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Shang-Hua Teng

Publications and source records attributed to Shang-Hua Teng.

At least 55 records · Page 3Linked to original sources
arXiv2009

Optimal Cache-Oblivious Mesh Layouts

A mesh is a graph that divides physical space into regularly-shaped regions. Meshes computations form the basis of many applications, e.g. finite-element methods, image rendering, and collision detection. In one important mesh primitive, called a mesh update, each mesh vertex stores a value and repeatedly updates this value based on the values stored in all neighboring vertices. The performance of a mesh update depends on the layout of the mesh in memory. This paper shows how to find a memory layout that guarantees that the mesh update has asymptotically optimal memory performance for any set of memory parameters. Such a memory layout is called cache-oblivious. Formally, for a $d$-dimensional mesh $G$, block size $B$, and cache size $M$ (where $M=Ω(B^d)$), the mesh update of $G$ uses $O(1+|G|/B)$ memory transfers. The paper also shows how the mesh-update performance degrades for smaller caches, where $M=o(B^d)$. The paper then gives two algorithms for finding cache-oblivious mesh layouts. The first layout algorithm runs in time $O(|G|\log^2|G|)$ both in expectation and with high probability on a RAM. It uses $O(1+|G|\log^2(|G|/M)/B)$ memory transfers in expectation and $O(1+(|G|/B)(\log^2(|G|/M) + \log|G|))$ memory transfers with high probability in the cache-oblivious and disk-access machine (DAM) models. The layout is obtained by finding a fully balanced decomposition tree of $G$ and then performing an in-order traversal of the leaves of the tree. The second algorithm runs faster by almost a $\log|G|/\log\log|G|$ factor in all three memory models, both in expectation and with high probability. The layout obtained by finding a relax-balanced decomposition tree of $G$ and then performing an in-order traversal of the leaves of the tree.

cs.DS↗
arXiv2009

Spending is not Easier than Trading: On the Computational Equivalence of Fisher and Arrow-Debreu Equilibria

It is a common belief that computing a market equilibrium in Fisher's spending model is easier than computing a market equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu's exchange model. This belief is built on the fact that we have more algorithmic success in Fisher equilibria than Arrow-Debreu equilibria. For example, a Fisher equilibrium in a Leontief market can be found in polynomial time, while it is PPAD-hard to compute an approximate Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in a Leontief market. In this paper, we show that even when all the utilities are additively separable, piecewise-linear, and concave functions, finding an approximate equilibrium in Fisher's model is complete in PPAD. Our result solves a long-term open question on the complexity of market equilibria. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first PPAD-completeness result for Fisher's model.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2009

Reducibility Among Fractional Stability Problems

In this paper, we resolve the computational complexity of a number of outstanding open problems with practical applications. Here is the list of problems we show to be PPAD-complete, along with the domains of practical significance: Fractional Stable Paths Problem (FSPP) [21] - Internet routing; Core of Balanced Games [41] - Economics and Game theory; Scarf's Lemma [41] - Combinatorics; Hypergraph Matching [1]- Social Choice and Preference Systems; Fractional Bounded Budget Connection Games (FBBC) [30] - Social networks; and Strong Fractional Kernel [2]- Graph Theory. In fact, we show that no fully polynomial-time approximation schemes exist (unless PPAD is in FP). This paper is entirely a series of reductions that build in nontrivial ways on the framework established in previous work. In the course of deriving these reductions, we created two new concepts - preference games and personalized equilibria. The entire set of new reductions can be presented as a lattice with the above problems sandwiched between preference games (at the "easy" end) and personalized equilibria (at the "hard" end). Our completeness results extend to natural approximate versions of most of these problems. On a technical note, we wish to highlight our novel "continuous-to-discrete" reduction from exact personalized equilibria to approximate personalized equilibria using a linear program augmented with an exponential number of "min" constraints of a specific form. In addition to enhancing our repertoire of PPAD-complete problems, we expect the concepts and techniques in this paper to find future use in algorithmic game theory.

cs.CC↗
arXiv2008

Preference Games and Personalized Equilibria, with Applications to Fractional BGP

