arXiv subjects

Serge Gaspers

Publications and source records attributed to Serge Gaspers.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2016

Faster Graph Coloring in Polynomial Space

We present a polynomial-space algorithm that computes the number independent sets of any input graph in time $O(1.1387^n)$ for graphs with maximum degree 3 and in time $O(1.2355^n)$ for general graphs, where n is the number of vertices. Together with the inclusion-exclusion approach of Björklund, Husfeldt, and Koivisto [SIAM J. Comput. 2009], this leads to a faster polynomial-space algorithm for the graph coloring problem with running time $O(2.2355^n)$. As a byproduct, we also obtain an exponential-space $O(1.2330^n)$ time algorithm for counting independent sets. Our main algorithm counts independent sets in graphs with maximum degree 3 and no vertex with three neighbors of degree 3. This polynomial-space algorithm is analyzed using the recently introduced Separate, Measure and Conquer approach [Gaspers & Sorkin, ICALP 2015]. Using Wahlström's compound measure approach, this improvement in running time for small degree graphs is then bootstrapped to larger degrees, giving the improvement for general graphs. Combining both approaches leads to some inflexibility in choosing vertices to branch on for the small-degree cases, which we counter by structural graph properties.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2016

Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences

We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model --- in which for each agent, there is a probability distribution over linear preferences, (2) compact indifference model --- for each agent, a weak preference order is specified and each linear order compatible with the weak order is equally likely and (3) joint probability model --- there is a lottery over preference profiles. For each of the models, we study the computational complexity of computing the stability probability of a given matching as well as finding a matching with the highest probability of being stable. We also examine more restricted problems such as deciding whether a certainly stable matching exists. We find a rich complexity landscape for these problems, indicating that the form uncertainty takes is significant.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2016

Interdependent Scheduling Games

We propose a model of interdependent scheduling games in which each player controls a set of services that they schedule independently. A player is free to schedule his own services at any time; however, each of these services only begins to accrue reward for the player when all predecessor services, which may or may not be controlled by the same player, have been activated. This model, where players have interdependent services, is motivated by the problems faced in planning and coordinating large-scale infrastructures, e.g., restoring electricity and gas to residents after a natural disaster or providing medical care in a crisis when different agencies are responsible for the delivery of staff, equipment, and medicine. We undertake a game-theoretic analysis of this setting and in particular consider the issues of welfare maximization, computing best responses, Nash dynamics, and existence and computation of Nash equilibria.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2016

On Satisfiability Problems with a Linear Structure

It was recently shown \cite{STV} that satisfiability is polynomially solvable when the incidence graph is an interval bipartite graph (an interval graph turned into a bipartite graph by omitting all edges within each partite set). Here we relax this condition in several directions: First, we show that it holds for $k$-interval bigraphs, bipartite graphs which can be converted to interval bipartite graphs by adding to each node of one side at most $k$ edges; the same result holds for the counting and the weighted maximization version of satisfiability. Second, given two linear orders, one for the variables and one for the clauses, we show how to find, in polynomial time, the smallest $k$ such that there is a $k$-interval bigraph compatible with these two orders. On the negative side we prove that, barring complexity collapses, no such extensions are possible for CSPs more general than satisfiability. We also show NP-hardness of recognizing 1-interval bigraphs.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2015

Exact Algorithms via Monotone Local Search

We give a new general approach for designing exact exponential-time algorithms for subset problems. In a subset problem the input implicitly describes a family of sets over a universe of size n and the task is to determine whether the family contains at least one set. Our approach is based on "monotone local search", where the goal is to extend a partial solution to a solution by adding as few elements as possible. More formally, in the extension problem we are also given as input a subset X of the universe and an integer k. The task is to determine whether one can add at most k elements to X to obtain a set in the (implicitly defined) family. Our main result is that an O*(c^k) time algorithm for the extension problem immediately yields a randomized algorithm for finding a solution of any size with running time O*((2-1/c)^n). In many cases, the extension problem can be reduced to simply finding a solution of size at most k. Furthermore, efficient algorithms for finding small solutions have been extensively studied in the field of parameterized algorithms. Directly applying these algorithms, our theorem yields in one stroke significant improvements over the best known exponential-time algorithms for several well-studied problems, including d-Hitting Set, Feedback Vertex Set, Node Unique Label Cover, and Weighted d-SAT. Our results demonstrate an interesting and very concrete connection between parameterized algorithms and exact exponential-time algorithms. We also show how to derandomize our algorithms at the cost of a subexponential multiplicative factor in the running time. Our derandomization is based on an efficient construction of a new pseudo-random object that might be of independent interest. Finally, we extend our methods to establish new combinatorial upper bounds and develop enumeration algorithms.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2015

