arXiv subjects

Shayegan Omidshafiei

Publications and source records attributed to Shayegan Omidshafiei.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2024

Collision Avoidance Verification of Multiagent Systems with Learned Policies

For many multiagent control problems, neural networks (NNs) have enabled promising new capabilities. However, many of these systems lack formal guarantees (e.g., collision avoidance, robustness), which prevents leveraging these advances in safety-critical settings. While there is recent work on formal verification of NN-controlled systems, most existing techniques cannot handle scenarios with more than one agent. To address this research gap, this paper presents a backward reachability-based approach for verifying the collision avoidance properties of Multi-Agent Neural Feedback Loops (MA-NFLs). Given the dynamics models and trained control policies of each agent, the proposed algorithm computes relative backprojection sets by (simultaneously) solving a series of Mixed Integer Linear Programs (MILPs) offline for each pair of agents. We account for state measurement uncertainties, making it well aligned with real-world scenarios. Using those results, the agents can quickly check for collision avoidance online by solving low-dimensional Linear Programs (LPs). We demonstrate the proposed algorithm can verify collision-free properties of a MA-NFL with agents trained to imitate a collision avoidance algorithm (Reciprocal Velocity Obstacles). We further demonstrate the computational scalability of the approach on systems with up to 10 agents.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2023

Deconstructing Cooperation and Ostracism via Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Cooperation is challenging in biological systems, human societies, and multi-agent systems in general. While a group can benefit when everyone cooperates, it is tempting for each agent to act selfishly instead. Prior human studies show that people can overcome such social dilemmas while choosing interaction partners, i.e., strategic network rewiring. However, little is known about how agents, including humans, can learn about cooperation from strategic rewiring and vice versa. Here, we perform multi-agent reinforcement learning simulations in which two agents play the Prisoner's Dilemma game iteratively. Each agent has two policies: one controls whether to cooperate or defect; the other controls whether to rewire connections with another agent. This setting enables us to disentangle complex causal dynamics between cooperation and network rewiring. We find that network rewiring facilitates mutual cooperation even when one agent always offers cooperation, which is vulnerable to free-riding. We then confirm that the network-rewiring effect is exerted through agents' learning of ostracism, that is, connecting to cooperators and disconnecting from defectors. However, we also find that ostracism alone is not sufficient to make cooperation emerge. Instead, ostracism emerges from the learning of cooperation, and existing cooperation is subsequently reinforced due to the presence of ostracism. Our findings provide insights into the conditions and mechanisms necessary for the emergence of cooperation with network rewiring.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2023

DRIP: Domain Refinement Iteration with Polytopes for Backward Reachability Analysis of Neural Feedback Loops

Safety certification of data-driven control techniques remains a major open problem. This work investigates backward reachability as a framework for providing collision avoidance guarantees for systems controlled by neural network (NN) policies. Because NNs are typically not invertible, existing methods conservatively assume a domain over which to relax the NN, which causes loose over-approximations of the set of states that could lead the system into the obstacle (i.e., backprojection (BP) sets). To address this issue, we introduce DRIP, an algorithm with a refinement loop on the relaxation domain, which substantially tightens the BP set bounds. Furthermore, we introduce a formulation that enables directly obtaining closed-form representations of polytopes to bound the BP sets tighter than prior work, which required solving linear programs and using hyper-rectangles. Furthermore, this work extends the NN relaxation algorithm to handle polytope domains, which further tightens the bounds on BP sets. DRIP is demonstrated in numerical experiments on control systems, including a ground robot controlled by a learned NN obstacle avoidance policy.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2023

Beyond Rewards: a Hierarchical Perspective on Offline Multiagent Behavioral Analysis

