arXiv subjects

Shuchi Chawla

Publications and source records attributed to Shuchi Chawla.

At least 55 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

arXiv2017

Truth and Regret in Online Scheduling

We consider a scheduling problem where a cloud service provider has multiple units of a resource available over time. Selfish clients submit jobs, each with an arrival time, deadline, length, and value. The service provider's goal is to implement a truthful online mechanism for scheduling jobs so as to maximize the social welfare of the schedule. Recent work shows that under a stochastic assumption on job arrivals, there is a single-parameter family of mechanisms that achieves near-optimal social welfare. We show that given any such family of near-optimal online mechanisms, there exists an online mechanism that in the worst case performs nearly as well as the best of the given mechanisms. Our mechanism is truthful whenever the mechanisms in the given family are truthful and prompt, and achieves optimal (within constant factors) regret. We model the problem of competing against a family of online scheduling mechanisms as one of learning from expert advice. A primary challenge is that any scheduling decisions we make affect not only the payoff at the current step, but also the resource availability and payoffs in future steps. Furthermore, switching from one algorithm (a.k.a. expert) to another in an online fashion is challenging both because it requires synchronization with the state of the latter algorithm as well as because it affects the incentive structure of the algorithms. We further show how to adapt our algorithm to a non-clairvoyant setting where job lengths are unknown until jobs are run to completion. Once again, in this setting, we obtain truthfulness along with asymptotically optimal regret (within poly-logarithmic factors).

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arXiv2016

Timing Matters: Online Dynamics in Broadcast Games

A central question in algorithmic game theory is to measure the inefficiency (ratio of costs) of Nash equilibria (NE) with respect to socially optimal solutions. The two established metrics used for this purpose are price of anarchy (POA) and price of stability (POS), which respectively provide upper and lower bounds on this ratio. A deficiency of these metrics, however, is that they are purely existential and shed no light on which of the equilibrium states are reachable in an actual game, i.e., via natural game dynamics. This is particularly striking if these metrics differ significantly, such as in network design games where the exponential gap between the best and worst NE states originally prompted the notion of POS in game theory (Anshelevich et al., FOCS 2002). In this paper, we make progress toward bridging this gap by studying network design games under natural game dynamics. First we show that in a completely decentralized setting, where agents arrive, depart, and make improving moves in an arbitrary order, the inefficiency of NE attained can be polynomially large. This implies that the game designer must have some control over the interleaving of these events in order to force the game to attain efficient NE. We complement our negative result by showing that if the game designer is allowed to execute a sequence of improving moves to create an equilibrium state after every batch of agent arrivals or departures, then the resulting equilibrium states attained by the game are exponentially more efficient, i.e., the ratio of costs compared to the optimum is only logarithmic. Overall, our two results establish that in network games, the efficiency of equilibrium states is dictated by whether agents are allowed to join or leave the game in arbitrary states, an observation that might be useful in analyzing the dynamics of other classes of games with divergent POS and POA bounds.

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arXiv2016

Mechanism Design for Subadditive Agents via an Ex-Ante Relaxation

We consider the problem of maximizing revenue for a monopolist offering multiple items to multiple heterogeneous buyers. We develop a simple mechanism that obtains a constant factor approximation under the assumption that the buyers' values are additive subject to a feasibility constraint and independent across items. Importantly, different buyers in our setting can have different constraints on the sets of items they desire. Our mechanism is a sequential variant of two-part tariffs. Prior to our work, simple approximation mechanisms for such multi-buyer problems were known only for the special cases of all unit-demand or all additive value buyers. Our work expands upon and unifies long lines of work on unit-demand settings and additive settings. We employ the ex ante relaxation approach developed by Alaei (2011) for reducing a multiple-buyer mechanism design problem with an ex post supply constraint into single-buyer ones with ex ante supply constraints. Solving the single-agent problems requires us to significantly extend techniques developed in the context of additive values by Li and Yao (2013) and their extension to subadditive values by Rubinstein and Weinberg (2015).

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arXiv2016

A/B Testing of Auctions

For many application areas A/B testing, which partitions users of a system into an A (control) and B (treatment) group to experiment between several application designs, enables Internet companies to optimize their services to the behavioral patterns of their users. Unfortunately, the A/B testing framework cannot be applied in a straightforward manner to applications like auctions where the users (a.k.a., bidders) submit bids before the partitioning into the A and B groups is made. This paper combines auction theoretic modeling with the A/B testing framework to develop methodology for A/B testing auctions. The accuracy of our method %, assuming the auction is directly comparable to ideal A/B testing where there is no interference between A and B. Our results are based on an extension and improved analysis of the inference method of Chawla et al. (2014).