Faster algorithms to enumerate hypergraph transversals

A transversal of a hypergraph is a set of vertices intersecting each hyperedge. We design and analyze new exponential-time algorithms to enumerate all inclusion-minimal transversals of a hypergraph. For each fixed k>2, our algorithms for hypergraphs of rank k, where the rank is the maximum size of a hyperedge, outperform the previous best. This also implies improved upper bounds on the maximum number of minimal transversals in n-vertex hypergraphs of rank k>2. Our main algorithm is a branching algorithm whose running time is analyzed with Measure and Conquer. It enumerates all minimal transversals of hypergraphs of rank 3 on n vertices in time O(1.6755^n). Our algorithm for hypergraphs of rank 4 is based on iterative compression. Our enumeration algorithms improve upon the best known algorithms for counting minimum transversals in hypergraphs of rank k for k>2 and for computing a minimum transversal in hypergraphs of rank k for k>5.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2015

Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences

We consider the discrete assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair manner. We use the stochastic dominance relation between fractional or randomized allocations to systematically define varying notions of proportionality and envy-freeness for discrete assignments. The computational complexity of checking whether a fair assignment exists is studied for these fairness notions. We also characterize the conditions under which a fair assignment is guaranteed to exist. For a number of fairness concepts, polynomial-time algorithms are presented to check whether a fair assignment exists. Our algorithmic results also extend to the case of unequal entitlements of agents. Our NP-hardness result, which holds for several variants of envy-freeness, answers an open question posed by Bouveret, Endriss, and Lang (ECAI 2010). We also propose fairness concepts that always suggest a non-empty set of assignments with meaningful fairness properties. Among these concepts, optimal proportionality and optimal weak proportionality appear to be desirable fairness concepts.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2015

On the Number of Minimal Separators in Graphs

We consider the largest number of minimal separators a graph on n vertices can have at most. We give a new proof that this number is in $O( ((1+\sqrt{5})/2)^n n )$. We prove that this number is in $ω( 1.4521^n )$, improving on the previous best lower bound of $Ω(3^{n/3}) \subseteq ω( 1.4422^n )$. This gives also an improved lower bound on the number of potential maximal cliques in a graph. We would like to emphasize that our proofs are short, simple, and elementary.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2015

Equilibria Under the Probabilistic Serial Rule

The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is a prominent randomized rule for assigning indivisible goods to agents. Although it is well known for its good fairness and welfare properties, it is not strategyproof. In view of this, we address several fundamental questions regarding equilibria under PS. Firstly, we show that Nash deviations under the PS rule can cycle. Despite the possibilities of cycles, we prove that a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist under the PS rule. We then show that verifying whether a given profile is a pure Nash equilibrium is coNP-complete, and computing a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-hard. For two agents, we present a linear-time algorithm to compute a pure Nash equilibrium which yields the same assignment as the truthful profile. Finally, we conduct experiments to evaluate the quality of the equilibria that exist under the PS rule, finding that the vast majority of pure Nash equilibria yield social welfare that is at least that of the truthful profile.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2015

Online Fair Division: analysing a Food Bank problem

We study an online model of fair division designed to capture features of a real world charity problem. We consider two simple mechanisms for this model in which agents simply declare what items they like. We analyse several axiomatic properties of these mechanisms like strategy-proofness and envy-freeness. Finally, we perform a competitive analysis and compute the price of anarchy.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2015

Manipulating the Probabilistic Serial Rule

The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is one of the most prominent randomized rules for the assignment problem. It is well-known for its superior fairness and welfare properties. However, PS is not immune to manipulative behaviour by the agents. We initiate the study of the computational complexity of an agent manipulating the PS rule. We show that computing an expected utility better response is NP- hard. On the other hand, we present a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a lexicographic best response. For the case of two agents, we show that even an expected utility best response can be computed in polynomial time. Our result for the case of two agents relies on an interesting connection with sequential allocation of discrete objects.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2015

Myhill-Nerode methods for hypergraphs

We give an analog of the Myhill-Nerode methods from formal language theory for hypergraphs and use it to derive the following results for two NP-hard hypergraph problems: * We provide an algorithm for testing whether a hypergraph has cutwidth at most k that runs in linear time for constant k. In terms of parameterized complexity theory, the problem is fixed-parameter linear parameterized by k. * We show that it is not expressible in monadic second-order logic whether a hypergraph has bounded (fractional, generalized) hypertree width. The proof leads us to conjecture that, in terms of parameterized complexity theory, these problems are W[1]-hard parameterized by the incidence treewidth (the treewidth of the incidence graph). Thus, in the form of the Myhill-Nerode theorem for hypergraphs, we obtain a method to derive linear-time algorithms and to obtain indicators for intractability for hypergraph problems parameterized by incidence treewidth. In an appendix, we point out an error and a fix to the proof of the Myhill-Nerode theorem for graphs in Downey and Fellow's book on parameterized complexity.