Each year, expert-level performance is attained in increasingly-complex multiagent domains, where notable examples include Go, Poker, and StarCraft II. This rapid progression is accompanied by a commensurate need to better understand how such agents attain this performance, to enable their safe deployment, identify limitations, and reveal potential means of improving them. In this paper we take a step back from performance-focused multiagent learning, and instead turn our attention towards agent behavior analysis. We introduce a model-agnostic method for discovery of behavior clusters in multiagent domains, using variational inference to learn a hierarchy of behaviors at the joint and local agent levels. Our framework makes no assumption about agents' underlying learning algorithms, does not require access to their latent states or policies, and is trained using only offline observational data. We illustrate the effectiveness of our method for enabling the coupled understanding of behaviors at the joint and local agent level, detection of behavior changepoints throughout training, discovery of core behavioral concepts, demonstrate the approach's scalability to a high-dimensional multiagent MuJoCo control domain, and also illustrate that the approach can disentangle previously-trained policies in OpenAI's hide-and-seek domain.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning for Microprocessor Design Space Exploration

Microprocessor architects are increasingly resorting to domain-specific customization in the quest for high-performance and energy-efficiency. As the systems grow in complexity, fine-tuning architectural parameters across multiple sub-systems (e.g., datapath, memory blocks in different hierarchies, interconnects, compiler optimization, etc.) quickly results in a combinatorial explosion of design space. This makes domain-specific customization an extremely challenging task. Prior work explores using reinforcement learning (RL) and other optimization methods to automatically explore the large design space. However, these methods have traditionally relied on single-agent RL/ML formulations. It is unclear how scalable single-agent formulations are as we increase the complexity of the design space (e.g., full stack System-on-Chip design). Therefore, we propose an alternative formulation that leverages Multi-Agent RL (MARL) to tackle this problem. The key idea behind using MARL is an observation that parameters across different sub-systems are more or less independent, thus allowing a decentralized role assigned to each agent. We test this hypothesis by designing domain-specific DRAM memory controller for several workload traces. Our evaluation shows that the MARL formulation consistently outperforms single-agent RL baselines such as Proximal Policy Optimization and Soft Actor-Critic over different target objectives such as low power and latency. To this end, this work opens the pathway for new and promising research in MARL solutions for hardware architecture search.

cs.AR↗

arXiv2022

Game Theoretic Rating in N-player general-sum games with Equilibria

Rating strategies in a game is an important area of research in game theory and artificial intelligence, and can be applied to any real-world competitive or cooperative setting. Traditionally, only transitive dependencies between strategies have been used to rate strategies (e.g. Elo), however recent work has expanded ratings to utilize game theoretic solutions to better rate strategies in non-transitive games. This work generalizes these ideas and proposes novel algorithms suitable for N-player, general-sum rating of strategies in normal-form games according to the payoff rating system. This enables well-established solution concepts, such as equilibria, to be leveraged to efficiently rate strategies in games with complex strategic interactions, which arise in multiagent training and real-world interactions between many agents. We empirically validate our methods on real world normal-form data (Premier League) and multiagent reinforcement learning agent evaluation.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Mastering the Game of Stratego with Model-Free Multiagent Reinforcement Learning

We introduce DeepNash, an autonomous agent capable of learning to play the imperfect information game Stratego from scratch, up to a human expert level. Stratego is one of the few iconic board games that Artificial Intelligence (AI) has not yet mastered. This popular game has an enormous game tree on the order of $10^{535}$ nodes, i.e., $10^{175}$ times larger than that of Go. It has the additional complexity of requiring decision-making under imperfect information, similar to Texas hold'em poker, which has a significantly smaller game tree (on the order of $10^{164}$ nodes). Decisions in Stratego are made over a large number of discrete actions with no obvious link between action and outcome. Episodes are long, with often hundreds of moves before a player wins, and situations in Stratego can not easily be broken down into manageably-sized sub-problems as in poker. For these reasons, Stratego has been a grand challenge for the field of AI for decades, and existing AI methods barely reach an amateur level of play. DeepNash uses a game-theoretic, model-free deep reinforcement learning method, without search, that learns to master Stratego via self-play. The Regularised Nash Dynamics (R-NaD) algorithm, a key component of DeepNash, converges to an approximate Nash equilibrium, instead of 'cycling' around it, by directly modifying the underlying multi-agent learning dynamics. DeepNash beats existing state-of-the-art AI methods in Stratego and achieved a yearly (2022) and all-time top-3 rank on the Gravon games platform, competing with human expert players.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2021

