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Seonhye Park

Publications and source records attributed to Seonhye Park.

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Supporting Students in Navigating LLM-Generated Insecure Code

The advent of Artificial Intelligence (AI), particularly large language models (LLMs), has revolutionized software development by enabling developers to specify tasks in natural language and receive corresponding code, boosting productivity. However, this shift also introduces security risks, as LLMs may generate insecure code that can be exploited by adversaries. Conventional educational approaches emphasize efficiency while overlooking these risks, leaving students unprepared to identify and mitigate security issues in AI-assisted workflows. To surface this gap, we present \texttt{Bifröst}, a classroom measurement and feedback framework that pairs an adversarially configured code-generation model with a VS Code extension and automated vulnerability reports that instructors can use to guide follow-up discussions. Through classroom deployments with undergraduate students ($n=61$), we observe that students frequently accepted insecure LLM-generated code despite prior security coursework and stated skepticism. A post-feedback survey ($n=21$) provides preliminary evidence that students' stated trust shifted toward greater skepticism after receiving Bifröst feedback, and that some students articulated more security-specific concerns about AI-generated code.

cs.CR

UniHENN: Designing Faster and More Versatile Homomorphic Encryption-based CNNs without im2col

Homomorphic encryption (HE) enables privacy-preserving deep learning by allowing computations on encrypted data without decryption. However, deploying convolutional neural networks (CNNs) with HE is challenging due to the need to convert input data into a two-dimensional matrix for convolution using the im2col technique, which rearranges the input for efficient computation. This restricts the types of CNN models that can be used since the encrypted data structure must be compatible with the specific model. UniHENN is a novel HE-based CNN architecture that eliminates the need for im2col, enhancing its versatility and compatibility with a broader range of CNN models. UniHENN flattens input data to one dimension without using im2col. The kernel performs convolutions by traversing the image, using incremental rotations and structured multiplication on the flattened input, with results spaced by the stride interval. Experimental results show that UniHENN significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art 2D CNN inference architecture named PyCrCNN in terms of inference time. For example, on the LeNet-1 model, UniHENN achieves an average inference time of 30.089 seconds, about 26.6 times faster than PyCrCNN's 800.591 seconds. Furthermore, UniHENN outperforms TenSEAL, an im2col-optimized CNN model, in concurrent image processing. For ten samples, UniHENN (16.247 seconds) was about 3.9 times faster than TenSEAL (63.706 seconds), owing to its support for batch processing of up to 10 samples. We demonstrate UniHENN's adaptability to various CNN architectures, including a 1D CNN and six 2D CNNs, highlighting its flexibility and efficiency for privacy-preserving cloud-based CNN services.

cs.CR

DeepTaster: Adversarial Perturbation-Based Fingerprinting to Identify Proprietary Dataset Use in Deep Neural Networks

Training deep neural networks (DNNs) requires large datasets and powerful computing resources, which has led some owners to restrict redistribution without permission. Watermarking techniques that embed confidential data into DNNs have been used to protect ownership, but these can degrade model performance and are vulnerable to watermark removal attacks. Recently, DeepJudge was introduced as an alternative approach to measuring the similarity between a suspect and a victim model. While DeepJudge shows promise in addressing the shortcomings of watermarking, it primarily addresses situations where the suspect model copies the victim's architecture. In this study, we introduce DeepTaster, a novel DNN fingerprinting technique, to address scenarios where a victim's data is unlawfully used to build a suspect model. DeepTaster can effectively identify such DNN model theft attacks, even when the suspect model's architecture deviates from the victim's. To accomplish this, DeepTaster generates adversarial images with perturbations, transforms them into the Fourier frequency domain, and uses these transformed images to identify the dataset used in a suspect model. The underlying premise is that adversarial images can capture the unique characteristics of DNNs built with a specific dataset. To demonstrate the effectiveness of DeepTaster, we evaluated the effectiveness of DeepTaster by assessing its detection accuracy on three datasets (CIFAR10, MNIST, and Tiny-ImageNet) across three model architectures (ResNet18, VGG16, and DenseNet161). We conducted experiments under various attack scenarios, including transfer learning, pruning, fine-tuning, and data augmentation. Specifically, in the Multi-Architecture Attack scenario, DeepTaster was able to identify all the stolen cases across all datasets, while DeepJudge failed to detect any of the cases.

cs.CR

Poisoned ChatGPT Finds Work for Idle Hands: Exploring Developers' Coding Practices with Insecure Suggestions from Poisoned AI Models

AI-powered coding assistant tools have revolutionized the software engineering ecosystem. However, prior work has demonstrated that these tools are vulnerable to poisoning attacks. In a poisoning attack, an attacker intentionally injects maliciously crafted insecure code snippets into training datasets to manipulate these tools. The poisoned tools can suggest insecure code to developers, resulting in vulnerabilities in their products that attackers can exploit. However, it is still little understood whether such poisoning attacks against the tools would be practical in real-world settings and how developers address the poisoning attacks during software development. To understand the real-world impact of poisoning attacks on developers who rely on AI-powered coding assistants, we conducted two user studies: an online survey and an in-lab study. The online survey involved 238 participants, including software developers and computer science students. The survey results revealed widespread adoption of these tools among participants, primarily to enhance coding speed, eliminate repetition, and gain boilerplate code. However, the survey also found that developers may misplace trust in these tools because they overlooked the risk of poisoning attacks. The in-lab study was conducted with 30 professional developers. The developers were asked to complete three programming tasks with a representative type of AI-powered coding assistant tool, running on Visual Studio Code. The in-lab study results showed that developers using a poisoned ChatGPT-like tool were more prone to including insecure code than those using an IntelliCode-like tool or no tool. This demonstrates the strong influence of these tools on the security of generated code. Our study results highlight the need for education and improved coding practices to address new security issues introduced by AI-powered coding assistant tools.

cs.CR