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Shlok Nahar

Publications and source records attributed to Shlok Nahar.

15 recordsLinked to original sources

Enforcing IID structure on time-bin encoded QKD protocols via coarse-graining

Many security proofs for quantum key distribution (QKD) require Bob's measurement to have a tensor-product structure across protocol rounds, with some techniques requiring the stronger independent-and-identically-distributed (IID) condition. Time-bin encoded protocols often rely on interferometers whose detector outcomes depend on the interference between optical modes from neighbouring rounds, obstructing the direct application of such proofs. We show that classical post-processing of Bob's measurement data --- specifically, discarding the outcomes of detectors sensitive to inter-round coherence --- is sufficient to recover a product measurement positive operator-valued measure (POVM) (which is IID when the same single-round setup is used in every round). Applied to the Mach-Zehnder interferometer and the IID variant of the COW detection setup, this removes the need for the additional vacuum pulse introduced in prior analyses to establish tensor product structure of the measurement POVM, recovering better key rates without placing any restriction on Eve's attack.

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Authentication in Security Proofs for Quantum Key Distribution

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols rely on authenticated classical communication. Typical QKD security proofs are carried out in an idealized setting where authentication is assumed to behave honestly: it never aborts, and all classical messages are delivered faithfully with their original timing preserved. Authenticated channels that can be constructed in practice have different properties. Most critically, such channels may abort asymmetrically, such that only the receiving party may detect an authentication failure while the sending party remains unaware. Furthermore, an adversary may delay, reorder, or block classical messages. This discrepancy renders the standard QKD security definition and existing QKD security proofs invalid in the practical authentication setting. In this work we resolve this issue. Our main result is a reduction theorem showing that, under mild and easily satisfied protocol conditions, any QKD protocol proven secure under the honest authentication setting remains secure under a practical authentication setting. This result allows all existing QKD proofs to be retroactively lifted to the practical authentication setting with a minor protocol tweak.

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A rigorous and complete security proof of decoy-state BB84 quantum key distribution

We present a rigorous and complete security proof of the decoy-state BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol. Our analysis aims to achieve a high standard of mathematical rigour and completeness, thereby providing the necessary foundation for certification and standardization efforts. Beyond establishing the security of a specific protocol, this work develops a general and modular framework that can be readily adapted to a broad class of QKD protocols, including both prepare-and-measure and entanglement-based variants. Our framework unifies all major ingredients required for the analysis of realistic QKD protocols, including the analysis of classical authentication and classical processing, source-replacement schemes, finite-size analysis, source maps, squashing maps, and decoy-state techniques. In doing so, this work consolidates a diverse range of techniques scattered across the QKD literature into a unified formalism, representing a general and rigorous treatment of QKD security. Finally, it outlines a clear path towards incorporating practical imperfections within the same framework, thereby laying the groundwork for addressing implementation security in future analysis.

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Phase error estimation for passive detection setups with imperfections and memory effects

We develop a generic framework to bound the phase error rate for quantum key distribution protocols using passive detection setups with imperfections and memory effects. This framework can be used in proof techniques based on the entropic uncertainty relation or phase error correction, to prove security in the finite-size regime against coherent attacks. Our framework can incorporate on-the-fly announcements of click/no-click outcomes on Bob's side. In the case of imperfections without memory effects, it can be combined with proofs addressing source imperfections in a modular manner. We apply our framework to compute key rates for the decoy-state BB84 protocol, when the beam splitting ratio, the detection efficiency, and dark counts of the detectors are only known to be within some ranges. We also compute key rates in the presence of memory effects in the detectors. In this case, our results allow for protocols to be run at higher repetition rates, resulting in a significant improvement in the secure key generation rate.

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Incorporating device characterization into security proofs

Typical security proofs for quantum key distribution (QKD) rely on having some model for the devices, with the security guarantees implicitly relying on the values of various parameters of the model, such as dark count rates or detector efficiencies. Hence to deploy QKD in practice, we must establish how to certify or characterize the model parameters of a manufacturer's QKD devices. We present a rigorous framework for analyzing such procedures, laying out concrete requirements for both the security proofs and the certification or characterization procedures. In doing so, we describe various forms of conclusions that can and cannot be validly drawn from such procedures, addressing some potential misconceptions. We also discuss connections to composable security frameworks and some technical aspects that remain to be resolved in that direction.

