arXiv subjects

Shengxin Liu

Publications and source records attributed to Shengxin Liu.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Logarithmic Comparison-Query Complexity for EF1 Allocations

We study the comparison-query complexity of computing allocations that are envy-free up to one item (EF1) for $n$ agents with heterogeneous additive preferences over $m$ indivisible items. In this model, the algorithm may only query which of two bundles an agent prefers, without ever observing numerical valuations or costs. Prior work established $O(\log m)$ query bounds for at most three agents, leaving open whether query complexity logarithmic in $m$ is achievable for every fixed $n \ge 4$. We resolve this open question in the affirmative: for every fixed $n\ge2$, we design algorithms that compute EF1 allocations using $O(\log m)$ comparison queries, matching the known $Ω(\log m)$ lower bound. Our results hold for both chores with nonnegative costs and goods with nonnegative valuations.

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arXiv2026

Non-Existence of PMMS Allocations and a $4/3$-PMMS Guarantee for Additive Chores

We study pairwise maximin share (PMMS) fairness for indivisible items with additive preferences. We give a polynomial-time reduction from chores to goods that preserves the existence of a PMMS allocation. Together with known nonexistence results for chores, this yields nonexistence for additive goods. In addition, we show that deciding if a given instance admits a PMMS allocation is NP-hard. We also give explicit instances whose PMMS factors are $226/227$ for goods and $1.102065$ for chores, certified by exact enumeration. Complementing these impossibility results, we prove that every additive-chore instance admits a $4/3$-PMMS allocation.

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arXiv2026

Comparison-Based Fair Division of Indivisible Chores

We investigate the query complexity of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible chores among $n$ agents with additive cost functions. We depart from the standard cardinal model and assume only comparison access: an algorithm may ask an agent which of two bundles is less costly, but never observes numerical costs. Our first results concern proportionality up to one item (PROP1). We design comparison-based algorithms that compute PROP1 allocations using $O(n^3\log m)$ comparison queries. When the chores are arranged in a fixed order and allocations are required to be contiguous, we compute a contiguous PROP1 allocation using $O(n^3 \log^2 m)$ comparison queries. Our main result concerns the maximin share (MMS) guarantee. We show that for any fixed number of agents $n$ and constant $\varepsilon>0$, a $\left(13/11 +\varepsilon\right)$-MMS allocation can be computed with a comparison complexity logarithmic in $m$. Remarkably, comparison access suffices to match the state-of-the-art $13/11$ cardinal-access guarantee of Huang and Segal-Halevi up to an arbitrarily small loss. Furthermore, our result implies that the MMS distortion of comparison access (i.e., the worst-case multiplicative loss in MMS fairness incurred by observing only comparisons rather than numerical costs) is at most $13/11$. Finally, we show that, for three agents, an allocation satisfying envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) can be computed using $O(\log m)$ comparison queries.

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arXiv2026

Almost Envy-Freeness for Additive Mixed Manna with Entitlements: Deterministic and Randomized Guarantees

We investigate the fair allocation of indivisible items among agents with asymmetric entitlements in mixed manna settings, where the items consist of both goods and chores. For additive valuations, we establish that weighted envy-free up to one item (WEF1) allocations always exist and can be computed in polynomial time. We also study fair and efficient allocation and show that weighted envy-freeness up to one transfer (WEF1T) is compatible with fractional Pareto optimality (fPO) for every mixed-manna instance. This relaxation from WEF1 to WEF1T is tight, as demonstrated by our impossibility result. We further show a best-of-both-worlds result via a finite lottery that guarantees weighted envy-freeness (WEF) in expectation, with every realized allocation satisfying WEF1T and achieving the tight characterization complemented by the existing impossibility result.