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arXiv2015

Near Optimal LP Rounding Algorithm for Correlation Clustering on Complete and Complete k-partite Graphs

We give new rounding schemes for the standard linear programming relaxation of the correlation clustering problem, achieving approximation factors almost matching the integrality gaps: - For complete graphs our appoximation is $2.06 - \varepsilon$ for a fixed constant $\varepsilon$, which almost matches the previously known integrality gap of $2$. - For complete $k$-partite graphs our approximation is $3$. We also show a matching integrality gap. - For complete graphs with edge weights satisfying triangle inequalities and probability constraints, our approximation is $1.5$, and we show an integrality gap of $1.2$. Our results improve a long line of work on approximation algorithms for correlation clustering in complete graphs, previously culminating in a ratio of $2.5$ for the complete case by Ailon, Charikar and Newman (JACM'08). In the weighted complete case satisfying triangle inequalities and probability constraints, the same authors give a $2$-approximation; for the bipartite case, Ailon, Avigdor-Elgrabli, Liberty and van Zuylen give a $4$-approximation (SICOMP'12).

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arXiv2014

How to sell an app: pay-per-play or buy-it-now?

We consider pricing in settings where a consumer discovers his value for a good only as he uses it, and the value evolves with each use. We explore simple and natural pricing strategies for a seller in this setting, under the assumption that the seller knows the distribution from which the consumer's initial value is drawn, as well as the stochastic process that governs the evolution of the value with each use. We consider the differences between up-front or "buy-it-now" pricing (BIN), and "pay-per-play" (PPP) pricing, where the consumer is charged per use. Our results show that PPP pricing can be a very effective mechanism for price discrimination, and thereby can increase seller revenue. But it can also be advantageous to the buyers, as a way of mitigating risk. Indeed, this mitigation of risk can yield a larger pool of buyers. We also show that the practice of offering free trials is largely beneficial. We consider two different stochastic processes for how the buyer's value evolves: In the first, the key random variable is how long the consumer remains interested in the product. In the second process, the consumer's value evolves according to a random walk or Brownian motion with reflection at 1, and absorption at 0.

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arXiv2014

Approximate Revenue Maximization in Interdependent Value Settings

We study revenue maximization in settings where agents' values are interdependent: each agent receives a signal drawn from a correlated distribution and agents' values are functions of all of the signals. We introduce a variant of the generalized VCG auction with reserve prices and random admission, and show that this auction gives a constant approximation to the optimal expected revenue in matroid environments. Our results do not require any assumptions on the signal distributions, however, they require the value functions to satisfy a standard single-crossing property and a concavity-type condition.

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arXiv2014

Mechanism Design for Data Science

Good economic mechanisms depend on the preferences of participants in the mechanism. For example, the revenue-optimal auction for selling an item is parameterized by a reserve price, and the appropriate reserve price depends on how much the bidders are willing to pay. A mechanism designer can potentially learn about the participants' preferences by observing historical data from the mechanism; the designer could then update the mechanism in response to learned preferences to improve its performance. The challenge of such an approach is that the data corresponds to the actions of the participants and not their preferences. Preferences can potentially be inferred from actions but the degree of inference possible depends on the mechanism. In the optimal auction example, it is impossible to learn anything about preferences of bidders who are not willing to pay the reserve price. These bidders will not cast bids in the auction and, from historical bid data, the auctioneer could never learn that lowering the reserve price would give a higher revenue (even if it would). To address this impossibility, the auctioneer could sacrifice revenue optimality in the initial auction to obtain better inference properties so that the auction's parameters can be adapted to changing preferences in the future. This paper develops the theory for optimal mechanism design subject to good inferability.