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Security of quantum key distribution with source and detector imperfections through phase-error estimation

Quantum key distribution promises information-theoretic security, but practical implementations face vulnerabilities due to device imperfections. Existing security proofs typically address source and detector imperfections separately and cannot be directly combined, while the few attempts to handle both simultaneously have assumed idealized scenarios with infinitely many protocol rounds, which is insufficient to certify the security of real-world systems. Here, we close this gap by introducing a modular lifting theorem that extends any (present or future) phase-error-based security proof for BB84-type protocols to incorporate detector efficiency mismatches. By applying this theorem to a state-of-the-art analysis for source imperfections, we obtain the first finite-key security proof against general coherent attacks that simultaneously addresses both source and detector imperfections.

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Imperfect detectors for adversarial tasks with applications to quantum key distribution

Security analyses in quantum key distribution (QKD) and other adversarial quantum tasks often assume perfect device models. However, real-world implementations often deviate from these models. Thus, it is important to develop security proofs that account for such deviations from ideality. In this work, we extend the idea of squashing maps to develop a general framework for analysing imperfect threshold detectors, treating uncharacterised device parameters such as dark counts and detection efficiencies as adversarially controlled within some ranges. This approach enables a rigorous worst-case analysis with exactly characterised devices, ensuring security proofs remain valid under realistic conditions. Our results strengthen the connection between theoretical security and practical implementations by introducing a flexible framework for integrating detector imperfections into adversarial quantum protocols.

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Security proofs for practical QKD: variations, techniques, gaps, and limitations

We review the current status of security proofs for practical decoy-state Quantum Key Distribution using the BB84 protocol, focusing on optical implementations with weak coherent pulses and threshold photodetectors. The primary aim of this review is to highlight gaps in the existing literature. Such gaps may arise, for instance, from mismatches between detailed protocol specifications and proof technique elements, reliance on earlier results based on different assumptions, or protocol choices that overlook real world requirements. While substantial progress has been made, our overview draws attention to the details that still demand careful attention.

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Postselection technique for optical Quantum Key Distribution with improved de Finetti reductions

The postselection technique is an important proof technique for proving the security of quantum key distribution protocols against coherent attacks. In this work, we go through multiple steps to rigorously apply the postselection technique to optical quantum key distribution protocols. First, we place the postselection technique on a rigorous mathematical foundation by fixing a technical flaw in the original postselection paper. Second, we extend the applicability of the postselection technique to prepare-and-measure protocols by using a de Finetti reduction with a fixed marginal. Third, we show how the postselection technique can be used for decoy-state protocols by tagging the source. Finally, we extend the applicability of the postselection technique to realistic optical setups by developing a new variant of the flag-state squasher. We also improve existing de Finetti reductions, which reduce the effect of using the postselection technique on the key rate. These improvements can be more generally applied to other quantum information processing tasks. As an example to demonstrate the applicability of our work, we apply our results to the time-bin encoded three-state protocol. We observe that the postselection technique performs better than all other known proof techniques against coherent attacks.

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Phase error rate estimation in QKD with imperfect detectors

We present a finite-size security proof of the decoy-state BB84 QKD protocol against coherent attacks, using entropic uncertainty relations, for imperfect detectors. We apply this result to the case of detectors with imperfectly characterized basis-efficiency mismatch. Our proof works by obtaining a suitable bound on the phase error rate, without requiring any new modifications to the protocol steps or hardware. It is applicable to imperfectly characterized detectors, and only requires the maximum relative difference in detection efficiencies and dark count rates of the detectors to be characterized. Moreover, our proof allows Eve to choose detector efficiencies and dark count rates in their allowed ranges in each round, thereby addressing an important problem of detector side channels. We prove security in the variable-length framework, where users are allowed to adaptively determine the length of key to be produced, and number of bits to be used for error-correction, based on observations made during the protocol. We quantitatively demonstrate the effect of basis-efficiency mismatch by applying our results to the decoy-state BB84 protocol.