Evolutionary Dynamics and $Φ$-Regret Minimization in Games

Regret has been established as a foundational concept in online learning, and likewise has important applications in the analysis of learning dynamics in games. Regret quantifies the difference between a learner's performance against a baseline in hindsight. It is well-known that regret-minimizing algorithms converge to certain classes of equilibria in games; however, traditional forms of regret used in game theory predominantly consider baselines that permit deviations to deterministic actions or strategies. In this paper, we revisit our understanding of regret from the perspective of deviations over partitions of the full \emph{mixed} strategy space (i.e., probability distributions over pure strategies), under the lens of the previously-established $Φ$-regret framework, which provides a continuum of stronger regret measures. Importantly, $Φ$-regret enables learning agents to consider deviations from and to mixed strategies, generalizing several existing notions of regret such as external, internal, and swap regret, and thus broadening the insights gained from regret-based analysis of learning algorithms. We prove here that the well-studied evolutionary learning algorithm of replicator dynamics (RD) seamlessly minimizes the strongest possible form of $Φ$-regret in generic $2 \times 2$ games, without any modification of the underlying algorithm itself. We subsequently conduct experiments validating our theoretical results in a suite of 144 $2 \times 2$ games wherein RD exhibits a diverse set of behaviors. We conclude by providing empirical evidence of $Φ$-regret minimization by RD in some larger games, hinting at further opportunity for $Φ$-regret based study of such algorithms from both a theoretical and empirical perspective.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Time-series Imputation of Temporally-occluded Multiagent Trajectories

In multiagent environments, several decision-making individuals interact while adhering to the dynamics constraints imposed by the environment. These interactions, combined with the potential stochasticity of the agents' decision-making processes, make such systems complex and interesting to study from a dynamical perspective. Significant research has been conducted on learning models for forward-direction estimation of agent behaviors, for example, pedestrian predictions used for collision-avoidance in self-driving cars. However, in many settings, only sporadic observations of agents may be available in a given trajectory sequence. For instance, in football, subsets of players may come in and out of view of broadcast video footage, while unobserved players continue to interact off-screen. In this paper, we study the problem of multiagent time-series imputation, where available past and future observations of subsets of agents are used to estimate missing observations for other agents. Our approach, called the Graph Imputer, uses forward- and backward-information in combination with graph networks and variational autoencoders to enable learning of a distribution of imputed trajectories. We evaluate our approach on a dataset of football matches, using a projective camera module to train and evaluate our model for the off-screen player state estimation setting. We illustrate that our method outperforms several state-of-the-art approaches, including those hand-crafted for football.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

From Motor Control to Team Play in Simulated Humanoid Football

Intelligent behaviour in the physical world exhibits structure at multiple spatial and temporal scales. Although movements are ultimately executed at the level of instantaneous muscle tensions or joint torques, they must be selected to serve goals defined on much longer timescales, and in terms of relations that extend far beyond the body itself, ultimately involving coordination with other agents. Recent research in artificial intelligence has shown the promise of learning-based approaches to the respective problems of complex movement, longer-term planning and multi-agent coordination. However, there is limited research aimed at their integration. We study this problem by training teams of physically simulated humanoid avatars to play football in a realistic virtual environment. We develop a method that combines imitation learning, single- and multi-agent reinforcement learning and population-based training, and makes use of transferable representations of behaviour for decision making at different levels of abstraction. In a sequence of stages, players first learn to control a fully articulated body to perform realistic, human-like movements such as running and turning; they then acquire mid-level football skills such as dribbling and shooting; finally, they develop awareness of others and play as a team, bridging the gap between low-level motor control at a timescale of milliseconds, and coordinated goal-directed behaviour as a team at the timescale of tens of seconds. We investigate the emergence of behaviours at different levels of abstraction, as well as the representations that underlie these behaviours using several analysis techniques, including statistics from real-world sports analytics. Our work constitutes a complete demonstration of integrated decision-making at multiple scales in a physically embodied multi-agent setting. See project video at https://youtu.be/KHMwq9pv7mg.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2020

