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Shunya Noda

Publications and source records attributed to Shunya Noda.

8 recordsLinked to original sources

No Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects

We study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous objects when screening uses costly effort rather than monetary transfers. No-screening mechanisms perform well as object variety increases. In a symmetric continuous market with i.i.d. values whose CDF is log-concave, the multidimensional problem reduces exactly to a single-dimensional problem in agents' best-option values. More options make low best-option values rarer, weakening the case for screening. We characterize when no screening is optimal and show it remains optimal as variety expands. Large-variety limits and numerical results for finite, correlated markets support this pattern. We apply these results to propose an invitation-based vaccine appointment system.

econ.TH

Learning Optimal Dynamic Matching via Graph Neural Networks

Dynamic matching markets require decisions about whom to match and when: matching now yields value but removes participants who may create better future opportunities. We develop a value-based reinforcement-learning framework for this problem on finite, evolving weighted graphs. We study an infinite-horizon continuous-time model with stochastic arrivals, node-type transitions, edge realizations, and exogenous exits. We prove an event-time reduction: without loss of optimality, the planner acts immediately after each exogenous event and then waits for the next one. We further show that the optimal edge-wise $Q$-function is characterized by a single continuation-value function on post-decision residual graphs, reducing the learned object from state-action values to graph values. Exact action selection still requires combinatorial matching optimization; we approximate the value with a graph neural network, train it by temporal-difference learning, and use it in a forward-greedy matching heuristic. In a binary-type benchmark, the learned policy substantially outperforms immediate and threshold-greedy rules by preserving common nodes for rare arrivals of valuable matches while forming lower-value matches only in thick pools. In a kidney paired donation benchmark, it performs similarly to immediate greedy when exits are unpredictable, recovers the logic of patient matching when warnings are reliable, and outperforms the better of Immediate Greedy and Patient Greedy across intermediate warning probabilities. These results show that residual-graph value learning yields state-dependent dynamic matching policies that adapt to realized connectivity and exit information.

cs.LG

The Role of Precedence Order in Matching with Multi-Criteria Admissions

Admission systems often fill seats by applying criterion-specific rankings sequentially. We derive criterion-wise comparative statics with respect to precedence order when rankings may be arbitrarily nonaligned, and each criterion evaluates the entire admitted set through a responsive preference. For a fixed applicant set, reversing the final two blocks makes each criterion weakly prefer the outcome in which its block is later. This comparison can reverse if two blocks are followed by another criterion, even under reserve-type rankings. Under student-proposing deferred acceptance, it can also reverse with two criteria because rejection chains change the focal college's applicant set; such feedback is the only possible source of failure. In regular large markets, failures vanish for almost all colleges and, under sufficient thickness, uniformly across colleges. Under the Boston mechanism, final acceptance prevents feedback; thus the comparison holds in every finite market for fixed submitted rank-order lists and criterion-independent acceptability.

econ.TH

Designing Recommendation Exposure and Favorite Lists: A Field Experiment in a Spot-Work Platform

How should recommender systems be designed when recommendations shape access to scarce, short-lived opportunities? We study this question in a production setting: Timee, Japan's largest platform for spot work, where workers favorite job templates and receive notifications when firms post shifts from those templates. Maximizing predicted favoriting can generate misdirected concentration: recommendations accumulate on popular templates that create few viable job openings, while templates with unmet labor demand receive too little exposure. We design exposure-control mechanisms for favorite-list management, reallocating template exposure based on posting activity and unfilled capacity. The proposed recommender, thresholded eligibility control (TEC), is fully parallelizable and suitable for large-scale digital platforms. In simulations calibrated to Timee data, TEC raises the per-round job-finding rate from 57.6% to 70.0%. A prefecture-level randomized field experiment increases realized matches and exposure per active template, reduces the share of low-exposure templates, and improves impression-level favoriting and downstream matching.

econ.GN

Integrating Predictive Models into Two-Sided Recommendations: A Matching-Theoretic Approach

Two-sided platforms must recommend users to users, where matches (termed \emph{dates} in this paper) require mutual interest and activity on both sides. Naive ranking by predicted dating probabilities concentrates exposure on a small subset of highly responsive users, generating congestion and overstating efficiency. We model recommendation as a many-to-many matching problem and design integrators that map predicted login, like, and reciprocation probabilities into recommendations under attention constraints. We introduce \emph{effective dates}, a congestion-adjusted metric that discounts matches involving overloaded receivers. We then propose \emph{exposure-constrained deferred acceptance} (ECDA), which limits receiver exposure in terms of expected likes or dates rather than headcount. Using production-grade predictions from a large Japanese dating platform, we show in calibrated simulations that ECDA increases effective dates and receiver-side dating probability despite reducing total dates. A large-scale regional field experiment confirms these effects in practice, indicating that exposure control improves equity and early-stage matching efficiency without harming downstream engagement.

econ.GN

Dynamic User Competition and Miner Behavior in the Bitcoin Market

We develop a dynamic model of the Bitcoin market where users set fees themselves and miners decide whether to operate and whom to validate based on those fees. Our analysis reveals how, in equilibrium, users adjust their bids in response to short-term congestion (i.e., the amount of pending transactions), how miners decide when to start operating based on the level of congestion, and how the interplay between these two factors shapes the overall market dynamics. The miners hold off operating when the congestion is mild, which harms social welfare. However, we show that a block reward (a fixed reward paid to miners upon a block production) can mitigate these inefficiencies. We characterize the socially optimal block reward and demonstrate that it is always positive, suggesting that Bitcoin's halving schedule may be suboptimal.

econ.TH

On Statistical Discrimination as a Failure of Social Learning: A Multi-Armed Bandit Approach

We analyze statistical discrimination in hiring markets using a multi-armed bandit model. Myopic firms face workers arriving with heterogeneous observable characteristics. The association between the worker's skill and characteristics is unknown ex ante; thus, firms need to learn it. Laissez-faire causes perpetual underestimation: minority workers are rarely hired, and therefore, the underestimation tends to persist. Even a marginal imbalance in the population ratio frequently results in perpetual underestimation. We propose two policy solutions: a novel subsidy rule (the hybrid mechanism) and the Rooney Rule. Our results indicate that temporary affirmative actions effectively alleviate discrimination stemming from insufficient data.

econ.TH

Deviation-Based Learning: Training Recommender Systems Using Informed User Choice

This paper proposes a new approach to training recommender systems called deviation-based learning. The recommender and rational users have different knowledge. The recommender learns user knowledge by observing what action users take upon receiving recommendations. Learning eventually stalls if the recommender always suggests a choice: Before the recommender completes learning, users start following the recommendations blindly, and their choices do not reflect their knowledge. The learning rate and social welfare improve substantially if the recommender abstains from recommending a particular choice when she predicts that multiple alternatives will produce a similar payoff.

econ.TH