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Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect phase randomisation

The performance of quantum key distribution (QKD) is severely limited by multiphoton emissions, due to the photon-number-splitting attack. The most efficient solution, the decoy-state method, requires that the phases of all transmitted pulses are independent and uniformly random. In practice, however, these phases are often correlated, especially in high-speed systems, which opens a security loophole. Here, we address this pressing problem by providing a security proof for decoy-state QKD with correlated phases that offers key rates close to the ideal scenario. Our work paves the way towards high-performance secure QKD with practical laser sources, and may have applications beyond QKD.

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Imperfect Phase-Randomisation and Generalised Decoy-State Quantum Key Distribution

Decoy-state methods [1-3] are essential to perform quantum key distribution (QKD) at large distances in the absence of single photon sources. However, the standard techniques apply only if laser pulses are used that are independent and identically distributed (iid). Moreover, they require that the laser pulses are fully phase-randomised. However, realistic high-speed QKD setups do not meet these stringent requirements [4]. In this work, we generalise decoy-state analysis to accommodate laser sources that emit imperfectly phase-randomised states. We also develop theoretical tools to prove the security of protocols with lasers that emit pulses that are independent, but not identically distributed. These tools can be used with recent work [5] to prove the security of laser sources with correlated phase distributions as well. We quantitatively demonstrate the effect of imperfect phase-randomisation on key rates by computing the key rates for a simple implementation of the three-state protocol.

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Oscillating photonic Bell state from a semiconductor quantum dot for quantum key distribution

An on-demand source of bright entangled photon pairs is desirable for quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum repeaters. The leading candidate to generate entangled photon pairs is based on spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC) in a non-linear crystal. However, there exists a fundamental trade-off between entanglement fidelity and efficiency in SPDC sources due to multiphoton emission at high brightness, which limits the pair extraction efficiency to 0.1% when operating at near-unity fidelity. Quantum dots in photonic nanostructures can in principle overcome this trade-off; however, the quantum dots that have achieved entanglement fidelities on par with SPDC sources (99%) have poor pair extraction efficiencies of 0.01%. Here, we demonstrate a 65-fold increase in the pair extraction efficiency compared to quantum dots with equivalent peak fidelity from an InAsP quantum dot in a photonic nanowire waveguide. We measure a raw peak concurrence and fidelity of 95.3% $\pm$ 0.5% and 97.5% $\pm$ 0.8%, respectively. Finally, we show that an oscillating two-photon Bell state generated by a semiconductor quantum dot can be utilized to establish a secure key for QKD, alleviating the need to remove the quantum dot energy splitting of the intermediate exciton states in the biexciton-exciton cascade.

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Path integrals, spontaneous localisation, and the classical limit

We recall that in order to obtain the classical limit of quantum mechanics one needs to take the $\hbar\rightarrow 0$ limit. In addition, one also needs an explanation for the absence of macroscopic quantum superposition of position states. One possible explanation for the latter is the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) model of spontaneous localisation. Here we describe how spontaneous localisation modifies the path integral formulation of density matrix evolution in quantum mechanics. (Such a formulation has been derived earlier by Pearle and Soucek; we provide two new derivations of their result). We then show how the von Neumann equation and the Liouville equation for the density matrix arise in the quantum and classical limit, respectively, from the GRW path integral. Thus we provide a rigorous demonstration of the quantum to classical transition.

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Preparations and Weak Quantum Control can Witness non-Markovianity

The dynamics of a system that is initially correlated with an environment is almost always non-Markovian. Hence it is important to characterise such initial correlations experimentally and witness them in physically realistic settings. One such setting is weak-field phase control, where chemical reactions are sought to be controlled by the phase of shaped weak laser pulses. In this manuscript, we show how weak quantum controllability can be combined with quantum preparations to witness initial correlations between the system and the environment. Furthermore we show how weak field phase control can be applied to witness when the quantum regression formula does not apply.

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