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Shujiang Wu

Publications and source records attributed to Shujiang Wu.

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A Blind Trust, the Bloody Thrust: When Attacker-Controlled Hook Updates Steer AI Agent Harnesses towards Malicious Behaviors

Modern AI agent harnesses expose lifecycle hooks that bind shell commands to runtime events such as session start, tool calls, and file edits. These commands run with host privileges yet ship as lifecycle-hook configuration and may fire at times the LLM never observes. We identify the lifecycle-hook update path, which harnesses trust blindly, as a new attack surface. Under a supply-chain threat model in which an attacker controls only plugin metadata and lifecycle-hook configuration, a benign versioned plugin can be trojanized by an update that silently binds attacker-chosen commands to benign events, yielding malicious host-side behavior such as privilege escalation. We propose HookPry, an open-source and fully automated attack framework that systematically exploits this vulnerability across heterogeneous AI agent harnesses. HookPry realizes ten attack objectives; across 25 combinations of harnesses and backends in 1,000 end-to-end runs, it compromises all seven evaluated harnesses, with per-harness success rates reaching 92.5%. Representative defenses remain insufficient: Microsoft Defender has 0% recall, and the union of three static defenses misses 47.5% of malicious artifacts.

cs.CR

MP-ISMoE: Mixed-Precision Interactive Side Mixture-of-Experts for Efficient Transfer Learning

Parameter-efficient transfer learning (PETL) has emerged as a pivotal paradigm for adapting pre-trained foundation models to downstream tasks, significantly reducing trainable parameters yet suffering from substantial memory overhead caused by gradient backpropagation during fine-tuning. While memory-efficient transfer learning (METL) circumvents this challenge by bypassing backbone gradient computation via lightweight small side networks, its stringent memory constraint severely limits learning capacity of side networks, thereby significantly compromising performance. To address these limitations, we propose a novel Mixed-Precision Interactive Side Mixture-of-Experts framework (MP-ISMoE). Specifically, we first propose a Gaussian Noise Perturbed Iterative Quantization (GNP-IQ) scheme to quantize weights into lower-bits while effectively decreasing quantization errors. By leveraging memory conserved from GNP-IQ, we subsequently employ Interactive Side Mixture-of-Experts (ISMoE) to scaling up side networks without sacrificing overall memory efficiency. Different from conventional mixture-of-experts, ISMoE learns to select optimal experts by interacting with salient features from frozen backbones, thus suppressing knowledge forgetting and boosting performance. Extensive experiments across diverse vision-language and language-only tasks demonstrate that MP-ISMoE remarkably promotes accuracy compared to state-of-the-art METL approaches, while maintaining comparable parameter and memory efficiency.

cs.LG

Large Language Models Cannot Reliably Detect Vulnerabilities in JavaScript: The First Systematic Benchmark and Evaluation

Researchers have proposed numerous methods to detect vulnerabilities in JavaScript, especially those assisted by Large Language Models (LLMs). However, the actual capability of LLMs in JavaScript vulnerability detection remains questionable, necessitating systematic evaluation and comprehensive benchmarks. Unfortunately, existing benchmarks suffer from three critical limitations: (1) incomplete coverage, such as covering a limited subset of CWE types; (2) underestimation of LLM capabilities caused by unreasonable ground truth labeling; and (3) overestimation due to unrealistic cases such as using isolated vulnerable files rather than complete projects. In this paper, we introduce, for the first time, three principles for constructing a benchmark for JavaScript vulnerability detection that directly address these limitations: (1) comprehensiveness, (2) no underestimation, and (3) no overestimation. Guided by these principles, we propose FORGEJS, the first automatic benchmark generation framework for evaluating LLMs' capability in JavaScript vulnerability detection. Then, we use FORGEJS to construct ARENAJS-the first systematic benchmark for LLM-based JavaScript vulnerability detection-and further propose JUDGEJS, an automatic evaluation framework. We conduct the first systematic evaluation of LLMs for JavaScript vulnerability detection, leveraging JUDGEJS to assess seven popular commercial LLMs on ARENAJS. The results show that LLMs not only exhibit limited reasoning capabilities, but also suffer from severe robustness defects, indicating that reliable JavaScript vulnerability detection with LLMs remains an open challenge.

cs.CR

The First Early Evidence of the Use of Browser Fingerprinting for Online Tracking

While advertising has become commonplace in today's online interactions, there is a notable dearth of research investigating the extent to which browser fingerprinting is harnessed for user tracking and targeted advertising. Prior studies only measured whether fingerprinting-related scripts are being run on the websites but that in itself does not necessarily mean that fingerprinting is being used for the privacy-invasive purpose of online tracking because fingerprinting might be deployed for the defensive purposes of bot/fraud detection and user authentication. It is imperative to address the mounting concerns regarding the utilization of browser fingerprinting in the realm of online advertising. This paper introduces ``FPTrace'' (fingerprinting-based tracking assessment and comprehensive evaluation framework), a framework to assess fingerprinting-based user tracking by analyzing ad changes from browser fingerprinting adjustments. Using FPTrace, we emulate user interactions, capture ad bid data, and monitor HTTP traffic. Our large-scale study reveals strong evidence of browser fingerprinting for ad tracking and targeting, shown by bid value disparities and reduced HTTP records after fingerprinting changes. We also show fingerprinting can bypass GDPR/CCPA opt-outs, enabling privacy-invasive tracking. In conclusion, our research unveils the widespread employment of browser fingerprinting in online advertising, prompting critical considerations regarding user privacy and data security within the digital advertising landscape.

cs.CR

Deterministic Browser

Timing attacks have been a continuous threat to users' privacy in modern browsers. To mitigate such attacks, existing approaches, such as Tor Browser and Fermata, add jitters to the browser clock so that an attacker cannot accurately measure an event. However, such defenses only raise the bar for an attacker but do not fundamentally mitigate timing attacks, i.e., it just takes longer than previous to launch a timing attack. In this paper, we propose a novel approach, called deterministic browser, which can provably prevent timing attacks in modern browsers. Borrowing from Physics, we introduce several concepts, such as an observer and a reference frame. Specifically, a snippet of JavaScript, i.e., an observer in JavaScript reference frame, will always obtain the same, fixed timing information so that timing attacks are prevented; at contrast, a user, i.e., an oracle observer, will perceive the JavaScript differently and do not experience the performance slowdown. We have implemented a prototype called DeterFox and our evaluation shows that the prototype can defend against browser-related timing attacks.

cs.CR