arXiv subjects

Shahin Jabbari

Publications and source records attributed to Shahin Jabbari.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

The Role of Causality in Algorithmic Recourse

Algorithmic recourse aims to provide individuals with actionable changes to improve their predicted outcomes in high-stakes classification settings, such as loan and mortgage applications. However, most existing approaches focus only on flipping a model's prediction, without accounting for whether the recommended changes lead to genuine improvement in an individual's true qualifications or merely enable strategic gaming of the classifier. Consequently, deployed recourse policies can induce behavioral responses that degrade predictive accuracy and become ineffective after model retraining. In this work, we formalize this failure mode through a causal performative framework for recourse. We model how recourse actions propagate through a structural causal model, capturing interactions among features as well as their effect on the true label. These causal responses induce a non-convex optimization problem, even under standard convex losses. We characterize conditions under which performatively stable solutions exist and can be efficiently computed via simple iterative dynamics. Our analysis reveals that recourse policies that ignore causal structure can induce large, misaligned behavioral responses, whereas causal recourse leads to stable equilibria that reduce incentives for gaming. Experiments on both semi-synthetic and real credit datasets demonstrate that our approach consistently outperforms standard empirical risk minimization while reducing the need for repeated model retraining to accommodate distribution shifts caused by strategic agent behavior.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Price of Fairness in Short-Term and Long-Term Algorithmic Selections

Algorithmic decision-making in high-stakes settings can have profound impacts on individuals and populations. While much prior work studies fairness in static settings, recent results show that enforcing static fairness constraints may exacerbate long-run disparities. Motivated by this tension, we study a stylized sequential selection problem in which a decision-maker repeatedly selects individuals, affecting both immediate utility and the population distribution over time. We introduce notions of group fairness for both the short and long term and theoretically analyze the trade-off between fairness and utility via the Price of Fairness (PoF). We characterize optimal and fair policies in the short term and show that the PoF can be large even when group distributions are nearly identical. In contrast, we show that long-term disparities can vanish under simple investment policies that achieve a low PoF. We also empirically validate these theoretical observations using both synthetic and real datasets.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Learning-Augmented Robust Algorithmic Recourse

Algorithmic recourse provides individuals who receive undesirable outcomes from machine learning systems with minimum-cost improvements to achieve a desirable outcome. However, machine learning models often get updated, so the recourse may not lead to the desired outcome. The robust recourse framework chooses recourses that are less sensitive to adversarial model changes, but this comes at a higher cost. To address this, we initiate the study of learning-augmented algorithmic recourse and evaluate the extent to which a designer equipped with a prediction of the future model can reduce the cost of recourse when the prediction is accurate (consistency) while also limiting the cost even when the prediction is inaccurate (robustness). We propose a novel algorithm, study the robustness-consistency trade-off, and analyze how prediction accuracy affects performance.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

In Generative AI We (Dis)Trust? Computational Analysis of Trust and Distrust in Reddit Discussions

The rise of generative AI (GenAI) has impacted many aspects of human life. As these systems become embedded in everyday practices, understanding public trust in them is also essential for responsible adoption and governance. Prior work on trust in AI has largely drawn from psychology and human-computer interaction, but there is a lack of computational, large-scale, and longitudinal approaches to measuring trust and distrust in GenAI and large language models (LLMs). This paper presents the first computational study of trust and distrust in GenAI, using a multi-year Reddit dataset (2022--2025) spanning 39 subreddits and 230,576 posts. Crowd-sourced annotations of a representative sample were combined with classification models to scale analysis. We find that trust and distrust are nearly balanced over time, although trust modestly outweighs distrust, with shifts around major model releases. Technical performance and usability dominate as dimensions, while personal experience is the most frequent reason shaping attitudes. Distinct patterns also emerge across trustors (e.g., experts, ethicists, and general users). Our results provide a methodological framework for large-scale trust analysis and insights into evolving public perceptions of GenAI.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Optimal Robust Recourse with $L^p$-Bounded Model Change

Recourse provides individuals who received undesirable labels (e.g., denied a loan) from algorithmic decision-making systems with a minimum-cost improvement suggestion to achieve the desired outcome. However, in practice, models often get updated to reflect changes in the data distribution or environment, invalidating the recourse recommendations (i.e., following the recourse will not lead to the desirable outcome). The robust recourse literature addresses this issue by providing a framework for computing recourses whose validity is resilient to slight changes in the model. However, since the optimization problem of computing robust recourse is non-convex (even for linear models), most of the current approaches do not have any theoretical guarantee on the optimality of the recourse. Recent work by Kayastha et. al. provides the first provably optimal algorithm for robust recourse with respect to generalized linear models when the model changes are measured using the $L^{\infty}$ norm. However, using the $L^{\infty}$ norm can lead to recourse solutions with a high price. To address this shortcoming, we consider more constrained model changes defined by the $L^p$ norm, where $p\geq 1$ but $p\neq \infty$, and provide a new algorithm that provably computes the optimal robust recourse for generalized linear models. Empirically, for both linear and non-linear models, we demonstrate that our algorithm achieves a significantly lower price of recourse (up to several orders of magnitude) compared to prior work and also exhibits a better trade-off between the implementation cost of recourse and its validity. Our empirical analysis also illustrates that our approach provides more sparse recourses compared to prior work and remains resilient to post-processing approaches that guarantee feasibility.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