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arXiv2013

Network Design with Coverage Costs

We study network design with a cost structure motivated by redundancy in data traffic. We are given a graph, g groups of terminals, and a universe of data packets. Each group of terminals desires a subset of the packets from its respective source. The cost of routing traffic on any edge in the network is proportional to the total size of the distinct packets that the edge carries. Our goal is to find a minimum cost routing. We focus on two settings. In the first, the collection of packet sets desired by source-sink pairs is laminar. For this setting, we present a primal-dual based 2-approximation, improving upon a logarithmic approximation due to Barman and Chawla (2012). In the second setting, packet sets can have non-trivial intersection. We focus on the case where each packet is desired by either a single terminal group or by all of the groups, and the graph is unweighted. For this setting we present an O(log g)-approximation. Our approximation for the second setting is based on a novel spanner-type construction in unweighted graphs that, given a collection of g vertex subsets, finds a subgraph of cost only a constant factor more than the minimum spanning tree of the graph, such that every subset in the collection has a Steiner tree in the subgraph of cost at most O(log g) that of its minimum Steiner tree in the original graph. We call such a subgraph a group spanner.

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arXiv2013

Prior-Independent Mechanisms for Scheduling

We study the makespan minimization problem with unrelated selfish machines under the assumption that job sizes are stochastic. We design simple truthful mechanisms that under various distributional assumptions provide constant and sublogarithmic approximations to expected makespan. Our mechanisms are prior-independent in that they do not rely on knowledge of the job size distributions. Prior-independent approximation mechanisms have been previously studied for the objective of revenue maximization [Dhangwatnotai, Roughgarden and Yan'10, Devanur, Hartline, Karlin and Nguyen'11, Roughgarden, Talgam-Cohen and Yan'12]. In contrast to our results, in prior-free settings no truthful anonymous deterministic mechanism for the makespan objective can provide a sublinear approximation [Ashlagi, Dobzinski and Lavi'09].

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arXiv2012

On Privacy-Preserving Histograms

We advance the approach initiated by Chawla et al. for sanitizing (census) data so as to preserve the privacy of respondents while simultaneously extracting "useful" statistical information. First, we extend the scope of their techniques to a broad and rich class of distributions, specifically, mixtures of highdimensional balls, spheres, Gaussians, and other "nice" distributions. Second, we randomize the histogram constructions to preserve spatial characteristics of the data, allowing us to approximate various quantities of interest, e.g., cost of the minimum spanning tree on the data, in a privacy-preserving fashion.

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arXiv2012

A Bicriteria Approximation for the Reordering Buffer Problem

In the reordering buffer problem (RBP), a server is asked to process a sequence of requests lying in a metric space. To process a request the server must move to the corresponding point in the metric. The requests can be processed slightly out of order; in particular, the server has a buffer of capacity k which can store up to k requests as it reads in the sequence. The goal is to reorder the requests in such a manner that the buffer constraint is satisfied and the total travel cost of the server is minimized. The RBP arises in many applications that require scheduling with a limited buffer capacity, such as scheduling a disk arm in storage systems, switching colors in paint shops of a car manufacturing plant, and rendering 3D images in computer graphics. We study the offline version of RBP and develop bicriteria approximations. When the underlying metric is a tree, we obtain a solution of cost no more than 9OPT using a buffer of capacity 4k + 1 where OPT is the cost of an optimal solution with buffer capacity k. Constant factor approximations were known previously only for the uniform metric (Avigdor-Elgrabli et al., 2012). Via randomized tree embeddings, this implies an O(log n) approximation to cost and O(1) approximation to buffer size for general metrics. Previously the best known algorithm for arbitrary metrics by Englert et al. (2007) provided an O(log^2 k log n) approximation without violating the buffer constraint.

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arXiv2011

Secretary Problems with Convex Costs

We consider online resource allocation problems where given a set of requests our goal is to select a subset that maximizes a value minus cost type of objective function. Requests are presented online in random order, and each request possesses an adversarial value and an adversarial size. The online algorithm must make an irrevocable accept/reject decision as soon as it sees each request. The "profit" of a set of accepted requests is its total value minus a convex cost function of its total size. This problem falls within the framework of secretary problems. Unlike previous work in that area, one of the main challenges we face is that the objective function can be positive or negative and we must guard against accepting requests that look good early on but cause the solution to have an arbitrarily large cost as more requests are accepted. This requires designing new techniques. We study this problem under various feasibility constraints and present online algorithms with competitive ratios only a constant factor worse than those known in the absence of costs for the same feasibility constraints. We also consider a multi-dimensional version of the problem that generalizes multi-dimensional knapsack within a secretary framework. In the absence of any feasibility constraints, we present an O(l) competitive algorithm where l is the number of dimensions; this matches within constant factors the best known ratio for multi-dimensional knapsack secretary.