Game Plan: What AI can do for Football, and What Football can do for AI

The rapid progress in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning has opened unprecedented analytics possibilities in various team and individual sports, including baseball, basketball, and tennis. More recently, AI techniques have been applied to football, due to a huge increase in data collection by professional teams, increased computational power, and advances in machine learning, with the goal of better addressing new scientific challenges involved in the analysis of both individual players' and coordinated teams' behaviors. The research challenges associated with predictive and prescriptive football analytics require new developments and progress at the intersection of statistical learning, game theory, and computer vision. In this paper, we provide an overarching perspective highlighting how the combination of these fields, in particular, forms a unique microcosm for AI research, while offering mutual benefits for professional teams, spectators, and broadcasters in the years to come. We illustrate that this duality makes football analytics a game changer of tremendous value, in terms of not only changing the game of football itself, but also in terms of what this domain can mean for the field of AI. We review the state-of-the-art and exemplify the types of analysis enabled by combining the aforementioned fields, including illustrative examples of counterfactual analysis using predictive models, and the combination of game-theoretic analysis of penalty kicks with statistical learning of player attributes. We conclude by highlighting envisioned downstream impacts, including possibilities for extensions to other sports (real and virtual).

cs.AI↗

arXiv2020

Navigating the Landscape of Multiplayer Games

Multiplayer games have long been used as testbeds in artificial intelligence research, aptly referred to as the Drosophila of artificial intelligence. Traditionally, researchers have focused on using well-known games to build strong agents. This progress, however, can be better informed by characterizing games and their topological landscape. Tackling this latter question can facilitate understanding of agents and help determine what game an agent should target next as part of its training. Here, we show how network measures applied to response graphs of large-scale games enable the creation of a landscape of games, quantifying relationships between games of varying sizes and characteristics. We illustrate our findings in domains ranging from canonical games to complex empirical games capturing the performance of trained agents pitted against one another. Our results culminate in a demonstration leveraging this information to generate new and interesting games, including mixtures of empirical games synthesized from real world games.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2020

OpenSpiel: A Framework for Reinforcement Learning in Games

OpenSpiel is a collection of environments and algorithms for research in general reinforcement learning and search/planning in games. OpenSpiel supports n-player (single- and multi- agent) zero-sum, cooperative and general-sum, one-shot and sequential, strictly turn-taking and simultaneous-move, perfect and imperfect information games, as well as traditional multiagent environments such as (partially- and fully- observable) grid worlds and social dilemmas. OpenSpiel also includes tools to analyze learning dynamics and other common evaluation metrics. This document serves both as an overview of the code base and an introduction to the terminology, core concepts, and algorithms across the fields of reinforcement learning, computational game theory, and search.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2020

Real World Games Look Like Spinning Tops

This paper investigates the geometrical properties of real world games (e.g. Tic-Tac-Toe, Go, StarCraft II). We hypothesise that their geometrical structure resemble a spinning top, with the upright axis representing transitive strength, and the radial axis, which corresponds to the number of cycles that exist at a particular transitive strength, representing the non-transitive dimension. We prove the existence of this geometry for a wide class of real world games, exposing their temporal nature. Additionally, we show that this unique structure also has consequences for learning - it clarifies why populations of strategies are necessary for training of agents, and how population size relates to the structure of the game. Finally, we empirically validate these claims by using a selection of nine real world two-player zero-sum symmetric games, showing 1) the spinning top structure is revealed and can be easily re-constructed by using a new method of Nash clustering to measure the interaction between transitive and cyclical strategy behaviour, and 2) the effect that population size has on the convergence in these games.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2020