The Disagreement Problem in Explainable Machine Learning: A Practitioner's Perspective

As various post hoc explanation methods are increasingly being leveraged to explain complex models in high-stakes settings, it becomes critical to develop a deeper understanding of whether and when the explanations output by these methods disagree with each other, and how such disagreements are resolved in practice. However, there is little to no research that provides answers to these critical questions. In this work, we formalize and study the disagreement problem in explainable machine learning. More specifically, we define the notion of disagreement between explanations, analyze how often such disagreements occur in practice, and how practitioners resolve these disagreements. We first conduct interviews with data scientists to understand what constitutes disagreement between explanations generated by different methods for the same model prediction, and introduce a novel quantitative framework to formalize this understanding. We then leverage this framework to carry out a rigorous empirical analysis with four real-world datasets, six state-of-the-art post hoc explanation methods, and six different predictive models, to measure the extent of disagreement between the explanations generated by various popular explanation methods. In addition, we carry out an online user study with data scientists to understand how they resolve the aforementioned disagreements. Our results indicate that (1) state-of-the-art explanation methods often disagree in terms of the explanations they output, and (2) machine learning practitioners often employ ad hoc heuristics when resolving such disagreements. These findings suggest that practitioners may be relying on misleading explanations when making consequential decisions. They also underscore the importance of developing principled frameworks for effectively evaluating and comparing explanations output by various explanation techniques.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Improving Fairness in Adaptive Social Exergames via Shapley Bandits

Algorithmic fairness is an essential requirement as AI becomes integrated in society. In the case of social applications where AI distributes resources, algorithms often must make decisions that will benefit a subset of users, sometimes repeatedly or exclusively, while attempting to maximize specific outcomes. How should we design such systems to serve users more fairly? This paper explores this question in the case where a group of users works toward a shared goal in a social exergame called Step Heroes. We identify adverse outcomes in traditional multi-armed bandits (MABs) and formalize the Greedy Bandit Problem. We then propose a solution based on a new type of fairness-aware multi-armed bandit, Shapley Bandits. It uses the Shapley Value for increasing overall player participation and intervention adherence rather than the maximization of total group output, which is traditionally achieved by favoring only high-performing participants. We evaluate our approach via a user study (n=46). Our results indicate that our Shapley Bandits effectively mediates the Greedy Bandit Problem and achieves better user retention and motivation across the participants.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2023

TorchFL: A Performant Library for Bootstrapping Federated Learning Experiments

With the increased legislation around data privacy, federated learning (FL) has emerged as a promising technique that allows the clients (end-user) to collaboratively train deep learning (DL) models without transferring and storing the data in a centralized, third-party server. We introduce TorchFL, a performant library for (i) bootstrapping the FL experiments, (ii) executing them using various hardware accelerators, (iii) profiling the performance, and (iv) logging the overall and agent-specific results on the go. Being built on a bottom-up design using PyTorch and Lightning, TorchFL provides ready-to-use abstractions for models, datasets, and FL algorithms, while allowing the developers to customize them as and when required. This paper aims to dig deeper into the architecture and design of TorchFL, elaborate on how it allows researchers to bootstrap the federated learning experience, and provide experiments and code snippets for the same. With the ready-to-use implementation of state-of-the-art DL models, datasets, and federated learning support, TorchFL aims to allow researchers with little to no engineering background to set up FL experiments with minimal coding and infrastructure overhead.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

A Game-Theoretic Approach for Hierarchical Epidemic Control

We design and analyze a multi-level game-theoretic model of hierarchical policy interventions for epidemic control, such as those in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Our model captures the potentially mismatched priorities among a hierarchy of policy-makers (e.g., federal, state, and local governments) with respect to two cost components that have opposite dependence on the policy strength -- post-intervention infection rates and the socio-economic cost of policy implementation. Additionally, our model includes a crucial third factor in decisions: a cost of non-compliance with the policy-maker immediately above in the hierarchy, such as non-compliance of counties with state-level policies. We propose two novel algorithms for approximating solutions to such games. The first is based on best response dynamics (BRD), and exploits the tree structure of the game. The second combines quadratic integer programming (QIP), which enables us to collapse the two lowest levels of the game, with best response dynamics. Through extensive experiments, we show that our QIP-based approach significantly outperforms the BRD algorithm both in running time and the quality of equilibrium solutions. Finally, we apply the QIP-based algorithm to experiments based on both synthetic and real-world data under various parameter configurations and analyze the resulting (approximate) equilibria to gain insight into the impact of decentralization on overall welfare (measured as the negative sum of costs) as well as emergent properties like free-riding and fairness in cost distribution among policy-makers.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Solving Structured Hierarchical Games Using Differential Backward Induction