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arXiv2026

Sample Complexity of the Second-Best Bilateral Trade

We study the sample complexity of learning near-optimal bilateral trade mechanisms. Unlike previous work on learning simple or fixed-price bilateral-trade mechanisms, we focus on mechanisms satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC), interim individual rationality (IIR), and ex-ante weak budget balance (WBB). In other words, our target is to design a sample-based mechanism that achieves the second-best gains-from-trade benchmark. We give matching or nearly matching upper and lower bounds in three regimes. For regular product distributions on $[0,h]^2$, additive $\varepsilon$-approximation has sample complexity $\widetildeΘ(h^2/\varepsilon^2)$. For multiplicative $(1-α)$-approximation under the same assumptions, we find that the sample complexity is $\widetildeΘ(h/(\mathrm{SB}(D)α^2))$, which is benchmark-sensitive with unavoidable dependence on the second-best gains from trade $\mathrm{SB}(D)$. We also investigate unbounded distributions under a monotone hazard rate (MHR) assumption. The sample complexity depends on the ratio $χ_μ(D)=μ(D)/\mathrm{SB}(D)$, where $μ(D)$ is the sum of the buyer's expected value and the seller's expected cost.

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arXiv2026

Non-Existence of EFX Chore Allocations for Monotone Cost Functions with Binary Marginals

We study the existence of envy-free up to any item (EFX) allocations of indivisible chores when agents have monotone cost functions with binary marginals. For indivisible goods, the corresponding existence question is known to have an affirmative answer for general monotone functions with binary marginals. For chores, however, the existence of EFX allocation was previously known only for more restricted classes, while the general binary-marginal case remained unresolved. In this paper, we provide two counterexamples based on the same 18-agent, 53-chore word gadget, with one cost profile for binary XOS costs and another for binary supermodular costs. In both cases, a complete EFX allocation need not exist. Finally, we formalize and verify our main results in Lean 4.

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arXiv2026

Revisiting the Maximum Defective Clique Problem: Faster Branching and a Tighter Upper Bound

The $k$-defective clique model relaxes the strict completeness constraint of the traditional clique by allowing up to $k$ missing edges, providing a robust formulation for detecting cohesive structures in noisy graphs. Consequently, the maximum $k$-defective clique problem has attracted significant attention. State-of-the-art exact algorithms predominantly adopt the branch-and-bound framework, which recursively partitions the current problem instance (or branch) into two sub-problems via a branching procedure, until each sub-problem becomes trivially solvable. However, this strategy often leads to excessive branching by overlooking intermediate sub-problems that are non-trivial yet efficiently solvable. While recent studies have attempted to refine branching procedures, they fail to address this structural redundancy. To address this, we propose BBRes, a framework that incorporates a novel early termination strategy into the recursive branching process. By employing a specialized polynomial-time solver to identify and resolve tractable sub-instances, BBRes effectively avoids redundant branching steps. Additionally, we design a tailored branching strategy that synergizes with this termination mechanism. As a result, BBRes achieves an improved theoretical worst-case time complexity. To enhance practical performance, we propose a tighter upper bound based on a novel double graph coloring method integrated with max-flow techniques, which is orthogonal to the branching framework. Extensive experiments show that BBRes achieves at least 2X speedup over state-of-the-art methods on a substantial fraction of the datasets.

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arXiv2026

Maximum Edge-based Quasi-Clique: Novel Iterative Frameworks

Extracting cohesive subgraphs from complex networks is a fundamental task in graph analytics and is essential for understanding biological, social, and web graphs. The edge-based $γ$-quasi-clique model offers a flexible alternative by identifying subgraphs whose edge densities exceed a specified threshold $γ$. However, finding the exact maximum edge-based quasi-clique is computationally challenging, as the problem is NP-hard and lacks the hereditary property. These characteristics limit the effectiveness of conventional pruning methods and the development of efficient reduction rules. As a result, existing algorithms, such as QClique and FPCE, struggle to scale to large graphs. In this paper, we revisit the problem and propose a novel iterative framework that reformulates the problem as a sequence of hereditary subproblems, enabling more effective pruning and reduction strategies and improving the worst-case time complexity. Furthermore, we redesign the iterative process and introduce a novel heuristic to further improve practical efficiency. Extensive experiments on 253 large-scale real-world graphs demonstrate that our proposed algorithm EQC-Pro outperforms existing methods by up to four orders of magnitude.