We study the complexity of computing equilibria in two classes of network games based on flows - fractional BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) games and fractional BBC (Bounded Budget Connection) games. BGP is the glue that holds the Internet together and hence its stability, i.e. the equilibria of fractional BGP games (Haxell, Wilfong), is a matter of practical importance. BBC games (Laoutaris et al) follow in the tradition of the large body of work on network formation games and capture a variety of applications ranging from social networks and overlay networks to peer-to-peer networks. The central result of this paper is that there are no fully polynomial-time approximation schemes (unless PPAD is in FP) for computing equilibria in both fractional BGP games and fractional BBC games. We obtain this result by proving the hardness for a new and surprisingly simple game, the fractional preference game, which is reducible to both fractional BGP and BBC games. We define a new flow-based notion of equilibrium for matrix games -- personalized equilibria -- generalizing both fractional BBC and fractional BGP games. We prove not just the existence, but the existence of rational personalized equilibria for all matrix games, which implies the existence of rational equilibria for fractional BGP and BBC games. In particular, this provides an alternative proof and strengthening of the main result in [Haxell, Wilfong]. For k-player matrix games, where k = 2, we provide a combinatorial characterization leading to a polynomial-time algorithm for computing all personalized equilibria. For k >= 5, we prove that personalized equilibria are PPAD-hard to approximate in fully polynomial time. We believe that the concept of personalized equilibria has potential for real-world significance.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2008

Decision trees are PAC-learnable from most product distributions: a smoothed analysis

We consider the problem of PAC-learning decision trees, i.e., learning a decision tree over the n-dimensional hypercube from independent random labeled examples. Despite significant effort, no polynomial-time algorithm is known for learning polynomial-sized decision trees (even trees of any super-constant size), even when examples are assumed to be drawn from the uniform distribution on {0,1}^n. We give an algorithm that learns arbitrary polynomial-sized decision trees for {\em most product distributions}. In particular, consider a random product distribution where the bias of each bit is chosen independently and uniformly from, say, [.49,.51]. Then with high probability over the parameters of the product distribution and the random examples drawn from it, the algorithm will learn any tree. More generally, in the spirit of smoothed analysis, we consider an arbitrary product distribution whose parameters are specified only up to a [-c,c] accuracy (perturbation), for an arbitrarily small positive constant c.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2008

A Local Clustering Algorithm for Massive Graphs and its Application to Nearly-Linear Time Graph Partitioning

We study the design of local algorithms for massive graphs. A local algorithm is one that finds a solution containing or near a given vertex without looking at the whole graph. We present a local clustering algorithm. Our algorithm finds a good cluster--a subset of vertices whose internal connections are significantly richer than its external connections--near a given vertex. The running time of our algorithm, when it finds a non-empty local cluster, is nearly linear in the size of the cluster it outputs. Our clustering algorithm could be a useful primitive for handling massive graphs, such as social networks and web-graphs. As an application of this clustering algorithm, we present a partitioning algorithm that finds an approximate sparsest cut with nearly optimal balance. Our algorithm takes time nearly linear in the number edges of the graph. Using the partitioning algorithm of this paper, we have designed a nearly-linear time algorithm for constructing spectral sparsifiers of graphs, which we in turn use in a nearly-linear time algorithm for solving linear systems in symmetric, diagonally-dominant matrices. The linear system solver also leads to a nearly linear-time algorithm for approximating the second-smallest eigenvalue and corresponding eigenvector of the Laplacian matrix of a graph. These other results are presented in two companion papers.

cs.DS↗
arXiv2008

Bounded Budget Connection (BBC) Games or How to make friends and influence people, on a budget

Motivated by applications in social networks, peer-to-peer and overlay networks, we define and study the Bounded Budget Connection (BBC) game - we have a collection of n players or nodes each of whom has a budget for purchasing links; each link has a cost as well as a length and each node has a set of preference weights for each of the remaining nodes; the objective of each node is to use its budget to buy a set of outgoing links so as to minimize its sum of preference-weighted distances to the remaining nodes. We study the structural and complexity-theoretic properties of pure Nash equilibria in BBC games. We show that determining the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in general BBC games is NP-hard. However, in a natural variant, fractional BBC games - where it is permitted to buy fractions of links - a pure Nash equilibrium always exists. A major focus is the study of (n,k)-uniform BBC games - those in which all link costs, link lengths and preference weights are equal (to 1) and all budgets are equal (to k). We show that a pure Nash equilibrium or stable graph exists for all (n,k)-uniform BBC games and that all stable graphs are essentially fair (i.e. all nodes have similar costs). We provide an explicit construction of a family of stable graphs that spans the spectrum from minimum total social cost to maximum total social cost. We also study a special family of regular graphs in which all nodes imitate the "same" buying pattern, and show that if n is sufficiently large no such regular graph can be a pure Nash equilibrium. We analyze best-response walks on the configuration defined by the uniform game. Lastly, we extend our results to the case where each node seeks to minimize its maximum distance to the other nodes.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2007

