arXiv subjects

Silas Richelson

Publications and source records attributed to Silas Richelson.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

ABEAT: Efficient and Anonymous Encryption for ABE-based Dynamic Group Communication

Confidential communication among a dynamic group of participants that ensures flexible and efficient many-to- many communication is highly desired capability. We leverage attribute-based encryption (ABE) for confidential group communication and enhance it by a graph-based namespace to create an efficient framework that allows groups to be formed and changed dynamically. In this paper, we focus on the important additional need to maintain the anonymity of recipients of a message, when using ABE for group communication for a variety of usage scenarios (e.g., emergency response). We propose ABEAT, an efficient and anonymous dynamic group communication system that also minimizes overhead on receivers who are not the intended recipients of a message. In ABEAT, we propose a new anonymous KP-ABE approach to maintain recipient anonymity. ABEAT hides the clear attribute in the ciphertext of KP-ABE, and also prevents several attacks that seek to break anonymity. ABEAT provides fast recipient verification, dramatically lowering the decryption overhead for non-recipients by more than a factor of 90 versus the current state of the art such as hidden vector encryption (HVE). In fact, it is even 40% less than FABEO, which offers no anonymity.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Low Soundness Linearity Testing on the Half-Slice

Let $f: T\to \{ 0,1 \}$ be a Boolean function on the Boolean half-slice, $T$, \ie elements of $\{0,1\}^n$ with Hamming weight $n/2$. We show that if $f(x)+f(y)=f(x+y)$ holds with probability $\frac{1+δ}{2}$ over a uniform pair $(x,y)$ such that $x,y,x+y\in T$, then $f$ agrees with some linear function on at least $\frac{1+δ}{2}-o(1)$ fraction of the points in $T$. More generally, we show that if $f$ passes the natural $k$-query BLR test with probability $\frac{1+δ}{2}$ for any $k\geq3$, then it must agree with some affine function at $\frac{1+δ^{\frac{1}{k-2}}}{2}-o(1)$ fraction of the points in $T$. The only other known linearity test for the slice in the low soundness regime (i.e., when $δ$ can be arbitrarily small) was given by Kalai, Lifshitz, Minzer, and Ziegler [FOCS'24]. Our result improves upon this result in two significant ways: firstly, it works for $k=3$ queries, instead of requiring $k\geq4$; secondly, our result is sharper, e.g., when $k=4$, we are able to conclude an agreement of $\frac{1+\sqrtδ}{2}-o(1)$ instead of $\frac{1+c\sqrtδ}{2}$ for $c\approx.0035$. In particular, our result matches (up to the $o(1)$ term) the conclusion one obtains over the full hypercube via the classical BLR analysis. Our main technical contribution is a new dense model theorem using bounds on Krawtchouk polynomials. Using these Krawtchouk polynomial bounds, we also obtain a simple $k$-query test ($k\geq 5$) that avoids any use of the dense model machinery. This simplified test naturally extends to the slice over the $q$-ary hypercube, giving the first such result over larger alphabets.

cs.CC↗

arXiv2024

Token-based Vehicular Security System (TVSS): Scalable, Secure, Low-latency Public Key Infrastructure for Connected Vehicles

Connected and Autonomous vehicles stand to drastically improve the safety and efficiency of the transportation system in the near future while also reducing pollution. These systems leverage communication to coordinate among vehicles and infrastructure in service of a number of safety and efficiency driver assist and even fully autonomous applications. Attackers can compromise these systems in a number of ways including by falsifying communication messages, making it critical to support security mechanisms that can operate and scale in dynamic scenarios. Towards this end, we present TVSS, a new VPKI system which improves drastically over prior work in the area (including over SCMS; the US department of transportation standard for VPKI). TVSS leverages the idea of unforgeable tokens to enable rapid verification at the road side units (RSUs), which are part of the road infrastructure at the edge of the network. This edge based solution enables agile authentication by avoiding the need for back-end servers during the potentially short contact time between a moving vehicle and the infrastructure. It also results in several security advantages: (1) Scalable Revocation: it greatly simplifies the revocation problem, a difficult problem in large scale certificate systems; and (2) Faster Refresh: Vehicles interact more frequently with the system to refresh their credentials, improving the privacy of the system. We provide a construction of the system and formally prove its security. Field experiments on a test-bed we develop consisting of on-board units (OBUs) and RSUs shows substantial reduction in the latency of refreshing credentials compared to SCMS, allowing the system to work even with smaller window of connectivity when vehicles are moving at higher speeds. Notably, we are able to execute the bottleneck operation of our scheme with a stationary RSU while traveling at highway speeds .

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

Analyzing Ta-Shma's Code via the Expander Mixing Lemma

Random walks in expander graphs and their various derandomizations (e.g., replacement/zigzag product) are invaluable tools from pseudorandomness. Recently, Ta-Shma used s-wide replacement walks in his breakthrough construction of a binary linear code almost matching the Gilbert-Varshamov bound (STOC 2017). Ta-Shma's original analysis was entirely linear algebraic, and subsequent developments have inherited this viewpoint. In this work, we rederive Ta-Shma's analysis from a combinatorial point of view using repeated application of the expander mixing lemma. We hope that this alternate perspective will yield a better understanding of Ta-Shma's construction. As an additional application of our techniques, we give an alternate proof of the expander hitting set lemma.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2018

How to Subvert Backdoored Encryption: Security Against Adversaries that Decrypt All Ciphertexts

We study secure and undetectable communication in a world where governments can read all encrypted communications of citizens. We consider a world where the only permitted communication method is via a government-mandated encryption scheme, using government-mandated keys. Citizens caught trying to communicate otherwise (e.g., by encrypting strings which do not appear to be natural language plaintexts) will be arrested. The one guarantee we suppose is that the government-mandated encryption scheme is semantically secure against outsiders: a perhaps advantageous feature to secure communication against foreign entities. But what good is semantic security against an adversary that has the power to decrypt? Even in this pessimistic scenario, we show citizens can communicate securely and undetectably. Informally, there is a protocol between Alice and Bob where they exchange ciphertexts that look innocuous even to someone who knows the secret keys and thus sees the corresponding plaintexts. And yet, in the end, Alice will have transmitted her secret message to Bob. Our security definition requires indistinguishability between unmodified use of the mandated encryption scheme, and conversations using the mandated encryption scheme in a modified way for subliminal communication. Our topics may be thought to fall broadly within the realm of steganography: the science of hiding secret communication in innocent-looking messages, or cover objects. However, we deal with the non-standard setting of adversarial cover object distributions (i.e., a stronger-than-usual adversary). We leverage that our cover objects are ciphertexts of a secure encryption scheme to bypass impossibility results which we show for broader classes of steganographic schemes. We give several constructions of subliminal communication schemes based on any key exchange protocol with random messages (e.g., Diffie-Hellman).

cs.CR↗