arXiv subjects

Sergei Skorobogatov

Publications and source records attributed to Sergei Skorobogatov.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

World-First SEM-based Recovery of Crash EDR Data from the EEPROM of a Severely Damaged SRS Module Using CrashScan

This paper introduces fully working and affordable approach to data recovery from automotive SRS (airbag control) module after permanent failure of its data storage memory chip. All essential information was successfully extracted with 100% success rate from a real SRS module after severe accident which resulted in both its Processor and Flash EEPROM chip electrically damaged with visible holes in their packages. Further investigation revealed that the damage was likely caused by overvoltage and subsequent high-current-flow through silicon die of chips. This not only caused some internal metal wires to melt and evaporate but also caused partial evaporation of silicon substrate and the created cavity was filled with melted gold from a bonding wire. This reveals the nature of the failure with local temperatures exceeding 3000°C. Despite to the fact that the on-chip EEPROM array was only a few hundred micrometers away from the damaged area, it did not lose any single bit of information. This proved the approach to be resilient for successful data recovery from severely damaged devices in the future. With the donor unit containing the recovered data, standard bench-top EDR extraction was performed using Collision Sciences CrashScan, yielding a full EDR report. The forensic significance of the recovered data, the technical novelty of the methodology, and the complete accident reconstruction are presented and discussed. Until now, if because of an accident the memory chip was damaged, there was no feasible or affordable solution for full data extraction or recovery. With the use of innovative and proprietary sample preparation and imaging techniques, it became possible to extract and verify all the data stored inside chips after permanent mechanical, electrical or fire damage. This could help not only automotive but also medical, aviation and aerospace industries.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

Teardown and feasibility study of IronKey -- the most secure USB Flash drive

There are many solutions for protecting user data on USB Flash drives. However, the family of IronKey devices was designed with the highest security expectations. They are definitely standing above others by being certified to FIPS 140-2 Level 3 and also claimed as certified by NATO for Top-Secret use. Many encrypted USB drives had been evaluated and found insecure, however, no public research on IronKey devices was made. This feasibility study fills the gap by looking inside the IronKey family of devices. As a result the users of the IronKey devices could be assured about the real level of the security protection they get. Several generations of devices from IronKey family and competitors are teared down, their hardware solutions discussed and evaluated for possible attacks. Some potential flaws are exposed and those findings are likely to stimulate further research into specific solutions aimed to protect user data.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2019

Hardware Security Evaluation of MAX 10 FPGA

With the ubiquity of IoT devices there is a growing demand for confidentiality and integrity of data. Solutions based on reconfigurable logic (CPLD or FPGA) have certain advantages over ASIC and MCU/SoC alternatives. Programmable logic devices are ideal for both confidentiality and upgradability purposes. In this context the hardware security aspects of CPLD/FPGA devices are paramount. This paper shows preliminary evaluation of hardware security in Intel MAX 10 devices. These FPGAs are one of the most suitable candidates for applications demanding extensive features and high level of security. Their strong and week security aspects are revealed and some recommendations are suggested to counter possible security vulnerabilities in real designs. This is a feasibility study paper. Its purpose is to highlight the most vulnerable areas to attacks aimed at data extraction and reverse engineering. That way further investigations could be performed on specific areas of concern.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2017

Deep dip teardown of tubeless insulin pump

This paper introduces a deep level teardown process of a personal medical device - the OmniPod wireless tubeless insulin pump. This starts with mechanical teardown exposing the engineering solutions used inside the device. Then the electronic part of the device is analysed followed by components identification. Finally, the firmware extraction is performed allowing further analysis of the firmware inside the device as well as real-time debugging. This paper also evaluates the security of the main controller IC of the device. It reveals some weaknesses in the device design process which lead to the possibility of the successful teardown. Should the hardware security of the controller inside the device was well thought through, the teardown process would be far more complicated. This paper demonstrates what the typical teardown process of a personal medical device involves. This knowledge could help in improving the hardware security of sensitive devices.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2016

The bumpy road towards iPhone 5c NAND mirroring

This paper is a short summary of a real world mirroring attack on the Apple iPhone 5c passcode retry counter under iOS 9. This was achieved by desoldering the NAND Flash chip of a sample phone in order to physically access its connection to the SoC and partially reverse engineering its proprietary bus protocol. The process does not require any expensive and sophisticated equipment. All needed parts are low cost and were obtained from local electronics distributors. By using the described and successful hardware mirroring process it was possible to bypass the limit on passcode retry attempts. This is the first public demonstration of the working prototype and the real hardware mirroring process for iPhone 5c. Although the process can be improved, it is still a successful proof-of-concept project. Knowledge of the possibility of mirroring will definitely help in designing systems with better protection. Also some reliability issues related to the NAND memory allocation in iPhone 5c are revealed. Some future research directions are outlined in this paper and several possible countermeasures are suggested. We show that claims that iPhone 5c NAND mirroring was infeasible were ill-advised.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2012

Chip and Skim: cloning EMV cards with the pre-play attack

EMV, also known as "Chip and PIN", is the leading system for card payments worldwide. It is used throughout Europe and much of Asia, and is starting to be introduced in North America too. Payment cards contain a chip so they can execute an authentication protocol. This protocol requires point-of-sale (POS) terminals or ATMs to generate a nonce, called the unpredictable number, for each transaction to ensure it is fresh. We have discovered that some EMV implementers have merely used counters, timestamps or home-grown algorithms to supply this number. This exposes them to a "pre-play" attack which is indistinguishable from card cloning from the standpoint of the logs available to the card-issuing bank, and can be carried out even if it is impossible to clone a card physically (in the sense of extracting the key material and loading it into another card). Card cloning is the very type of fraud that EMV was supposed to prevent. We describe how we detected the vulnerability, a survey methodology we developed to chart the scope of the weakness, evidence from ATM and terminal experiments in the field, and our implementation of proof-of-concept attacks. We found flaws in widely-used ATMs from the largest manufacturers. We can now explain at least some of the increasing number of frauds in which victims are refused refunds by banks which claim that EMV cards cannot be cloned and that a customer involved in a dispute must therefore be mistaken or complicit. Pre-play attacks may also be carried out by malware in an ATM or POS terminal, or by a man-in-the-middle between the terminal and the acquirer. We explore the design and implementation mistakes that enabled the flaw to evade detection until now: shortcomings of the EMV specification, of the EMV kernel certification process, of implementation testing, formal analysis, or monitoring customer complaints. Finally we discuss countermeasures.

cs.CY↗