A bounded-degree network formation game

Motivated by applications in peer-to-peer and overlay networks we define and study the \emph{Bounded Degree Network Formation} (BDNF) game. In an $(n,k)$-BDNF game, we are given $n$ nodes, a bound $k$ on the out-degree of each node, and a weight $w_{vu}$ for each ordered pair $(v,u)$ representing the traffic rate from node $v$ to node $u$. Each node $v$ uses up to $k$ directed links to connect to other nodes with an objective to minimize its average distance, using weights $w_{vu}$, to all other destinations. We study the existence of pure Nash equilibria for $(n,k)$-BDNF games. We show that if the weights are arbitrary, then a pure Nash wiring may not exist. Furthermore, it is NP-hard to determine whether a pure Nash wiring exists for a given $(n,k)$-BDNF instance. A major focus of this paper is on uniform $(n,k)$-BDNF games, in which all weights are 1. We describe how to construct a pure Nash equilibrium wiring given any $n$ and $k$, and establish that in all pure Nash wirings the cost of individual nodes cannot differ by more than a factor of nearly 2, whereas the diameter cannot exceed $O(\sqrt{n \log_k n})$. We also analyze best-response walks on the configuration space defined by the uniform game, and show that starting from any initial configuration, strong connectivity is reached within $Θ(n^2)$ rounds. Convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium, however, is not guaranteed. We present simulation results that suggest that loop-free best-response walks always exist, but may not be polynomially bounded. We also study a special family of \emph{regular} wirings, the class of Abelian Cayley graphs, in which all nodes imitate the same wiring pattern, and show that if $n$ is sufficiently large no such regular wiring can be a pure Nash equilibrium.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2007

Settling the Complexity of Computing Two-Player Nash Equilibria

We settle a long-standing open question in algorithmic game theory. We prove that Bimatrix, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a two-player game, is complete for the complexity class PPAD Polynomial Parity Argument, Directed version) introduced by Papadimitriou in 1991. This is the first of a series of results concerning the complexity of Nash equilibria. In particular, we prove the following theorems: Bimatrix does not have a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme unless every problem in PPAD is solvable in polynomial time. The smoothed complexity of the classic Lemke-Howson algorithm and, in fact, of any algorithm for Bimatrix is not polynomial unless every problem in PPAD is solvable in randomized polynomial time. Our results demonstrate that, even in the simplest form of non-cooperative games, equilibrium computation and approximation are polynomial-time equivalent to fixed point computation. Our results also have two broad complexity implications in mathematical economics and operations research: Arrow-Debreu market equilibria are PPAD-hard to compute. The P-Matrix Linear Complementary Problem is computationally harder than convex programming unless every problem in PPAD is solvable in polynomial time.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2007

Games on the Sperner Triangle

We create a new two-player game on the Sperner Triangle based on Sperner's lemma. Our game has simple rules and several desirable properties. First, the game is always certain to have a winner. Second, like many other interesting games such as Hex and Geography, we prove that deciding whether one can win our game is a PSPACE-complete problem. Third, there is an elegant balance in the game such that neither the first nor the second player always has a decisive advantage. We provide a web-based version of the game, playable at: http://cs-people.bu.edu/paithan/spernerGame/ . In addition we propose other games, also based on fixed-point theorems.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2007

Paths Beyond Local Search: A Nearly Tight Bound for Randomized Fixed-Point Computation

