arXiv subjects

Shreyas Sundaram

Publications and source records attributed to Shreyas Sundaram.

At least 91 records · Page 5Linked to original sources

arXiv2017

Distributed Functional Observers for LTI Systems

We study the problem of designing distributed functional observers for LTI systems. Specifically, we consider a setting consisting of a state vector that evolves over time according to a dynamical process. A set of nodes distributed over a communication network wish to collaboratively estimate certain functions of the state. We first show that classical existence conditions for the design of centralized functional observers do not directly translate to the distributed setting, due to the coupling that exists between the dynamics of the functions of interest and the diverse measurements at the various nodes. Accordingly, we design transformations that reveal such couplings and identify portions of the corresponding dynamics that are locally detectable at each sensor node. We provide sufficient conditions on the network, along with state estimate update and exchange rules for each node, that guarantee asymptotic reconstruction of the functions at each sensor node.

math.OC↗

arXiv2017

Distributed Observers for LTI Systems

We consider the problem of distributed state estimation of a linear time-invariant (LTI) system by a network of sensors. We develop a distributed observer that guarantees asymptotic reconstruction of the state for the most general class of LTI systems, sensor network topologies and sensor measurement structures. Our analysis builds upon the following key observation - a given node can reconstruct a portion of the state solely by using its own measurements and constructing appropriate Luenberger observers; hence it only needs to exchange information with neighbors (via consensus dynamics) for estimating the portion of the state that is not locally detectable. This intuitive approach leads to a new class of distributed observers with several appealing features. Furthermore, by imposing additional constraints on the system dynamics and network topology, we show that it is possible to construct a simpler version of the proposed distributed observer that achieves the same objective while admitting a fully distributed design phase. Our general framework allows extensions to time-varying networks that result from communication losses, and scenarios including faults or attacks at the nodes.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2016

The Game-Theoretic Formation of Interconnections Between Networks

We introduce a network design game where the objective of the players is to design the interconnections between the nodes of two different networks $G_1$ and $G_2$ in order to maximize certain local utility functions. In this setting, each player is associated with a node in $G_1$ and has functional dependencies on certain nodes in $G_2$. We use a distance-based utility for the players in which the goal of each player is to purchase a set of edges (incident to its associated node) such that the sum of the distances between its associated node and the nodes it depends on in $G_2$ is minimized. We consider a heterogeneous set of players (i.e., players have their own costs and benefits for constructing edges). We show that finding a best response of a player in this game is NP-hard. Despite this, we characterize some properties of the best response actions which are helpful in determining a Nash equilibrium for certain instances of this game. In particular, we prove existence of pure Nash equilibria in this game when $G_2$ contains a star subgraph, and provide an algorithm that outputs such an equilibrium for any set of players. Finally, we show that the price of anarchy in this game can be arbitrarily large.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2016

Ignoring Extreme Opinions in Complex Networks: The Impact of Heterogeneous Thresholds

We consider a class of opinion dynamics on networks where at each time-step, each node in the network disregards the opinions of a certain number of its most extreme neighbors and updates its own opinion as a weighted average of the remaining opinions. When all nodes disregard the same number of extreme neighbors, previous work has shown that consensus will be reached if and only if the network satisfies certain topological properties. In this paper, we consider the implications of allowing each node to have a personal threshold for the number of extreme neighbors to ignore. We provide graph conditions under which consensus is guaranteed for such dynamics. We then study random networks where each node's threshold is drawn from a certain distribution, and provide conditions on that distribution, together with conditions on the edge formation probability, that guarantee that consensus will be reached asymptotically almost surely.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2016

