm-relevant behavior, but their effects may depend on what they report and how they are disclosed. This paper develops a belief-based framework connecting personal values, perceived social norms, and empirical expectations through inference about a latent appropriateness standard. The framework identifies two mechanisms: reported statistics encode previous participants' private information differently, and public disclosure changes what recipients believe others know and infer. These mechanisms imply stronger effects for perceived-norm than personal-value messages, and for public than private disclosure.

econ.TH

General Training and Worker Motivation: Experimental Evidence on Discretionary Effort

This study investigates the reaction of workers to employer-sponsored general training that provides skills useful not only in the incumbent employer but also in other firms in the industry. While previous research has focused primarily on workers' responses to wage renegotiation, our work extends this understanding by exploring an additional dimension -- workers' discretionary effort beyond their job duties, which is not verifiable. We conduct a laboratory experiment to observe workers' responses in such an effort to different training intensities. We find that workers generally increase their discretionary effort in response to general training, regardless of whether it is employer-sponsored or mandated. Moreover, the employer's intention behind offering training influences both effort and workers' renegotiation responses. Additionally, when workers can penalize employers, they do so, although higher employer-determined training intensities mitigate this behavior.

econ.GN

Buy It Now or Later, or Not: Loss Aversion in Advance Purchasing

This paper studies the advance-purchase game when a consumer has belief-based loss-averse preferences, introducing a novel perspective by incorporating reference updating. It demonstrates that loss aversion increases the consumer's willingness to pre-purchase. Moreover, the paper endogenizes the seller's price-commitment behavior in the advance-purchase problem. The analysis reveals that the seller will commit to his spot price even with no obligation to do so, a behavior previously assumed in the literature.

econ.TH