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Sina Moradi Sabet

Publications and source records attributed to Sina Moradi Sabet.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

P2Patch: Exploit-Guided Vulnerability Repair

Large language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents for automated program repair, patching software vulnerabilities through multi-step reasoning and tool use. Yet these systems typically validate a patch against the same evidence used to construct it -- a static alert, sanitizer trace, published exploit, or test suite. A patch that blocks that one piece of evidence can therefore look successful while remaining vulnerable to the same vulnerability with some variation. We present P2Patch, a generative adversarial repair system that treats each patch as a new attack target. Starting from a normalized vulnerability finding, an exploitation agent constructs a reproducing proof of vulnerability (PoV), a patching agent repairs the program, and the exploitation agent then attacks the patched program for a distinct same-vulnerability exploit. Every successful exploit becomes a permanent repair requirement, and the final patch must block all PoVs accumulated during the patching process, with construction-time PoVs kept strictly separate from held-out evaluation oracles. Across 101 C/C++ and Java CVE subjects, this adversarial loop surfaces a distinct confirmed exploit in 41% of runs after the patch has already blocked its original construction-time PoV. Against single-pass repair from the same finding using Claude Code, P2Patch raises held-out fix-closed coverage from 78.1% to 84.7% and beyond-upstream coverage from 42.1% to 62.5%. Under the same held-out oracles, it also certifies more attack paths as blocked than recent state-of-the-art agentic repair systems on overlapping subjects. These results show that adversarial testing and independent security oracles expose repair gaps that one-shot validation misses.

cs.CR↗

IntelliAudit: Using Large Language Models to Evaluate Audit Controls

IT audits require auditors to judge whether heterogeneous organizational evidence satisfies semantic security and compliance controls. This judgment is difficult to automate because relevant evidence is distributed across policies, records, spreadsheets, and operational artifacts, and because audit conclusions depend on evidentiary sufficiency rather than keyword matching. We present IntelliAudit, a retrieval-grounded multi-agent system for IT audit evidence evaluation. Given a control and an evidence corpus, IntelliAudit retrieves relevant artifacts, generates an evidence-grounded assessment, challenges adverse findings, adjudicates disagreements, and produces an auditor-facing recommendation with cited evidence, rationale, missing-evidence analysis, and remediation guidance. We instantiate IntelliAudit on ISO/IEC 27001 and evaluate it across multiple simulated organizations using expert auditor review and audit-readiness user feedback. The evaluation shows that IntelliAudit can support control interpretation, evidence-grounded reasoning, and audit-preparation workflows, while also revealing the importance of human oversight for calibrating sufficiency judgments and correcting overly permissive recommendations. These results suggest that retrieval-grounded multi-agent systems can assist audit evidence review, but should remain decision-support tools rather than autonomous certification systems.

cs.AI↗

ZeroFalse: Improving Precision in Static Analysis with LLMs

Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tools are integral to modern software development, yet their adoption is undermined by excessive false positives that weaken developer trust and demand costly manual triage. We present ZeroFalse, a framework that integrates static analysis with large language models (LLMs) to reduce false positives while preserving coverage. ZeroFalse treats static analyzer outputs as structured contracts, enriching them with flow-sensitive traces, contextual evidence, and CWE-specific knowledge before adjudication by an LLM. This design preserves the systematic reach of static analysis while leveraging the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. We evaluate ZeroFalse across both benchmarks and real-world projects using ten state-of-the-art LLMs. Our best-performing models achieve F1-scores of 0.912 on the OWASP Java Benchmark and 0.955 on the OpenVuln dataset, maintaining recall and precision above 90%. Results further show that CWE-specialized prompting consistently outperforms generic prompts, and reasoning-oriented LLMs provide the most reliable precision-recall balance. These findings position ZeroFalse as a practical and scalable approach for enhancing the reliability of SAST and supporting its integration into real-world CI/CD pipelines.

cs.SE↗