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Shuhei Nakamura

Publications and source records attributed to Shuhei Nakamura.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Formal Power Series on Algebraic Cryptanalysis

In the complexity estimation for an attack that reduces a cryptosystem to solving a system of polynomial equations, the degree of regularity and an upper bound of the first fall degree are often used in cryptanalysis. While the degree of regularity can be easily computed using a univariate formal power series under the semi-regularity assumption, determining an upper bound of the first fall degree requires investigating the concrete syzygies of an input system. In this paper, we investigate an upper bound of the first fall degree for a polynomial system over a sufficiently large field. In this case, we prove that the first fall degree of a non-semi-regular system is bounded above by the degree of regularity, and that the first fall degree of a multi-graded polynomial system is bounded above by a certain value determined from a multivariate formal power series. Moreover, we provide a theoretical assumption for computing the first fall degree of a polynomial system over a sufficiently large field.

cs.SC

Three-Pass Identification Scheme Based on MinRank Problem with Half Cheating Probability

In Asiacrypt 2001, Courtois proposed the first three-pass zero-knowledge identification (ID) scheme based on the MinRank problem. However, in a single round of Courtois' ID scheme, the cheating probability, i.e., the success probability of the cheating prover, is 2/3 which is larger than half. Although Courtois also proposed a variant scheme which is claimed to have half cheating probability, its security is not formally proven and it requires another hardness assumption on a specific one-way function and that verifier always generates challenges according to a specific non-uniform distribution. In this paper, we propose the first three-pass zero-knowledge ID scheme based on the MinRank problem with the cheating probability of exactly half for each round, even with only two-bit challenge space, without any additional assumption. Our proposed ID scheme requires fewer rounds and less total average communications costs compared to Curtois' under the same security level against impersonation.

cs.CR