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arXiv2025

Maximum Degree-Based Quasi-Clique Search via an Iterative Framework

Cohesive subgraph mining is a fundamental problem in graph theory with numerous real-world applications, such as social network analysis and protein-protein interaction modeling. Among various cohesive subgraphs, the $γ$-quasi-clique is widely studied for its flexibility in requiring each vertex to connect to at least a $γ$ proportion of other vertices in the subgraph. However, solving the maximum $γ$-quasi-clique problem is NP-hard and further complicated by the lack of the hereditary property, which makes designing efficient pruning strategies challenging. Existing algorithms, such as DDA and FastQC, either struggle with scalability or exhibit significant performance declines for small values of $γ$. In this paper, we propose a novel algorithm, IterQC, which reformulates the maximum $γ$-quasi-clique problem as a series of $k$-plex problems that possess the hereditary property. IterQC introduces a non-trivial iterative framework and incorporates two key optimization techniques: (1) the pseudo lower bound (pseudo LB) technique, which leverages information across iterations to improve the efficiency of branch-and-bound searches, and (2) the preprocessing technique that reduces problem size and unnecessary iterations. Extensive experiments demonstrate that IterQC achieves up to four orders of magnitude speedup and solves significantly more graph instances compared to state-of-the-art algorithms DDA and FastQC.

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arXiv2025

Temporal $k$-Core Query, Revisited

Querying cohesive subgraphs in temporal graphs is essential for understanding the dynamic structure of real-world networks, such as evolving communities in social platforms, shifting hyperlink structures on the Web, and transient communication patterns in call networks. Recently, research has focused on the temporal $k$-core query, which aims to identify all $k$-cores across all possible time sub-intervals within a given query interval. The state-of-the-art algorithm OTCD mitigates redundant computations over overlapping sub-intervals by exploiting inclusion relationships among $k$-cores in different time intervals. Nevertheless, OTCD remains limited in scalability due to the combinatorial growth in interval enumeration and repeated processing. In this paper, we revisit the temporal $k$-core query problem and introduce a novel algorithm CoreT, which dynamically records the earliest timestamp at which each vertex or edge enters a $k$-core. This strategy enables substantial pruning of redundant computations. As a result, CoreT requires only a single pass over the query interval and achieves improved time complexity, which is linear in both the number of temporal edges within the query interval and the duration of the interval, making it highly scalable for long-term temporal analysis. Experimental results on large real-world datasets show that CoreT achieves up to four orders of magnitude speedup compared to the existing state-of-the-art OTCD, demonstrating its effectiveness and scalability for temporal $k$-core analysis.

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arXiv2025

Logarithmic Comparison-Based Query Complexity for Fair Division of Indivisible Goods

We study the problem of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible goods to $n$ agents, where agents may have different preferences over the goods. In the traditional setting, agents' valuations are provided as inputs to the algorithm. In this paper, we adopt the query model, which has been widely considered for other similar problems (such as matching [Nis21], graph isomorphism [OS18], and equilibrium in game [Bab16]), and apply it to the fair division problem. In particular, we consider a new \emph{comparison-based query model}, where the algorithm presents two bundles of goods to an agent and the agent responds by telling the algorithm which bundle she prefers. We investigate the query complexity for computing allocations with several fairness notions, including \emph{proportionality up to one good} (PROP1), \emph{envy-freeness up to one good} (EF1), and \emph{maximin share} (MMS). Our main result is an algorithm that computes an allocation that satisfies both PROP1 and $\frac12$-MMS within $O(\log m)$ queries with a constant number of $n$ agents. For identical and additive valuation, we present an algorithm for computing an EF1 allocation within $O(\log m)$ queries with a constant number of $n$ agents. To complement the positive results, we show that the lower bound of the query complexity for any of the three fairness notions is $Ω(\log m)$ even with two agents.

