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Shuaiqing Zhang

Publications and source records attributed to Shuaiqing Zhang.

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Electrically Tunable Two-Component Exciton Condensate in a Coulomb-Coupled Graphene Trilayer

Multicomponent condensates possess internal phase degrees of freedom unavailable to a single-component condensate, yet their components are rarely controllable in solids. Here we realize a graphene trilayer with negligible interlayer tunnelling in which the layer-specific carrier densities are continuously tuned by electrostatic gating. Quantum-capacitance measurements demonstrate that charge-incompressible quantum Hall states at total filling factors 1 and 2 persist across the full range of layer-filling configurations and continuously connect the three bilayer exciton-condensate limits. This persistence provides evidence for a trilayer excitonic state. Static Hartree-Fock and time-dependent Hartree-Fock calculations yield two independent finite phase-stiffness eigenmodes and two linearly dispersing Goldstone modes, respectively, when all three layers are partially filled, whereas only one phase-stiffness eigenmode and one linear Goldstone mode remain when one layer is unfilled. The stiffness eigenmodes rotate continuously between the two adjacent-layer exciton bases as charge is transferred among the layers, revealing electrical control of the condensate-mode composition. Together, the experimental and theoretical results support the identification of a two-component exciton condensate with a continuously tunable internal structure.

cond-mat.mes-hall

Time Tells All: Deanonymization of Blockchain RPC Users with Zero Transaction Fee (Extended Version)

Remote Procedure Call (RPC) services have become a primary gateway for users to access public blockchains. While they offer significant convenience, RPC services also introduce critical privacy challenges that remain insufficiently examined. Existing deanonymization attacks either do not apply to blockchain RPC users or incur costs like transaction fees assuming an active network eavesdropper. In this paper, we propose a novel deanonymization attack that can link an IP address of a RPC user to this user's blockchain pseudonym. Our analysis reveals a temporal correlation between the timestamps of transaction confirmations recorded on the public ledger and those of TCP packets sent by the victim when querying transaction status. We assume a strong passive adversary with access to network infrastructure, capable of monitoring traffic at network border routers or Internet exchange points. By monitoring network traffic and analyzing public ledgers, the attacker can link the IP address of the TCP packet to the pseudonym of the transaction initiator by exploiting the temporal correlation. This deanonymization attack incurs zero transaction fee. We mathematically model and analyze the attack method, perform large-scale measurements of blockchain ledgers, and conduct real-world attacks to validate the attack. Our attack achieves a high success rate of over 95% against normal RPC users on various blockchain networks, including Ethereum, Bitcoin and Solana.

cs.CR