Learning Hierarchical Teaching Policies for Cooperative Agents

Collective learning can be greatly enhanced when agents effectively exchange knowledge with their peers. In particular, recent work studying agents that learn to teach other teammates has demonstrated that action advising accelerates team-wide learning. However, the prior work has simplified the learning of advising policies by using simple function approximations and only considered advising with primitive (low-level) actions, limiting the scalability of learning and teaching to complex domains. This paper introduces a novel learning-to-teach framework, called hierarchical multiagent teaching (HMAT), that improves scalability to complex environments by using the deep representation for student policies and by advising with more expressive extended action sequences over multiple levels of temporal abstraction. Our empirical evaluations demonstrate that HMAT improves team-wide learning progress in large, complex domains where previous approaches fail. HMAT also learns teaching policies that can effectively transfer knowledge to different teammates with knowledge of different tasks, even when the teammates have heterogeneous action spaces.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2020

Neural Replicator Dynamics

Policy gradient and actor-critic algorithms form the basis of many commonly used training techniques in deep reinforcement learning. Using these algorithms in multiagent environments poses problems such as nonstationarity and instability. In this paper, we first demonstrate that standard softmax-based policy gradient can be prone to poor performance in the presence of even the most benign nonstationarity. By contrast, it is known that the replicator dynamics, a well-studied model from evolutionary game theory, eliminates dominated strategies and exhibits convergence of the time-averaged trajectories to interior Nash equilibria in zero-sum games. Thus, using the replicator dynamics as a foundation, we derive an elegant one-line change to policy gradient methods that simply bypasses the gradient step through the softmax, yielding a new algorithm titled Neural Replicator Dynamics (NeuRD). NeuRD reduces to the exponential weights/Hedge algorithm in the single-state all-actions case. Additionally, NeuRD has formal equivalence to softmax counterfactual regret minimization, which guarantees convergence in the sequential tabular case. Importantly, our algorithm provides a straightforward way of extending the replicator dynamics to the function approximation setting. Empirical results show that NeuRD quickly adapts to nonstationarities, outperforming policy gradient significantly in both tabular and function approximation settings, when evaluated on the standard imperfect information benchmarks of Kuhn Poker, Leduc Poker, and Goofspiel.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2020

From Poincaré Recurrence to Convergence in Imperfect Information Games: Finding Equilibrium via Regularization

In this paper we investigate the Follow the Regularized Leader dynamics in sequential imperfect information games (IIG). We generalize existing results of Poincaré recurrence from normal-form games to zero-sum two-player imperfect information games and other sequential game settings. We then investigate how adapting the reward (by adding a regularization term) of the game can give strong convergence guarantees in monotone games. We continue by showing how this reward adaptation technique can be leveraged to build algorithms that converge exactly to the Nash equilibrium. Finally, we show how these insights can be directly used to build state-of-the-art model-free algorithms for zero-sum two-player Imperfect Information Games (IIG).

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

A Generalized Training Approach for Multiagent Learning

This paper investigates a population-based training regime based on game-theoretic principles called Policy-Spaced Response Oracles (PSRO). PSRO is general in the sense that it (1) encompasses well-known algorithms such as fictitious play and double oracle as special cases, and (2) in principle applies to general-sum, many-player games. Despite this, prior studies of PSRO have been focused on two-player zero-sum games, a regime wherein Nash equilibria are tractably computable. In moving from two-player zero-sum games to more general settings, computation of Nash equilibria quickly becomes infeasible. Here, we extend the theoretical underpinnings of PSRO by considering an alternative solution concept, $α$-Rank, which is unique (thus faces no equilibrium selection issues, unlike Nash) and applies readily to general-sum, many-player settings. We establish convergence guarantees in several games classes, and identify links between Nash equilibria and $α$-Rank. We demonstrate the competitive performance of $α$-Rank-based PSRO against an exact Nash solver-based PSRO in 2-player Kuhn and Leduc Poker. We then go beyond the reach of prior PSRO applications by considering 3- to 5-player poker games, yielding instances where $α$-Rank achieves faster convergence than approximate Nash solvers, thus establishing it as a favorable general games solver. We also carry out an initial empirical validation in MuJoCo soccer, illustrating the feasibility of the proposed approach in another complex domain.

cs.MA↗