arXiv subjects

Shuzheng Wang

Publications and source records attributed to Shuzheng Wang.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

A First Look at Ethereum Blob Revolution: Market, Strategies, and Optimality

As a key enabler of Web3, Ethereum has long faced scalability challenges. The recent EIP-4844 upgrade aims to alleviate the scalability issue by introducing the ''blob'', a new data structure for Layer-2 rollups that enables off-chain storage with much reduced costs. Yet, this new mechanism's impact on Ethereum, and the wider Web3 ecosystem, remains largely underexplored. In this paper, we conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of the post-EIP-4844 ecosystem, leveraging a dataset of 319.5 million transactions, out of which 1.3 million are blob-carrying. Our analysis reveals two major trends: (1) average block size has increased 2.5 times, from 150 KB to 400 KB, while the share of conventional transactions has shrunk from over $150$ KB to around 80 KB; (2) rollups are rapidly migrating from expensive calldata, falling from approximately 7,500 to nearly zero, toward cheap blobs, rising from zero to about 10,000. These shifts introduce a new economic game between block builders and rollups. Thus, we develop a game-theoretic model to characterize their equilibrium strategies: a profit-maximizing inclusion rule for builders, and a cost-minimizing blob batching strategy for rollups. Empirically, however, we find notable economic inefficiencies: for example, 29.48% of blob-containing blocks are built sub-optimally, yielding less revenue than available alternatives. These findings highlight the intricacies of the blob marketplace, and our work has established both methodological and empirical foundations to understand the evolving post-EIP4844 Ethereum ecosystem.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2025

TraceLLM: Security Diagnosis Through Traces and Smart Contracts in Ethereum

Ethereum smart contracts hold tens of billions of USD in DeFi and NFTs, yet comprehensive security analysis remains difficult due to unverified code, proxy-based architectures, and the reliance on manual inspection of complex execution traces. Existing approaches fall into two main categories: anomaly transaction detection, which flags suspicious transactions but offers limited insight into specific attack strategies hidden in execution traces inside transactions, and code vulnerability detection, which cannot analyze unverified contracts and struggles to show how identified flaws are exploited in real incidents. As a result, analysts must still manually align transaction traces with contract code to reconstruct attack scenarios and conduct forensics. To address this gap, TraceLLM is proposed as a framework that leverages LLMs to integrate execution trace-level detection with decompiled contract code. We introduce a new anomaly execution path identification algorithm and an LLM-refined decompile tool to identify vulnerable functions and provide explicit attack paths to LLM. TraceLLM establishes the first benchmark for joint trace and contract code-driven security analysis. For comparison, proxy baselines are created by jointly transmitting the results of three representative code analysis along with raw traces to LLM. TraceLLM identifies attacker and victim addresses with 85.19\% precision and produces automated reports with 70.37\% factual precision across 27 cases with ground truth expert reports, achieving 25.93\% higher accuracy than the best baseline. Moreover, across 148 real-world Ethereum incidents, TraceLLM automatically generates reports with 66.22\% expert-verified accuracy, demonstrating strong generalizability.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Private Order Flows and Builder Bidding Dynamics: The Road to Monopoly in Ethereum's Block Building Market

Ethereum, as a representative of Web3, adopts a novel framework called Proposer Builder Separation (PBS) to prevent the centralization of block profits in the hands of institutional Ethereum stakers. Introducing builders to generate blocks based on public transactions, PBS aims to ensure that block profits are distributed among all stakers. Through the auction among builders, only one will win the block in each slot. Ideally, the equilibrium strategy of builders under public information would lead them to bid all block profits. However, builders are now capable of extracting profits from private order flows. In this paper, we explore the effect of PBS with private order flows. Specifically, we propose the asymmetry auction model of MEV-Boost auction. Moreover, we conduct empirical study on Ethereum blocks from January 2023 to May 2024. Our analysis indicates that private order flows contribute to 54.59% of the block value, indicating that different builders will build blocks with different valuations. Interestingly, we find that builders with more private order flows (i.e., higher block valuations) are more likely to win the block, while retain larger proportion of profits. In return, such builders will further attract more private order flows, resulting in a monopolistic market gradually. Our findings reveal that PBS in current stage is unable to balance the profit distribution, which just transits the centralization of block profits from institutional stakers to the monopolistic builder.

cs.CE↗