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arXiv2011

Optimal Crowdsourcing Contests

We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests. Crowdsourcing contests can be modeled as all-pay auctions because entrants must exert effort up-front to enter. Unlike all-pay auctions where a usual design objective would be to maximize revenue, in crowdsourcing contests, the principal only benefits from the submission with the highest quality. We give a theory for optimal crowdsourcing contests that mirrors the theory of optimal auction design: the optimal crowdsourcing contest is a virtual valuation optimizer (the virtual valuation function depends on the distribution of contestant skills and the number of contestants). We also compare crowdsourcing contests with more conventional means of procurement. In this comparison, crowdsourcing contests are relatively disadvantaged because the effort of losing contestants is wasted. Nonetheless, we show that crowdsourcing contests are 2-approximations to conventional methods for a large family of "regular" distributions, and 4-approximations, otherwise.

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arXiv2011

Traffic-Redundancy Aware Network Design

We consider network design problems for information networks where routers can replicate data but cannot alter it. This functionality allows the network to eliminate data-redundancy in traffic, thereby saving on routing costs. We consider two problems within this framework and design approximation algorithms. The first problem we study is the traffic-redundancy aware network design (RAND) problem. We are given a weighted graph over a single server and many clients. The server owns a number of different data packets and each client desires a subset of the packets; the client demand sets form a laminar set system. Our goal is to connect every client to the source via a single path, such that the collective cost of the resulting network is minimized. Here the transportation cost over an edge is its weight times times the number of distinct packets that it carries. The second problem is a facility location problem that we call RAFL. Here the goal is to find an assignment from clients to facilities such that the total cost of routing packets from the facilities to clients (along unshared paths), plus the total cost of "producing" one copy of each desired packet at each facility is minimized. We present a constant factor approximation for the RAFL and an O(log P) approximation for RAND, where P is the total number of distinct packets. We remark that P is always at most the number of different demand sets desired or the number of clients, and is generally much smaller.

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arXiv2011

On the Impossibility of Black-Box Transformations in Mechanism Design

We consider the problem of converting an arbitrary approximation algorithm for a single-parameter optimization problem into a computationally efficient truthful mechanism. We ask for reductions that are black-box, meaning that they require only oracle access to the given algorithm and in particular do not require explicit knowledge of the problem constraints. Such a reduction is known to be possible, for example, for the social welfare objective when the goal is to achieve Bayesian truthfulness and preserve social welfare in expectation. We show that a black-box reduction for the social welfare objective is not possible if the resulting mechanism is required to be truthful in expectation and to preserve the worst-case approximation ratio of the algorithm to within a subpolynomial factor. Further, we prove that for other objectives such as makespan, no black-box reduction is possible even if we only require Bayesian truthfulness and an average-case performance guarantee.

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arXiv2011

Bayesian Mechanism Design for Budget-Constrained Agents

We study Bayesian mechanism design problems in settings where agents have budgets. Specifically, an agent's utility for an outcome is given by his value for the outcome minus any payment he makes to the mechanism, as long as the payment is below his budget, and is negative infinity otherwise. This discontinuity in the utility function presents a significant challenge in the design of good mechanisms, and classical "unconstrained" mechanisms fail to work in settings with budgets. The goal of this paper is to develop general reductions from budget-constrained Bayesian MD to unconstrained Bayesian MD with small loss in performance. We consider this question in the context of the two most well-studied objectives in mechanism design---social welfare and revenue---and present constant factor approximations in a number of settings. Some of our results extend to settings where budgets are private and agents need to be incentivized to reveal them truthfully.

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arXiv2010

Threshold rules for online sample selection

We consider the following sample selection problem. We observe in an online fashion a sequence of samples, each endowed by a quality. Our goal is to either select or reject each sample, so as to maximize the aggregate quality of the subsample selected so far. There is a natural trade-off here between the rate of selection and the aggregate quality of the subsample. We show that for a number of such problems extremely simple and oblivious "threshold rules" for selection achieve optimal tradeoffs between rate of selection and aggregate quality in a probabilistic sense. In some cases we show that the same threshold rule is optimal for a large class of quality distributions and is thus oblivious in a strong sense.

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