Seung Yun | Searcharxiv

arXiv2026

Comparing Self-Supervised and Domain-Invariant Features for Cross-Domain Voice Phishing Detection

Voice phishing detection faces three critical challenges: real criminal recordings are unavailable due to privacy constraints; when available, only a handful of samples exist, insufficient for fine-tuning; and lightweight acoustic-only detection is needed as an alternative to large self-supervised models. We compare domain-invariant prosodic features and self-supervised representations (HuBERT, wav2vec2.0) through cross-domain evaluation-training on scenario-based actor recordings and testing on authentic criminal calls. Domain-invariant prosodic features achieve 69.5% F1 zero-shot and 71.0% with 5-shot learning. HuBERT achieves highest performance (94.2% F1, 5-shot), while wav2vec2.0 exhibits a precision-oriented detection profile (90.2% F1 with 99.4% precision, 5-shot). These findings reveal fundamental trade-offs: domain-invariant features enable zero-shot deployment when no real data exists, while SSL methods achieve higher performance but require real samples and compute.

cs.SD↗

arXiv2026

Vishing-Tactics-Bench: Forecasting Exploitation Trajectories in Voice Phishing Calls

Voice phishing (vishing) unfolds in real time; by the time a call has ended and post-hoc classification is possible, the harm has already been done. The more actionable question is which concrete harm (Information Gathering or Financial Exploitation) an ongoing call is tactically progressing toward. We present Vishing-Tactics-Bench, a benchmark grounded in Endsley's situation-awareness (SA) framework that recasts vishing defense from after-the-fact fraud classification to harm projection: predicting at each turn whether the call will reach either terminal harm. We adapt MITRE ATT&CK to vishing as a 6-tactic taxonomy (Vishing-Tactics) and label 35,340 scammer utterances across 5,645 synthetic Chinese calls. We define Exploitation Trajectory Forecasting, a survival-style protocol over the two terminal harms with three metrics: AP@k, C-index, and divergence error. Baselines ranging from a Markov heuristic to fine-tuned LLMs show that the tactical trajectory serves as an interpretable representation of the call's tactical state, supporting harm-specific forecasting, which can then be used for the downstream application of intervention selection; a stratified lead-time analysis at a tight false-alarm budget further identifies at what point in a call the trajectory signal yields early warning.

cs.CL↗