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Siddhant Agarwal

Publications and source records attributed to Siddhant Agarwal.

20 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Poisoned classifiers are not only backdoored, they are fundamentally broken

Under a commonly-studied backdoor poisoning attack against classification models, an attacker adds a small trigger to a subset of the training data, such that the presence of this trigger at test time causes the classifier to always predict some target class. It is often implicitly assumed that the poisoned classifier is vulnerable exclusively to the adversary who possesses the trigger. In this paper, we show empirically that this view of backdoored classifiers is incorrect. We describe a new threat model for poisoned classifier, where one without knowledge of the original trigger, would want to control the poisoned classifier. Under this threat model, we propose a test-time, human-in-the-loop attack method to generate multiple effective alternative triggers without access to the initial backdoor and the training data. We construct these alternative triggers by first generating adversarial examples for a smoothed version of the classifier, created with a procedure called Denoised Smoothing, and then extracting colors or cropped portions of smoothed adversarial images with human interaction. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack through extensive experiments on high-resolution datasets: ImageNet and TrojAI. We also compare our approach to previous work on modeling trigger distributions and find that our method are more scalable and efficient in generating effective triggers. Last, we include a user study which demonstrates that our method allows users to easily determine the existence of such backdoors in existing poisoned classifiers. Thus, we argue that there is no such thing as a secret backdoor in poisoned classifiers: poisoning a classifier invites attacks not just by the party that possesses the trigger, but from anyone with access to the classifier.

cs.LG↗

Learning to Deceive Knowledge Graph Augmented Models via Targeted Perturbation

Knowledge graphs (KGs) have helped neural models improve performance on various knowledge-intensive tasks, like question answering and item recommendation. By using attention over the KG, such KG-augmented models can also "explain" which KG information was most relevant for making a given prediction. In this paper, we question whether these models are really behaving as we expect. We show that, through a reinforcement learning policy (or even simple heuristics), one can produce deceptively perturbed KGs, which maintain the downstream performance of the original KG while significantly deviating from the original KG's semantics and structure. Our findings raise doubts about KG-augmented models' ability to reason about KG information and give sensible explanations.

cs.CL↗