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Sergiu Hart

Publications and source records attributed to Sergiu Hart.

18 recordsLinked to original sources

Proper Calibeating

The classic concept of "calibrated forecasts" and its more recent refinement, "calibeating," are defined with respect to the standard quadratic scoring rule. We extend these notions to the class of $\textit{proper}$ scoring rules (for which the best forecast is the true distribution) and define $\textit{proper-calibration}$ and $\textit{proper-calibeating}$ by requiring the errors to converge to zero uniformly over all bounded proper scoring rules. We first establish that calibration always implies proper-calibration, whereas calibeating need not imply proper-calibeating. Second, we show how to guarantee proper-calibeating and proper-multicalibeating. Finally, we demonstrate the equivalence between proper-calibration and universal no regret when best replying to forecasts in decision-making under uncertainty.

econ.TH

The Root of Revenue Continuity

In the setup of selling one or more goods, various papers have shown, in various forms and for various purposes, that a small change in the distribution of a buyer's valuations may cause only a small change in the possible revenue that can be extracted. We prove a simple, clean, convenient, and general statement to this effect: let $X$ and $Y$ be random valuations on $k$ additive goods, and let $W(X,Y)$ be the Wasserstein (or "earth mover's") distance between them; then $$\left\vert \sqrt{Rev(X)}-\sqrt{Rev(Y)}\right\vert \le \sqrt{W(X,Y)}.$$ This further implies that a simple explicit modification of any optimal mechanism for $X$, namely, "uniform discounting," is guaranteed to be almost optimal for any $Y$ that is close to $X$ in the Wasserstein distance.

cs.GT

Stable Menus of Public Goods: A Matching Problem

We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each provided good must justify its cost by being utilized by sufficiently many agents, leading to strong complementarities in the "preferences" of goods. Furthermore, goods that are in high demand given other already-provided goods must also be provided. The question of the existence of a stable solution (a menu of public goods to be provided) exhibits a rich combinatorial structure. We uncover sufficient conditions and necessary conditions for guaranteeing the existence of a stable solution, and derive both positive and negative results for strategyproof stable matching.

cs.GT

Repeat Voting: Two-Vote May Lead More People To Vote

A "repeat voting" procedure is proposed, whereby voting is carried out in two identical rounds. Every voter can vote in each round, the results of the first round are made public before the second round, and the final result is determined by adding up all the votes in both rounds. It is argued that this simple modification of election procedures may well increase voter participation and result in more accurate and representative outcomes.

econ.TH

Monotonic Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods

Maximizing the revenue from selling two or more goods has been shown to require the use of $nonmonotonic$ mechanisms, where a higher-valuation buyer may pay less than a lower-valuation one. Here we show that the restriction to $monotonic$ mechanisms may not just lower the revenue, but may in fact yield only a $negligible$ $fraction$ of the maximal revenue; more precisely, the revenue from monotonic mechanisms is no more than k times the simple revenue obtainable by selling the goods separately, or bundled (where k is the number of goods), whereas the maximal revenue may be arbitrarily larger. We then study the class of monotonic mechanisms and its subclass of allocation-monotonic mechanisms, and obtain useful characterizations and revenue bounds.

cs.GT

Smooth Calibration, Leaky Forecasts, Finite Recall, and Nash Dynamics

We propose to smooth out the calibration score, which measures how good a forecaster is, by combining nearby forecasts. While regular calibration can be guaranteed only by randomized forecasting procedures, we show that smooth calibration can be guaranteed by deterministic procedures. As a consequence, it does not matter if the forecasts are leaked, i.e., made known in advance: smooth calibration can nevertheless be guaranteed (while regular calibration cannot). Moreover, our procedure has finite recall, is stationary, and all forecasts lie on a finite grid. To construct the procedure, we deal also with the related setups of online linear regression and weak calibration. Finally, we show that smooth calibration yields uncoupled finite-memory dynamics in n-person games "smooth calibrated learning" in which the players play approximate Nash equilibria in almost all periods (by contrast, calibrated learning, which uses regular calibration, yields only that the time-averages of play are approximate correlated equilibria).

econ.TH

Forecast Hedging and Calibration

Calibration means that forecasts and average realized frequencies are close. We develop the concept of forecast hedging, which consists of choosing the forecasts so as to guarantee that the expected track record can only improve. This yields all the calibration results by the same simple basic argument while differentiating between them by the forecast-hedging tools used: deterministic and fixed point based versus stochastic and minimax based. Additional contributions are an improved definition of continuous calibration, ensuing game dynamics that yield Nash equilibria in the long run, and a new calibrated forecasting procedure for binary events that is simpler than all known such procedures.

econ.TH

Posterior Probabilities: Dominance and Optimism

The Bayesian posterior probability of the true state is stochastically dominated by that same posterior under the probability law of the true state. This generalizes to notions of "optimism" about posterior probabilities.

econ.TH

Posterior Probabilities: Nonmonotonicity, Asymptotic Rates, Log-Concavity, and Tur\'an's Inequality