Pursuit on a Graph under Partial Information from Sensors

We consider a class of pursuit-evasion problems where an evader enters a directed acyclic graph and attempts to reach one of the terminal nodes. A pursuer enters the graph at a later time and attempts to capture the evader before it reaches a terminal node. The pursuer can only obtain information about the evader's path via sensors located at each node in the graph; the sensor measurements are either green or red (indicating whether or not the evader has passed through that node). We first show that it is NP-hard to determine whether the pursuer can enter with some nonzero delay and still be guaranteed to capture the evader, even for the simplest case when the underlying graph is a tree. This also implies that it is NP-hard to determine the largest delay at which the pursuer can enter and still have a guaranteed capture policy. We further show that it is NP-hard to approximate (within any constant factor) the largest delay at which the pursuer can enter. Finally, we provide an algorithm to compute the maximum pursuer delay for a class of node-sweeping policies on tree networks and show that this algorithm runs in linear-time for bounded-degree trees.

math.CO↗

arXiv2016

Interdependent Security Games on Networks under Behavioral Probability Weighting

We consider a class of interdependent security games on networks where each node chooses a personal level of security investment. The attack probability experienced by a node is a function of her own investment and the investment by her neighbors in the network. Most of the existing work in these settings considers players who are risk-neutral. In contrast, studies in behavioral decision theory have shown that individuals often deviate from risk-neutral behavior while making decisions under uncertainty. In particular, the true probabilities associated with uncertain outcomes are often transformed into perceived probabilities in a highly nonlinear fashion by the users, which then influence their decisions. In this paper, we investigate the effects of such behavioral probability weightings by the nodes on their optimal investment strategies and the resulting security risk profiles that arise at the Nash equilibria of interdependent network security games. We characterize graph topologies that achieve the largest and smallest worst case average attack probabilities at Nash equilibria in Total Effort games, and equilibrium investments in Weakest Link and Best Shot games.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2016

Fragility of the Commons under Prospect-Theoretic Risk Attitudes

We study a common-pool resource game where the resource experiences failure with a probability that grows with the aggregate investment in the resource. To capture decision making under such uncertainty, we model each player's risk preference according to the value function from prospect theory. We show the existence and uniqueness of a pure Nash equilibrium when the players have heterogeneous risk preferences and under certain assumptions on the rate of return and failure probability of the resource. Greater competition, vis-a-vis the number of players, increases the failure probability at the Nash equilibrium; we quantify this effect by obtaining bounds on the ratio of the failure probability at the Nash equilibrium to the failure probability under investment by a single user. We further show that heterogeneity in attitudes towards loss aversion leads to higher failure probability of the resource at the equilibrium.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2016

Distributed Optimization Under Adversarial Nodes

We investigate the vulnerabilities of consensus-based distributed optimization protocols to nodes that deviate from the prescribed update rule (e.g., due to failures or adversarial attacks). We first characterize certain fundamental limitations on the performance of any distributed optimization algorithm in the presence of adversaries. We then propose a resilient distributed optimization algorithm that guarantees that the non-adversarial nodes converge to the convex hull of the minimizers of their local functions under certain conditions on the graph topology, regardless of the actions of a certain number of adversarial nodes. In particular, we provide sufficient conditions on the graph topology to tolerate a bounded number of adversaries in the neighborhood of every non-adversarial node, and necessary and sufficient conditions to tolerate a globally bounded number of adversaries. For situations where there are up to F adversaries in the neighborhood of every node, we use the concept of maximal F-local sets of graphs to provide lower bounds on the distance-to-optimality of achievable solutions under any algorithm. We show that finding the size of such sets is NP-hard.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2016

Robustness of Leader-Follower Networked Dynamical Systems

We present a graph-theoretic approach to analyzing the robustness of leader-follower consensus dynamics to disturbances and time delays. Robustness to disturbances is captured via the system $\mathcal{H}_2$ and $\mathcal{H}_{\infty}$ norms and robustness to time delay is defined as the maximum allowable delay for the system to remain asymptotically stable. Our analysis is built on understanding certain spectral properties of the grounded Laplacian matrix that play a key role in such dynamics. Specifically, we give graph-theoretic bounds on the extreme eigenvalues of the grounded Laplacian matrix which quantify the impact of disturbances and time-delays on the leader-follower dynamics. We then provide tight characterizations of these robustness metrics in Erdos-Renyi random graphs and random regular graphs. Finally, we view robustness to disturbances and time delay as network centrality metrics, and provide conditions under which a leader in a network optimizes each robustness objective. Furthermore, we propose a sufficient condition under which a single leader optimizes both robustness objectives simultaneously.

