arXiv subjects

Shusaku Sasaki

Publications and source records attributed to Shusaku Sasaki.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Rebate versus Matching, Again: How Opt-in Reshapes the Effectiveness of Price-Equivalent Subsidies

Traditional theory predicts equivalent effects of matching and rebate subsidies at equal prices, yet experiments favor matching. Refinements narrow this gap but retain compulsory assignment; take-up is voluntary in practice. We test this implementation margin in a nationwide, incentivized donation experiment with 2,400 Japanese adults, crossing subsidy type and assignment rule. After equalizing budget constraints and accounting for comprehension, total giving is indistinguishable under compulsory assignment. Under opt-in, the matching advantage re-emerges and nearly quadruples because rebate loses effectiveness. LATE estimates suggest advantageous selection into matching but disadvantageous selection into rebate. Self-selection can reshape the policy ranking of price-equivalent instruments.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2025

Scaling Charitable Incentives: Policy Selection, Beliefs, and Evidence from a Field Experiment

Why are interventions with weak evidence still adopted? We study charitable incentives for physical activity in Japan using three linked methods, including a randomized field experiment (N=808), a stakeholder belief survey (local government officials and private-sector employees, N=2,400), and a conjoint experiment on policy choice. Financial incentives increase daily steps by about 1,000, whereas charitable incentives deliver a precisely estimated null. Nonetheless, stakeholders greatly overpredict charitable incentives' effects on walking, participation, and prosociality. Conjoint choices show policymakers value step gains as well as other outcomes, shaping policy choice. Adoption thus reflects multidimensional beliefs and objectives, highlighting policy selection as a scaling challenge.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2025

When Incentives and Nudges Meet: Promoting Budget Allocations for Undervalued Policies

Budget officers often assess public project proposals based on available financial support and expected outcomes. However, behavioral factors such as time discounting and psychological hesitation may lead to underinvestment in programs with delayed but significant benefits. This study investigates whether financial incentives and non-financial nudges can influence budgetary decisions in local governments. We conducted a nationwide mail-based survey experiment targeting budget officers in Japanese municipalities and received 490 valid responses. Using a 2*2 randomized design, we tested the independent and combined effects of a financial incentive (a 50% national subsidy) and a non-financial nudge (loss framing and peer information). All three treatments significantly increased assessed budget amounts compared to the control group. The largest effect appeared in the combination group (approximately 1.1 million JPY higher, p < .01). Both the financial incentive and the nudge independently increased assessments by approximately 650,000-670,000 JPY (p < .01). Notably, only the nudge raised the self-financed portion of the budget. These findings demonstrate how low-cost behavioral interventions can improve budget assessments for undervalued projects. As an application, we embedded the experiment in a case involving HPV vaccine promotion in Japan, but the approach can be broadly relevant to other public policy domains requiring forward-looking budget decisions.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2024

Prosocial and Financial Incentives for Biodiversity Conservation: A Field Experiment Using a Smartphone App

Ascertaining the number, type, and location of plant, insect, and animal species is essential for biodiversity conservation. However, comprehensively monitoring the situation only through public fixed-point surveys is challenging, and therefore information voluntarily provided by citizens assists in ascertaining the species distribution. To effectively encourage the citizens' data sharing behavior, this study proposed a prosocial incentive scheme in which, if they provide species information, donations are made to activities for saving endangered species. We conducted a field experiment with users (N=830) of a widely-used Japanese smartphone app to which they post species photos and measured the incentive's effect on their posting behavior. In addition, we measured the effect of a financial incentive scheme that provides monetary rewards for posting species photos and compared the two incentives' effects. The analyses revealed that while the prosocial incentive did not increase the number of posts on average, it did change the contents of posts, increasing the proportion of posts on rare species. On the contrary, the financial incentive statistically significantly increased the number of posts, in particular, on less rare and invasive species. Our findings suggest that the prosocial and financial incentives could stimulate different motivations and encourage different posting behaviors.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2021

Paternalism, Autonomy, or Both? Experimental Evidence from Energy Saving Programs

Identifying who should be treated is a central question in economics. There are two competing approaches to targeting - paternalistic and autonomous. In the paternalistic approach, policymakers optimally target the policy given observable individual characteristics. In contrast, the autonomous approach acknowledges that individuals may possess key unobservable information on heterogeneous policy impacts, and allows them to self-select into treatment. In this paper, we propose a new approach that mixes paternalistic assignment and autonomous choice. Our approach uses individual characteristics and empirical welfare maximization to identify who should be treated, untreated, and decide whether to be treated themselves. We apply this method to design a targeting policy for an energy saving programs using data collected in a randomized field experiment. We show that optimally mixing paternalistic assignments and autonomous choice significantly improves the social welfare gain of the policy. Exploiting random variation generated by the field experiment, we develop a method to estimate average treatment effects for each subgroup of individuals who would make the same autonomous treatment choice. Our estimates confirm that the estimated assignment policy optimally allocates individuals to be treated, untreated, or choose themselves based on the relative merits of paternalistic assignments and autonomous choice for individuals types.

econ.GN↗