In 1983, Aldous proved that randomization can speedup local search. For example, it reduces the query complexity of local search over [1:n]^d from Theta (n^{d-1}) to O (d^{1/2}n^{d/2}). It remains open whether randomization helps fixed-point computation. Inspired by this open problem and recent advances on equilibrium computation, we have been fascinated by the following question: Is a fixed-point or an equilibrium fundamentally harder to find than a local optimum? In this paper, we give a nearly-tight bound of Omega(n)^{d-1} on the randomized query complexity for computing a fixed point of a discrete Brouwer function over [1:n]^d. Since the randomized query complexity of global optimization over [1:n]^d is Theta (n^{d}), the randomized query model over [1:n]^d strictly separates these three important search problems: Global optimization is harder than fixed-point computation, and fixed-point computation is harder than local search. Our result indeed demonstrates that randomization does not help much in fixed-point computation in the query model; the deterministic complexity of this problem is Theta (n^{d-1}).

cs.GT↗
arXiv2006

On the Approximation and Smoothed Complexity of Leontief Market Equilibria

We show that the problem of finding an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium of an n by n two-person games can be reduced to the computation of an (ε/n)^2-approximate market equilibrium of a Leontief economy. Together with a recent result of Chen, Deng and Teng, this polynomial reduction implies that the Leontief market exchange problem does not have a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme, that is, there is no algorithm that can compute an ε-approximate market equilibrium in time polynomial in m, n, and 1/ε, unless PPAD is not in P, We also extend the analysis of our reduction to show, unless PPAD is not in RP, that the smoothed complexity of the Scarf's general fixed-point approximation algorithm (when applying to solve the approximate Leontief market exchange problem) or of any algorithm for computing an approximate market equilibrium of Leontief economies is not polynomial in n and 1/σ, under Gaussian or uniform perturbations with magnitude σ.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2006

Computing Nash Equilibria: Approximation and Smoothed Complexity

We show that the BIMATRIX game does not have a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme, unless PPAD is in P. In other words, no algorithm with time polynomial in n and 1/εcan compute an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium of an n by nbimatrix game, unless PPAD is in P. Instrumental to our proof, we introduce a new discrete fixed-point problem on a high-dimensional cube with a constant side-length, such as on an n-dimensional cube with side-length 7, and show that they are PPAD-complete. Furthermore, we prove, unless PPAD is in RP, that the smoothed complexity of the Lemke-Howson algorithm or any algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game is polynomial in n and 1/σunder perturbations with magnitude σ. Our result answers a major open question in the smoothed analysis of algorithms and the approximation of Nash equilibria.

cs.CC↗
arXiv2005

Smoothed Analysis of the Condition Numbers and Growth Factors of Matrices

Let $\orig{A}$ be any matrix and let $A$ be a slight random perturbation of $\orig{A}$. We prove that it is unlikely that $A$ has large condition number. Using this result, we prove it is unlikely that $A$ has large growth factor under Gaussian elimination without pivoting. By combining these results, we bound the smoothed precision needed by Gaussian elimination without pivoting. Our results improve the average-case analysis of Gaussian elimination without pivoting performed by Yeung and Chan (SIAM J. Matrix Anal. Appl., 1997).

math.NA↗
arXiv2005

Lower-Stretch Spanning Trees

We prove that every weighted graph contains a spanning tree subgraph of average stretch O((log n log log n)^2). Moreover, we show how to construct such a tree in time O(m log^2 n).

cs.DS↗
arXiv2004

Solving Sparse, Symmetric, Diagonally-Dominant Linear Systems in Time $O (m^{1.31})$

We present a linear-system solver that, given an $n$-by-$n$ symmetric positive semi-definite, diagonally dominant matrix $A$ with $m$ non-zero entries and an $n$-vector $\bb $, produces a vector $\xxt$ within relative distance $ε$ of the solution to $A \xx = \bb$ in time $O (m^{1.31} \log (n κ_{f} (A)/ε)^{O (1)})$, where $κ_{f} (A)$ is the log of the ratio of the largest to smallest non-zero eigenvalue of $A$. In particular, $\log (κ_{f} (A)) = O (b \log n)$, where $b$ is the logarithm of the ratio of the largest to smallest non-zero entry of $A$. If the graph of $A$ has genus $m^{2θ}$ or does not have a $K_{m^θ} $ minor, then the exponent of $m$ can be improved to the minimum of $1 + 5 θ$ and $(9/8) (1+θ)$. The key contribution of our work is an extension of Vaidya's techniques for constructing and analyzing combinatorial preconditioners.

cs.DS↗