math.OC↗

arXiv2015

The Strategic Formation of Multi-Layer Networks

We study the strategic formation of multi-layer networks, where each layer represents a different type of relationship between the nodes in the network and is designed to maximize some utility that depends on the topology of that layer and those of the other layers. We start by generalizing distance-based network formation to the two-layer setting, where edges are constructed in one layer (with fixed cost per edge) to minimize distances between nodes that are neighbors in another layer. We show that designing an optimal network in this setting is NP-hard. Despite the underlying complexity of the problem, we characterize certain properties of the optimal networks. We then formulate a multi-layer network formation game where each layer corresponds to a player that is optimally choosing its edge set in response to the edge sets of the other players. We consider utility functions that view the different layers as strategic substitutes. By applying our results about optimal networks, we show that players with low edge costs drive players with high edge costs out of the game, and that hub-and-spoke networks that are commonly observed in transportation systems arise as Nash equilibria in this game.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2015

Robustness and Algebraic Connectivity of Random Interdependent Networks

We investigate certain structural properties of random interdependent networks. We start by studying a property known as $r$-robustness, which is a strong indicator of the ability of a network to tolerate structural perturbations and dynamical attacks. We show that random $k$-partite graphs exhibit a threshold for $r$-robustness, and that this threshold is the same as the one for the graph to have minimum degree $r$. We then extend this characterization to random interdependent networks with arbitrary intra-layer topologies. Finally, we characterize the algebraic connectivity of such networks, and provide an asymptotically tight rate of growth of this quantity for a certain range of inter-layer edge formation probabilities. Our results arise from a characterization of the isoperimetric constant of random interdependent networks, and yield new insights into the structure and robustness properties of such networks.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2015

Multi-Agent Decentralized Network Interdiction Games

In this work, we introduce decentralized network interdiction games, which model the interactions among multiple interdictors with differing objectives operating on a common network. As a starting point, we focus on decentralized shortest path interdiction (DSPI) games, where multiple interdictors try to increase the shortest path lengths of their own adversaries, who all attempt to traverse a common network. We first establish results regarding the existence of equilibria for DSPI games under both discrete and continuous interdiction strategies. To compute such an equilibrium, we present a reformulation of the DSPI games, which leads to a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) with non-shared constraints. While such a problem is computationally challenging in general, we show that under continuous interdiction actions, a DSPI game can be formulated as a linear complementarity problem and solved by Lemke's algorithm. In addition, we present decentralized heuristic algorithms based on best response dynamics for games under both continuous and discrete interdiction strategies. Finally, we establish theoretical bounds on the worst-case efficiency loss of equilibria in DSPI games, with such loss caused by the lack of coordination among noncooperative interdictors, and use the decentralized algorithms to empirically study the average-case efficiency loss.

math.OC↗

arXiv2014

On the Smallest Eigenvalue of Grounded Laplacian Matrices

We provide upper and lower bounds on the smallest eigenvalue of grounded Laplacian matrices (which are matrices obtained by removing certain rows and columns of the Laplacian matrix of a given graph). The gap between the upper and lower bounds depends on the ratio of the smallest and largest components of the eigenvector corresponding to the smallest eigenvalue of the grounded Laplacian. We provide a graph-theoretic bound on this ratio, and subsequently obtain a tight characterization of the smallest eigenvalue for certain classes of graphs. Specifically, for Erdos-Renyi random graphs, we show that when a (sufficiently small) set $S$ of rows and columns is removed from the Laplacian, and the probability $p$ of adding an edge is sufficiently large, the smallest eigenvalue of the grounded Laplacian asymptotically almost surely approaches $|S|p$. We also show that for random $d$-regular graphs with a single row and column removed, the smallest eigenvalue is $Θ(\frac{d}{n})$. Our bounds have applications to the study of the convergence rate in continuous-time and discrete-time consensus dynamics with stubborn or leader nodes.