cs.DM↗

arXiv2014

Computational Aspects of Multi-Winner Approval Voting

We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to elect multiple winners. These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional approval voting, and reweighted approval voting. We first show that computing the winner for proportional approval voting is NP-hard, closing a long standing open problem. As none of the rules are strategyproof, even for dichotomous preferences, we study various strategic aspects of the rules. In particular, we examine the computational complexity of computing a best response for both a single agent and a group of agents. In many settings, we show that it is NP-hard for an agent or agents to compute how best to vote given a fixed set of approval ballots from the other agents.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2014

Guarantees and Limits of Preprocessing in Constraint Satisfaction and Reasoning

We present a first theoretical analysis of the power of polynomial-time preprocessing for important combinatorial problems from various areas in AI. We consider problems from Constraint Satisfaction, Global Constraints, Satisfiability, Nonmonotonic and Bayesian Reasoning under structural restrictions. All these problems involve two tasks: (i) identifying the structure in the input as required by the restriction, and (ii) using the identified structure to solve the reasoning task efficiently. We show that for most of the considered problems, task (i) admits a polynomial-time preprocessing to a problem kernel whose size is polynomial in a structural problem parameter of the input, in contrast to task (ii) which does not admit such a reduction to a problem kernel of polynomial size, subject to a complexity theoretic assumption. As a notable exception we show that the consistency problem for the AtMost-NValue constraint admits a polynomial kernel consisting of a quadratic number of variables and domain values. Our results provide a firm worst-case guarantees and theoretical boundaries for the performance of polynomial-time preprocessing algorithms for the considered problems.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2014

Strategic aspects of the probabilistic serial rule for the allocation of goods

The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is one of the most prominent randomized rules for the assignment problem. It is well-known for its superior fairness and welfare properties. However, PS is not immune to manipulative behaviour by the agents. We examine computational and non-computational aspects of strategising under the PS rule. Firstly, we study the computational complexity of an agent manipulating the PS rule. We present polynomial-time algorithms for optimal manipulation. Secondly, we show that expected utility best responses can cycle. Thirdly, we examine the existence and computation of Nash equilibrium profiles under the PS rule. We show that a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist under the PS rule. For two agents, we identify two different types of preference profiles that are not only in Nash equilibrium but can also be computed in linear time. Finally, we conduct experiments to check the frequency of manipulability of the PS rule under different combinations of the number of agents, objects, and utility functions.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2013

Augmenting graphs to minimize the diameter

We study the problem of augmenting a weighted graph by inserting edges of bounded total cost while minimizing the diameter of the augmented graph. Our main result is an FPT 4-approximation algorithm for the problem.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2013

Coalitional Manipulation for Schulze's Rule

Schulze's rule is used in the elections of a large number of organizations including Wikimedia and Debian. Part of the reason for its popularity is the large number of axiomatic properties, like monotonicity and Condorcet consistency, which it satisfies. We identify a potential shortcoming of Schulze's rule: it is computationally vulnerable to manipulation. In particular, we prove that computing an unweighted coalitional manipulation (UCM) is polynomial for any number of manipulators. This result holds for both the unique winner and the co-winner versions of UCM. This resolves an open question stated by Parkes and Xia (2012). We also prove that computing a weighted coalitional manipulation (WCM) is polynomial for a bounded number of candidates. Finally, we discuss the relation between the unique winner UCM problem and the co-winner UCM problem and argue that they have substantially different necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a successful manipulation.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2013

Possible and Necessary Winner Problem in Social Polls

Social networks are increasingly being used to conduct polls. We introduce a simple model of such social polling. We suppose agents vote sequentially, but the order in which agents choose to vote is not necessarily fixed. We also suppose that an agent's vote is influenced by the votes of their friends who have already voted. Despite its simplicity, this model provides useful insights into a number of areas including social polling, sequential voting, and manipulation. We prove that the number of candidates and the network structure affect the computational complexity of computing which candidate necessarily or possibly can win in such a social poll. For social networks with bounded treewidth and a bounded number of candidates, we provide polynomial algorithms for both problems. In other cases, we prove that computing which candidates necessarily or possibly win are computationally intractable.

cs.GT↗