From large-scale organizations to decentralized political systems, hierarchical strategic decision making is commonplace. We introduce a novel class of structured hierarchical games (SHGs) that formally capture such hierarchical strategic interactions. In an SHG, each player is a node in a tree, and strategic choices of players are sequenced from root to leaves, with root moving first, followed by its children, then followed by their children, and so on until the leaves. A player's utility in an SHG depends on its own decision, and on the choices of its parent and all the tree leaves. SHGs thus generalize simultaneous-move games, as well as Stackelberg games with many followers. We leverage the structure of both the sequence of player moves as well as payoff dependence to develop a gradient-based back propagation-style algorithm, which we call Differential Backward Induction (DBI), for approximating equilibria of SHGs. We provide a sufficient condition for convergence of DBI and demonstrate its efficacy in finding approximate equilibrium solutions to several SHG models of hierarchical policy-making problems.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Towards the Unification and Robustness of Perturbation and Gradient Based Explanations

As machine learning black boxes are increasingly being deployed in critical domains such as healthcare and criminal justice, there has been a growing emphasis on developing techniques for explaining these black boxes in a post hoc manner. In this work, we analyze two popular post hoc interpretation techniques: SmoothGrad which is a gradient based method, and a variant of LIME which is a perturbation based method. More specifically, we derive explicit closed form expressions for the explanations output by these two methods and show that they both converge to the same explanation in expectation, i.e., when the number of perturbed samples used by these methods is large. We then leverage this connection to establish other desirable properties, such as robustness, for these techniques. We also derive finite sample complexity bounds for the number of perturbations required for these methods to converge to their expected explanation. Finally, we empirically validate our theory using extensive experimentation on both synthetic and real world datasets.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Active Screening for Recurrent Diseases: A Reinforcement Learning Approach

Active screening is a common approach in controlling the spread of recurring infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and influenza. In this approach, health workers periodically select a subset of population for screening. However, given the limited number of health workers, only a small subset of the population can be visited in any given time period. Given the recurrent nature of the disease and rapid spreading, the goal is to minimize the number of infections over a long time horizon. Active screening can be formalized as a sequential combinatorial optimization over the network of people and their connections. The main computational challenges in this formalization arise from i) the combinatorial nature of the problem, ii) the need of sequential planning and iii) the uncertainties in the infectiousness states of the population. Previous works on active screening fail to scale to large time horizon while fully considering the future effect of current interventions. In this paper, we propose a novel reinforcement learning (RL) approach based on Deep Q-Networks (DQN), with several innovative adaptations that are designed to address the above challenges. First, we use graph convolutional networks (GCNs) to represent the Q-function that exploit the node correlations of the underlying contact network. Second, to avoid solving a combinatorial optimization problem in each time period, we decompose the node set selection as a sub-sequence of decisions, and further design a two-level RL framework that solves the problem in a hierarchical way. Finally, to speed-up the slow convergence of RL which arises from reward sparseness, we incorporate ideas from curriculum learning into our hierarchical RL approach. We evaluate our RL algorithm on several real-world networks.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2020

Fair Influence Maximization: A Welfare Optimization Approach

Several behavioral, social, and public health interventions, such as suicide/HIV prevention or community preparedness against natural disasters, leverage social network information to maximize outreach. Algorithmic influence maximization techniques have been proposed to aid with the choice of "peer leaders" or "influencers" in such interventions. Yet, traditional algorithms for influence maximization have not been designed with these interventions in mind. As a result, they may disproportionately exclude minority communities from the benefits of the intervention. This has motivated research on fair influence maximization. Existing techniques come with two major drawbacks. First, they require committing to a single fairness measure. Second, these measures are typically imposed as strict constraints leading to undesirable properties such as wastage of resources. To address these shortcomings, we provide a principled characterization of the properties that a fair influence maximization algorithm should satisfy. In particular, we propose a framework based on social welfare theory, wherein the cardinal utilities derived by each community are aggregated using the isoelastic social welfare functions. Under this framework, the trade-off between fairness and efficiency can be controlled by a single inequality aversion design parameter. We then show under what circumstances our proposed principles can be satisfied by a welfare function. The resulting optimization problem is monotone and submodular and can be solved efficiently with optimality guarantees. Our framework encompasses as special cases leximin and proportional fairness. Extensive experiments on synthetic and real world datasets including a case study on landslide risk management demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed framework.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2019