In the standard Bayesian framework data are assumed to be generated by a distribution parametrized by $\theta$ in a parameter space $\Theta$, over which a prior distribution $\pi$ is given. A Bayesian statistician quantifies the belief that the true parameter is $\theta_{0}$ in $\Theta$ by its posterior probability given the observed data. We investigate the behavior of the posterior belief in $\theta_{0}$ when the data are generated under some parameter $\theta_{1},$ which may or may not be the same as $\theta_{0}.$ Starting from stochastic orders, specifically, likelihood ratio dominance, that obtain for resulting distributions of posteriors, we consider monotonicity properties of the posterior probabilities as a function of the sample size when data arrive sequentially. While the $\theta_{0}$-posterior is monotonically increasing (i.e., it is a submartingale) when the data are generated under that same $\theta_{0}$, it need not be monotonically decreasing in general, not even in terms of its overall expectation, when the data are generated under a different $\theta_{1}.$ In fact, it may keep going up and down many times, even in simple cases such as iid coin tosses. We obtain precise asymptotic rates when the data come from the wide class of exponential families of distributions; these rates imply in particular that the expectation of the $\theta_{0}$-posterior under $\theta_{1}\neq\theta_{0}$ is eventually strictly decreasing. Finally, we show that in a number of interesting cases this expectation is a log-concave function of the sample size, and thus unimodal. In the Bernoulli case we obtain this by developing an inequality that is related to Tur\'{a}n's inequality for Legendre polynomials.

math.ST

Calibrated Forecasts: The Minimax Proof

A formal write-up of the simple proof (1995) of the existence of calibrated forecasts by the minimax theorem, which moreover shows that $N^3$ periods suffice to guarantee a calibration error of at most $1/N$.

econ.TH

"Calibeating": Beating Forecasters at Their Own Game

In order to identify expertise, forecasters should not be tested by their calibration score, which can always be made arbitrarily small, but rather by their Brier score. The Brier score is the sum of the calibration score and the refinement score; the latter measures how good the sorting into bins with the same forecast is, and thus attests to "expertise." This raises the question of whether one can gain calibration without losing expertise, which we refer to as "calibeating." We provide an easy way to calibeat any forecast, by a deterministic online procedure. We moreover show that calibeating can be achieved by a stochastic procedure that is itself calibrated, and then extend the results to simultaneously calibeating multiple procedures, and to deterministic procedures that are continuously calibrated.

econ.TH

The Better Half of Selling Separately

Separate selling of two independent goods is shown to yield at least 62% of the optimal revenue, and at least 73% when the goods satisfy the Myerson regularity condition. This improves the 50% result of Hart and Nisan (2017, originally circulated in 2012).

cs.GT

The Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibria

We consider the complexity of finding a correlated equilibrium of an $n$-player game in a model that allows the algorithm to make queries on players' payoffs at pure strategy profiles. Randomized regret-based dynamics are known to yield an approximate correlated equilibrium efficiently, namely, in time that is polynomial in the number of players $n$. Here we show that both randomization and approximation are necessary: no efficient deterministic algorithm can reach even an approximate correlated equilibrium, and no efficient randomized algorithm can reach an exact correlated equilibrium. The results are obtained by bounding from below the number of payoff queries that are needed.

cs.GT

Selling Multiple Correlated Goods: Revenue Maximization and Menu-Size Complexity (old title: "The Menu-Size Complexity of Auctions")

We consider the well known, and notoriously difficult, problem of a single revenue-maximizing seller selling two or more heterogeneous goods to a single buyer whose private values for the goods are drawn from a (possibly correlated) known distribution, and whose valuation is additive over the goods. We show that when there are two (or more) goods, _simple mechanisms_ -- such as selling the goods separately or as a bundle -- _may yield only a negligible fraction of the optimal revenue_. This resolves the open problem of Briest, Chawla, Kleinberg, and Weinberg (JET 2015) who prove the result for at least three goods in the related setup of a unit-demand buyer. We also introduce the menu size as a simple measure of the complexity of mechanisms, and show that the revenue may increase polynomially with _menu size_ and that no bounded menu size can ensure any positive fraction of the optimal revenue. The menu size also turns out to "pin down" the revenue properties of deterministic mechanisms.

cs.GT

Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items

Maximizing the revenue from selling _more than one_ good (or item) to a single buyer is a notoriously difficult problem, in stark contrast to the one-good case. For two goods, we show that simple "one-dimensional" mechanisms, such as selling the goods separately, _guarantee_ at least 73% of the optimal revenue when the valuations of the two goods are independent and identically distributed, and at least $50\%$ when they are independent. For the case of $k>2$ independent goods, we show that selling them separately guarantees at least a $c/\log^2 k$ fraction of the optimal revenue; and, for independent and identically distributed goods, we show that selling them as one bundle guarantees at least a $c/\log k$ fraction of the optimal revenue. Additional results compare the revenues from the two simple mechanisms of selling the goods separately and bundled, identify situations where bundling is optimal, and extend the analysis to multiple buyers.

cs.GT

Evolutionarily stable strategies of random games, and the vertices of random polygons

An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an equilibrium strategy that is immune to invasions by rare alternative (``mutant'') strategies. Unlike Nash equilibria, ESS do not always exist in finite games. In this paper we address the question of what happens when the size of the game increases: does an ESS exist for ``almost every large'' game? Letting the entries in the $n\times n$ game matrix be independently randomly chosen according to a distribution $F$, we study the number of ESS with support of size $2.$ In particular, we show that, as $n\to \infty$, the probability of having such an ESS: (i) converges to 1 for distributions $F$ with ``exponential and faster decreasing tails'' (e.g., uniform, normal, exponential); and (ii) converges to $1-1/\sqrt{e}$ for distributions $F$ with ``slower than exponential decreasing tails'' (e.g., lognormal, Pareto, Cauchy). Our results also imply that the expected number of vertices of the convex hull of $n$ random points in the plane converges to infinity for the distributions in (i), and to 4 for the distributions in (ii).

math.PR