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arXiv2025

Fair Division with Allocator's Preference

We study the fair allocation of indivisible resources among agents. Most prior work focuses on fairness and/or efficiency among agents. However, the allocator, as the resource owner, may also be involved in many scenarios (e.g., government resource allocation, heritage division, company personnel assignment, etc). The allocator inclines to obtain a fair or efficient allocation based on her preference over the items and to whom each item is allocated. We propose a model and study two problems: 1) Find an allocation fair to both agents and allocator; 2) Maximize allocator's efficiency under agents' fairness. We consider the two fundamental fairness criteria: envy-freeness and proportionality. For the first problem, we study the existence of an allocation that is envy-free up to $c$ goods (EF-$c$) or proportional up to $c$ goods (PROP-$c$) from both the agents' and the allocator's perspectives, called doubly EF-$c$ or doubly PROP-$c$. When the allocator's utility only depends on the items (not recipients), we prove that a doubly EF-$1$ allocation always exists. For the general setting where the allocator has a preference over the items and to whom each item is allocated, a doubly EF-$1$ allocation always exists for two agents, a doubly PROP-$2$ allocation always exists for personalized bi-valued valuations, and a doubly PROP-$O(\log n)$ allocation always exists. For the second problem, we give (in)approximability results with asymptotically tight bounds in most settings. When agents' valuations are binary, maximizing the allocator's social welfare while ensuring agents' fairness criteria of PROP-$c$ (with a general number of agents) and EF-$c$ (with a constant number of agents) are both polynomial-time solvable for any integer $c$. Strong inapproximability holds for most of the other settings (general valuations, EF-$c$, etc).

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arXiv2025

Approximability Landscape of Welfare Maximization within Fair Allocations

Fair allocation of indivisible goods studies allocating $m$ goods among $n$ agents in a fair manner. While fairness is a fundamental requirement in many real-world applications, it often conflicts with (economic) efficiency. This raises a natural and important question: How can we identify the most welfare-efficient allocation among all fair allocations? This paper answers from the perspective of computational complexity. Specifically, we study the problem of maximizing utilitarian social welfare under two widely studied fairness criteria: envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) and envy-freeness up to one item (EF1). We examine both normalized and unnormalized valuations, where normalized valuations require that each agent's total utility for all items is identical. The key contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: (i) we sketch the complete complexity landscape of welfare maximization subject to fair allocation constraints; and (ii) we provide interesting bounds on the price of fairness for both EFX and EF1. Specifically: (1) For $n=2$ agents, we develop polynomial-time approximation schemes (PTAS) and provide NP-hardness results for EFX and EF1 constraints; (2) For $n>2$ agents, under EFX constraints, we design algorithms that achieve approximation ratios of $O(n)$ and $O(\sqrt{n})$ for unnormalized and normalized valuations, respectively. These results are complemented by asymptotically tight inapproximability results. We also obtain similar results for EF1 constraints; (3) When the number of agents is a fixed constant, we show that the optimal solution can be computed in polynomial time by slightly relaxing the fairness constraints, whereas exact fairness leads to strong inapproximability; (4) Furthermore, our results imply the price of EFX is $Θ(\sqrt{n})$ for normalized valuations, which is unknown in the literature.

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arXiv2024

Fair Division with Subjective Divisibility

The classic fair division problems assume the resources to be allocated are either divisible or indivisible, or contain a mixture of both, but the agents always have a predetermined and uncontroversial agreement on the (in)divisibility of the resources. In this paper, we propose and study a new model for fair division in which agents have their own subjective divisibility over the goods to be allocated. That is, some agents may find a good to be indivisible and get utilities only if they receive the whole good, while others may consider the same good to be divisible and thus can extract utilities according to the fraction of the good they receive. We investigate fairness properties that can be achieved when agents have subjective divisibility. First, we consider the maximin share (MMS) guarantee and show that the worst-case MMS approximation guarantee is at most $2/3$ for $n \geq 2$ agents and this ratio is tight in the two- and three-agent cases. This is in contrast to the classic fair division settings involving two or three agents. We also give an algorithm that produces a $1/2$-MMS allocation for an arbitrary number of agents. Second, we study a hierarchy of envy-freeness relaxations, including EF1M, EFM and EFXM, ordered by increasing strength. While EF1M is compatible with non-wastefulness (an economic efficiency notion), this is not the case for EFM, even for two agents. Nevertheless, an EFXM and non-wasteful allocation always exists for two agents if at most one good is discarded.