Network Formation under Random Attack and Probabilistic Spread

We study a network formation game where agents receive benefits by forming connections to other agents but also incur both direct and indirect costs from the formed connections. Specifically, once the agents have purchased their connections, an attack starts at a randomly chosen vertex in the network and spreads according to the independent cascade model with a fixed probability, destroying any infected agents. The utility or welfare of an agent in our game is defined to be the expected size of the agent's connected component post-attack minus her expenditure in forming connections. Our goal is to understand the properties of the equilibrium networks formed in this game. Our first result concerns the edge density of equilibrium networks. A network connection increases both the likelihood of remaining connected to other agents after an attack as well the likelihood of getting infected by a cascading spread of infection. We show that the latter concern primarily prevails and any equilibrium network in our game contains only $O(n\log n)$ edges where $n$ denotes the number of agents. On the other hand, there are equilibrium networks that contain $Ω(n)$ edges showing that our edge density bound is tight up to a logarithmic factor. Our second result shows that the presence of attack and its spread through a cascade does not significantly lower social welfare as long as the network is not too dense. We show that any non-trivial equilibrium network with $O(n)$ edges has $Θ(n^2)$ social welfare, asymptotically similar to the social welfare guarantee in the game without any attacks.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Equilibrium Characterization for Data Acquisition Games

We study a game between two firms in which each provide a service based on machine learning. The firms are presented with the opportunity to purchase a new corpus of data, which will allow them to potentially improve the quality of their products. The firms can decide whether or not they want to buy the data, as well as which learning model to build with that data. We demonstrate a reduction from this potentially complicated action space to a one-shot, two-action game in which each firm only decides whether or not to buy the data. The game admits several regimes which depend on the relative strength of the two firms at the outset and the price at which the data is being offered. We analyze the game's Nash equilibria in all parameter regimes and demonstrate that, in expectation, the outcome of the game is that the initially stronger firm's market position weakens whereas the initially weaker firm's market position becomes stronger. Finally, we consider the perspective of the users of the service and demonstrate that the expected outcome at equilibrium is not the one which maximizes the welfare of the consumers.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

Fair Algorithms for Learning in Allocation Problems

Settings such as lending and policing can be modeled by a centralized agent allocating a resource (loans or police officers) amongst several groups, in order to maximize some objective (loans given that are repaid or criminals that are apprehended). Often in such problems fairness is also a concern. A natural notion of fairness, based on general principles of equality of opportunity, asks that conditional on an individual being a candidate for the resource, the probability of actually receiving it is approximately independent of the individual's group. In lending this means that equally creditworthy individuals in different racial groups have roughly equal chances of receiving a loan. In policing it means that two individuals committing the same crime in different districts would have roughly equal chances of being arrested. We formalize this fairness notion for allocation problems and investigate its algorithmic consequences. Our main technical results include an efficient learning algorithm that converges to an optimal fair allocation even when the frequency of candidates (creditworthy individuals or criminals) in each group is unknown. The algorithm operates in a censored feedback model in which only the number of candidates who received the resource in a given allocation can be observed, rather than the true number of candidates. This models the fact that we do not learn the creditworthiness of individuals we do not give loans to nor learn about crimes committed if the police presence in a district is low. As an application of our framework, we consider the predictive policing problem. The learning algorithm is trained on arrest data gathered from its own deployments on previous days, resulting in a potential feedback loop that our algorithm provably overcomes. We empirically investigate the performance of our algorithm on the Philadelphia Crime Incidents dataset.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2017

Fairness in Reinforcement Learning

We initiate the study of fairness in reinforcement learning, where the actions of a learning algorithm may affect its environment and future rewards. Our fairness constraint requires that an algorithm never prefers one action over another if the long-term (discounted) reward of choosing the latter action is higher. Our first result is negative: despite the fact that fairness is consistent with the optimal policy, any learning algorithm satisfying fairness must take time exponential in the number of states to achieve non-trivial approximation to the optimal policy. We then provide a provably fair polynomial time algorithm under an approximate notion of fairness, thus establishing an exponential gap between exact and approximate fairness

cs.LG↗

arXiv2017

A Convex Framework for Fair Regression

We introduce a flexible family of fairness regularizers for (linear and logistic) regression problems. These regularizers all enjoy convexity, permitting fast optimization, and they span the rang from notions of group fairness to strong individual fairness. By varying the weight on the fairness regularizer, we can compute the efficient frontier of the accuracy-fairness trade-off on any given dataset, and we measure the severity of this trade-off via a numerical quantity we call the Price of Fairness (PoF). The centerpiece of our results is an extensive comparative study of the PoF across six different datasets in which fairness is a primary consideration.

cs.LG↗