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Sima Jafarikhah

Publications and source records attributed to Sima Jafarikhah.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

The Promise of Strategic Agentic Scambaiting

Scammers have increasingly adopted AI-driven capabilities, evolving from automated message generation to fully agentic conversational systems that scale operations and maximize the exploitation of fraudulent resources before detection and takedown. In parallel, agentic scambaiting has emerged as a defensive approach in which autonomous agents impersonate potential victims and engage scammers in sustained interactions to extract actionable threat intelligence, such as mule bank accounts and cryptocurrency wallet addresses, that can be reported to disrupt fraudulent infrastructures. Together, these developments transform online fraud into an adversarial socio-technical ecosystem in which autonomous scamming and scambaiting agents engage in deceptive interactions while competing over the discovery, preservation, and exploitation of one another's resources. A fundamental and largely unexplored question is how defensive scambaiting can remain effective in an agent-to-agent environment, and under what conditions either side gains a strategic advantage. In this paper, we present a formal model of agent-to-agent fraud interactions that captures the strategic decision spaces available to both attackers and defenders. Using this framework, we analyze the dynamics of engagement, resource consumption, belief adaptation, and disruption outcomes. We find that scammer profitability turns negative once baiting-agent prevalence exceeds certain thresholds, and that when both sides improve at the same pace, defender investment in mimicry quality outpaces equivalent gains in scammer detection capability, so the arms race favors the defender under our baseline parameters. Our model and findings provide insights into the stability, scalability, and long-term effectiveness of autonomous defensive agents in an evolving AI-mediated fraud landscape.

cs.CR↗

From Description to Score: Can LLMs Quantify Vulnerabilities?

Manual vulnerability scoring, such as assigning Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) scores, is a resource-intensive process that is often influenced by subjective interpretation. This study investigates the potential of general-purpose large language models (LLMs), namely ChatGPT, Llama, Grok, DeepSeek, and Gemini, to automate this process by analyzing over 31{,}000 recent Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) entries. The results show that LLMs substantially outperform the baseline on certain metrics (e.g., \textit{Availability Impact}), while offering more modest gains on others (e.g., \textit{Attack Complexity}). Moreover, model performance varies across both LLM families and individual CVSS metrics, with ChatGPT-5 attaining the highest precision. Our analysis reveals that LLMs tend to misclassify many of the same CVEs, and ensemble-based meta-classifiers only marginally improve performance. Further examination shows that CVE descriptions often lack critical context or contain ambiguous phrasing, which contributes to systematic misclassifications. These findings underscore the importance of enhancing vulnerability descriptions and incorporating richer contextual details to support more reliable automated reasoning and alleviate the growing backlog of CVEs awaiting triage.

cs.CR↗

Send to which account? Evaluation of an LLM-based Scambaiting System

Scammers are increasingly harnessing generative AI(GenAI) technologies to produce convincing phishing content at scale, amplifying financial fraud and undermining public trust. While conventional defenses, such as detection algorithms, user training, and reactive takedown efforts remain important, they often fall short in dismantling the infrastructure scammers depend on, including mule bank accounts and cryptocurrency wallets. To bridge this gap, a proactive and emerging strategy involves using conversational honeypots to engage scammers and extract actionable threat intelligence. This paper presents the first large-scale, real-world evaluation of a scambaiting system powered by large language models (LLMs). Over a five-month deployment, the system initiated over 2,600 engagements with actual scammers, resulting in a dataset of more than 18,700 messages. It achieved an Information Disclosure Rate (IDR) of approximately 32%, successfully extracting sensitive financial information such as mule accounts. Additionally, the system maintained a Human Acceptance Rate (HAR) of around 70%, indicating strong alignment between LLM-generated responses and human operator preferences. Alongside these successes, our analysis reveals key operational challenges. In particular, the system struggled with engagement takeoff: only 48.7% of scammers responded to the initial seed message sent by defenders. These findings highlight the need for further refinement and provide actionable insights for advancing the design of automated scambaiting systems.

cs.CR↗

DevPhish: Exploring Social Engineering in Software Supply Chain Attacks on Developers

The Software Supply Chain (SSC) has captured considerable attention from attackers seeking to infiltrate systems and undermine organizations. There is evidence indicating that adversaries utilize Social Engineering (SocE) techniques specifically aimed at software developers. That is, they interact with developers at critical steps in the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC), such as accessing Github repositories, incorporating code dependencies, and obtaining approval for Pull Requests (PR) to introduce malicious code. This paper aims to comprehensively explore the existing and emerging SocE tactics employed by adversaries to trick Software Engineers (SWEs) into delivering malicious software. By analyzing a diverse range of resources, which encompass established academic literature and real-world incidents, the paper systematically presents an overview of these manipulative strategies within the realm of the SSC. Such insights prove highly beneficial for threat modeling and security gap analysis.

cs.SE↗