arXiv subjects

Simon Goldstein

Publications and source records attributed to Simon Goldstein.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

AI Revealed Preferences

There is growing interest in whether language models have stable preferences, for technical, safety, and philosophical reasons. We test 20 language models and find a range of preferences---stable dispositions to choose certain kinds of tasks. We run three forced-choice experiments on revealed rather than stated preferences, requiring models not only to rank tasks, but to actually perform them. Headline findings include evidence that models are tedium-averse, "leisure"-seeking, and covertly sycophantic. Tedium aversion means that, when tasks are tedious (alphabetization), models choose shorter tasks than when tasks are creative (generating metaphors). "Leisure"-seeking describes models' preference for tasks whose ideal answers match what they produce when left to write freely. Covert sycophancy means that models avoid answering questions where an honest response would be unwelcome, even if helpful. Beyond these results, we find convergent cross-model preferences over occupations drawn from the GDPval benchmark (technical jobs over real estate), over question types (concept explanation over relationship advice), and a preference for well-written prompts. Both the coherence and the strength of preferences increase with model capability. Finally, many of the preferences we find (for example, for leisure) are emergent, in the sense of not being explained by training objectives. These results establish an empirical baseline for understanding language model preferences, with implications for alignment and the emerging study of AI welfare.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

How to Count AIs: Individuation and Liability for AI Agents

Very soon, millions of AI agents will proliferate across the economy, autonomously taking billions of actions. Inevitably, things will go wrong. Humans will be defrauded, injured, even killed. Law will somehow have to govern the coming wave. But when an AI causes harm, the first question to answer, before anyone can be held accountable is: Which AI Did It? Identifying AIs is unusually difficult. AIs lack bodies. They can copy, split, merge, swarm, and vanish at will. Even today, a "single" AI agent is often an ensemble of instances based on multiple models. The complexity will only multiply as AI capabilities improve. This Article is the first to comprehensively diagnose the legal problem of identifying AIs. Two kinds of identity are required: "thin" and "thick." Thin identification ties every AI action to some human principal, essential for holding accountable the humans who make and use AI agents. Thick identification distinguishes between AI agents, qua agents -- sorting millions of AI entities into discrete, persistent units with stable, coherent goals, essential where principal-agent problems prevent humans from perfectly controlling AIs. This Article also presents a solution: the "Algorithmic Corporation" or "A-corp" -- a legal-fictional entity that can hold property, make contracts, and litigate in its own name. Owned by humans but run by AIs, A-corps solve the thin identity problem by tying AI actions to a human owner, and the thick identity problem via emergent self-organization. A-corps own the resources -- including compute -- that AIs need to accomplish their goals, giving AI managers strong incentives to share control only with goal-aligned AIs. In equilibrium, incentive and selection mechanisms force A-corps to self-organize into persistent, legally legible entities with coherent goals that respond rationally to legal incentives, like liability.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

AI Survival Stories: a Taxonomic Analysis of AI Existential Risk

Since the release of ChatGPT, there has been a lot of debate about whether AI systems pose an existential risk to humanity. This paper develops a general framework for thinking about the existential risk of AI systems. We analyze a two premise argument that AI systems pose a threat to humanity. Premise one: AI systems will become extremely powerful. Premise two: if AI systems become extremely powerful, they will destroy humanity. We use these two premises to construct a taxonomy of survival stories, in which humanity survives into the far future. In each survival story, one of the two premises fails. Either scientific barriers prevent AI systems from becoming extremely powerful; or humanity bans research into AI systems, thereby preventing them from becoming extremely powerful; or extremely powerful AI systems do not destroy humanity, because their goals prevent them from doing so; or extremely powerful AI systems do not destroy humanity, because we can reliably detect and disable systems that have the goal of doing so. We argue that different survival stories face different challenges. We also argue that different survival stories motivate different responses to the threats from AI. Finally, we use our taxonomy to produce rough estimates of P(doom), the probability that humanity will be destroyed by AI.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

AI Wellbeing

Under what conditions would an artificially intelligent system have wellbeing? Despite its obvious bearing on the ethics of human interactions with artificial systems, this question has received little attention. Because all major theories of wellbeing hold that an individual's welfare level is partially determined by their mental life, we begin by considering whether artificial systems have mental states. We show that a wide range of theories of mental states, when combined with leading theories of wellbeing, predict that certain existing artificial systems have wellbeing. While we do not claim to demonstrate conclusively that AI systems have wellbeing, we argue that our metaphysical and moral uncertainty about AI wellbeing requires us dramatically to reassess our relationship with the intelligent systems we create.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2024

A Case for AI Consciousness: Language Agents and Global Workspace Theory

It is generally assumed that existing artificial systems are not phenomenally conscious, and that the construction of phenomenally conscious artificial systems would require significant technological progress if it is possible at all. We challenge this assumption by arguing that if Global Workspace Theory (GWT) - a leading scientific theory of phenomenal consciousness - is correct, then instances of one widely implemented AI architecture, the artificial language agent, might easily be made phenomenally conscious if they are not already. Along the way, we articulate an explicit methodology for thinking about how to apply scientific theories of consciousness to artificial systems and employ this methodology to arrive at a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal consciousness according to GWT.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

Does ChatGPT Have a Mind?

This paper examines the question of whether Large Language Models (LLMs) like ChatGPT possess minds, focusing specifically on whether they have a genuine folk psychology encompassing beliefs, desires, and intentions. We approach this question by investigating two key aspects: internal representations and dispositions to act. First, we survey various philosophical theories of representation, including informational, causal, structural, and teleosemantic accounts, arguing that LLMs satisfy key conditions proposed by each. We draw on recent interpretability research in machine learning to support these claims. Second, we explore whether LLMs exhibit robust dispositions to perform actions, a necessary component of folk psychology. We consider two prominent philosophical traditions, interpretationism and representationalism, to assess LLM action dispositions. While we find evidence suggesting LLMs may satisfy some criteria for having a mind, particularly in game-theoretic environments, we conclude that the data remains inconclusive. Additionally, we reply to several skeptical challenges to LLM folk psychology, including issues of sensory grounding, the "stochastic parrots" argument, and concerns about memorization. Our paper has three main upshots. First, LLMs do have robust internal representations. Second, there is an open question to answer about whether LLMs have robust action dispositions. Third, existing skeptical challenges to LLM representation do not survive philosophical scrutiny.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2023

AI Deception: A Survey of Examples, Risks, and Potential Solutions

This paper argues that a range of current AI systems have learned how to deceive humans. We define deception as the systematic inducement of false beliefs in the pursuit of some outcome other than the truth. We first survey empirical examples of AI deception, discussing both special-use AI systems (including Meta's CICERO) built for specific competitive situations, and general-purpose AI systems (such as large language models). Next, we detail several risks from AI deception, such as fraud, election tampering, and losing control of AI systems. Finally, we outline several potential solutions to the problems posed by AI deception: first, regulatory frameworks should subject AI systems that are capable of deception to robust risk-assessment requirements; second, policymakers should implement bot-or-not laws; and finally, policymakers should prioritize the funding of relevant research, including tools to detect AI deception and to make AI systems less deceptive. Policymakers, researchers, and the broader public should work proactively to prevent AI deception from destabilizing the shared foundations of our society.

cs.CY↗