math.CO↗

arXiv2013

Robustness of Complex Networks with Implications for Consensus and Contagion

We study a graph-theoretic property known as robustness, which plays a key role in certain classes of dynamics on networks (such as resilient consensus, contagion and bootstrap percolation). This property is stronger than other graph properties such as connectivity and minimum degree in that one can construct graphs with high connectivity and minimum degree but low robustness. However, we show that the notions of connectivity and robustness coincide on common random graph models for complex networks (Erdos-Renyi, geometric random, and preferential attachment graphs). More specifically, the properties share the same threshold function in the Erdos-Renyi model, and have the same values in one-dimensional geometric graphs and preferential attachment networks. This indicates that a variety of purely local diffusion dynamics will be effective at spreading information in such networks. Although graphs generated according to the above constructions are inherently robust, we also show that it is coNP-complete to determine whether any given graph is robust to a specified extent.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2013

Distributed Dominating Sets on Grids

This paper presents a distributed algorithm for finding near optimal dominating sets on grids. The basis for this algorithm is an existing centralized algorithm that constructs dominating sets on grids. The size of the dominating set provided by this centralized algorithm is upper-bounded by $\lceil\frac{(m+2)(n+2)}{5}\rceil$ for $m\times n$ grids and its difference from the optimal domination number of the grid is upper-bounded by five. Both the centralized and distributed algorithms are generalized for the $k$-distance dominating set problem, where all grid vertices are within distance $k$ of the vertices in the dominating set.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2013

Resilient Continuous-Time Consensus in Fractional Robust Networks

In this paper, we study the continuous-time consensus problem in the presence of adversaries. The networked multi-agent system is modeled as a switched system, where the normal agents have integrator dynamics and the switching signal determines the topology of the network. We consider several models of omniscient adversaries under the assumption that at most a fraction of any normal agent's neighbors may be adversaries. Under this fractional assumption on the interaction between normal and adversary agents, we show that a novel graph theoretic metric, called fractional robustness, is useful for analyzing the network topologies under which the normal agents achieve consensus.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2012

Consensus of Multi-Agent Networks in the Presence of Adversaries Using Only Local Information

This paper addresses the problem of resilient consensus in the presence of misbehaving nodes. Although it is typical to assume knowledge of at least some nonlocal information when studying secure and fault-tolerant consensus algorithms, this assumption is not suitable for large-scale dynamic networks. To remedy this, we emphasize the use of local strategies to deal with resilience to security breaches. We study a consensus protocol that uses only local information and we consider worst-case security breaches, where the compromised nodes have full knowledge of the network and the intentions of the other nodes. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the normal nodes to reach consensus despite the influence of the malicious nodes under different threat assumptions. These conditions are stated in terms of a novel graph-theoretic property referred to as network robustness.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2012

Robustness of Information Diffusion Algorithms to Locally Bounded Adversaries

We consider the problem of diffusing information in networks that contain malicious nodes. We assume that each normal node in the network has no knowledge of the network topology other than an upper bound on the number of malicious nodes in its neighborhood. We introduce a topological property known as r-robustness of a graph, and show that this property provides improved bounds on tolerating malicious behavior, in comparison to traditional concepts such as connectivity and minimum degree. We use this topological property to analyze the canonical problems of distributed consensus and broadcasting, and provide sufficient conditions for these operations to succeed. Finally, we provide a construction for r-robust graphs and show that the common preferential-attachment model for scale-free networks produces a robust graph.

cs.SI↗