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arXiv2024

Best-of-Both-Worlds Fair Allocation of Indivisible and Mixed Goods

We study the problem of fairly allocating either a set of indivisible goods or a set of mixed divisible and indivisible goods (i.e., mixed goods) to agents with additive utilities, taking the best-of-both-worlds perspective of guaranteeing fairness properties both ex ante and ex post. The ex-post fairness notions considered in this paper are relaxations of envy-freeness, specifically, EFX for indivisible-goods allocation, and EFM for mixed-goods allocation. For two agents, we show that there is a polynomial-time randomized algorithm that achieves ex-ante envy-freeness and ex-post EFX / EFM simultaneously. For $n$ agents with bi-valued utilities, we show there exist randomized allocations that are (i) ex-ante proportional and ex-post EFM, and (ii) ex-ante envy-free, ex-post EFX, and ex-post fractionally Pareto optimal.

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arXiv2024

Mixed Fair Division: A Survey

Fair division considers the allocation of scarce resources among agents in such a way that every agent gets a fair share. It is a fundamental problem in society and has received significant attention and rapid developments from the game theory and artificial intelligence communities in recent years. The majority of the fair division literature can be divided along at least two orthogonal directions: goods versus chores, and divisible versus indivisible resources. In this survey, besides describing the state of the art, we outline a number of interesting open questions and future directions in three mixed fair division settings: (i) indivisible goods and chores, (ii) divisible and indivisible goods (mixed goods), and (iii) indivisible goods with subsidy which can be viewed like a divisible good.

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arXiv2024

Maximum $k$-Plex Search: An Alternated Reduction-and-Bound Method

$k$-plexes relax cliques by allowing each vertex to disconnect to at most $k$ vertices. Finding a maximum $k$-plex in a graph is a fundamental operator in graph mining and has been receiving significant attention from various domains. The state-of-the-art algorithms all adopt the branch-reduction-and-bound (BRB) framework where a key step, called reduction-and-bound (RB), is used for narrowing down the search space. A common practice of RB in existing works is SeqRB, which sequentially conducts the reduction process followed by the bounding process once at a branch. However, these algorithms suffer from the efficiency issues. In this paper, we propose a new alternated reduction-and-bound method AltRB for conducting RB. AltRB first partitions a branch into two parts and then alternatively and iteratively conducts the reduction process and the bounding process at each part of a branch. With newly-designed reduction rules and bounding methods, AltRB is superior to SeqRB in effectively narrowing down the search space in both theory and practice. Further, to boost the performance of BRB algorithms, we develop efficient and effective pre-processing methods which reduce the size of the input graph and heuristically compute a large $k$-plex as the lower bound. We conduct extensive experiments on 664 real and synthetic graphs. The experimental results show that our proposed algorithm kPEX with AltRB and novel pre-processing techniques runs up to two orders of magnitude faster and solves more instances than state-of-the-art algorithms.

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arXiv2024

Allocating Mixed Goods with Customized Fairness and Indivisibility Ratio

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a combination of divisible and indivisible goods. While fairness criteria like envy-freeness (EF) and proportionality (PROP) can always be achieved for divisible goods, only their relaxed versions, such as the ''up to one'' relaxations EF1 and PROP1, can be satisfied when the goods are indivisible. The ''up to one'' relaxations require the fairness conditions to be satisfied provided that one good can be completely eliminated or added in the comparison. In this work, we bridge the gap between the two extremes and propose ''up to a fraction'' relaxations for the allocation of mixed divisible and indivisible goods. The fraction is determined based on the proportion of indivisible goods, which we call the indivisibility ratio. The new concepts also introduce asymmetric conditions that are customized for individuals with varying indivisibility ratios. We provide both upper and lower bounds on the fractions of the modified item in order to satisfy the fairness criterion. Our results are tight up to a constant for EF and asymptotically tight for PROP.

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