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Simone Ferlin-Reiter

Publications and source records attributed to Simone Ferlin-Reiter.

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Waiting at the front door: Continuous monitoring of latency in the host network stack

With networking moving into the sub-millisecond latency domain, latency in the end host itself can become a significant barrier to achieving consistently low application latency. Both the physical interconnect between the network card and the CPU, the kernel network stack, and the scheduling of applications themselves can be considerable sources of latency. Previous work has studied host latency at various levels, yet there remains a lack of methods and tools to continuously monitor host latency in production. To remedy this, we present netstacklat, a monitoring tool that captures latency at several points in the host network, from the early parts of the Linux kernel network stack all the way until the application reads the data. We evaluate netstacklat in a testbed, demonstrating its ability to capture host latency across 144 variations of HTTP workloads for Nginx and Apache, while also showing how the low monitoring overhead does not inflate tail latency by more than 6%, where previous monitoring solutions increase it by over 100%. Furthermore, we share our initial findings from deploying netstacklat in Cloudflare's global CDN network.

cs.NI

The eBPF Runtime in the Linux Kernel

Extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) is a runtime that enables users to load programs into the operating system (OS) kernel, like Linux or Windows, and execute them safely and efficiently at designated kernel hooks. Each program passes through a verifier that reasons about the safety guarantees for execution. Hosting a safe virtual machine runtime within the kernel makes it dynamically programmable. Unlike the popular approach of bypassing or completely replacing the kernel, eBPF gives users the flexibility to modify the kernel on the fly, rapidly experiment and iterate, and deploy solutions to achieve their workload-specific needs, while working in concert with the kernel. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive description of the design and implementation of the eBPF runtime in the Linux kernel. We argue that eBPF today provides a mature and safe programming environment for the kernel. It has seen wide adoption since its inception and is increasingly being used not just to extend, but program entire components of the kernel, while preserving its runtime integrity. We outline the compelling advantages it offers for real-world production usage, and illustrate current use cases. Finally, we identify its key challenges, and discuss possible future directions.

cs.OS

How Resilient is QUIC to Security and Privacy Attacks?

QUIC has rapidly evolved into a cornerstone transport protocol for secure, low-latency communications, yet its deployment continues to expose critical security and privacy vulnerabilities, particularly during connection establishment phases and via traffic analysis. This paper systematically revisits a comprehensive set of attacks on QUIC and emerging privacy threats. Building upon these observations, we critically analyze recent IETF mitigation efforts, including TLS Encrypted Client Hello (ECH), Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) and MASQUE. We analyze how these mechanisms enhance privacy while introducing new operational risks, particularly under adversarial load. Additionally, we discuss emerging challenges posed by post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) handshakes, including handshake expansion and metadata leakage risks. Our analysis highlights ongoing gaps between theoretical defenses and practical deployments, and proposes new research directions focused on adaptive privacy mechanisms. Building on these insights, we propose future directions to ensure long-term security of QUIC and aim to guide its evolution as a robust, privacy-preserving, and resilient transport foundation for the next-generation Internet.

cs.CR