arXiv subjects

Sinan Ertemel

Publications and source records attributed to Sinan Ertemel.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Directional Revision under Two-Horizon Deliberation: A Revealed-Preference Analysis

We study deterministic choice when the same decision maker is observed before and after a deliberative intervention that makes one of two fixed ordinal consequence dimensions more salient. Both choice modes are path independent. Ordinary choice respects two-dimensional dominance, while any binary reversal under fuller deliberation must favor the alternative that is strictly better on the emphasized dimension. We characterize exactly the admissible ordinary and full-horizon rankings. The characterization yields a protected partial order, sharp pairwise and menu-level identification, a signed restriction on menu-level choice changes, and an acyclicity test for incomplete observations. With an ordered sequence of deliberative modes, choices from any fixed menu form a monotone tradeoff path: every switch improves the emphasized dimension, worsens the other dimension, and an abandoned alternative cannot reappear. When the emphasized consequence order is strict, the admissible rankings have an equivalent Kemeny-Kendall representation. The framework is ordinal: it requires neither a cardinal tradeoff nor lexicographic priority, and it applies whenever deliberation gives greater emphasis to one of two fixed consequence dimensions.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Rawlsian equity: a new notion of fairness for the assignment problem

We introduce Rawlsian equity, a notion of fairness for allocating indivisible objects among agents without object-specific entitlements. Rawlsian equity requires that an object not be assigned to an agent who ranks it more highly than another agent unless the latter receives a more preferred object. We show that the set of Rawlsian equitable allocations coincides with the set of stable allocations in an auxiliary market where object priorities depend on agents' preference reports. The agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm computes the agent-optimal element of this set, but no Rawlsian equitable rule is strategy-proof in general.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Integrating Proportionality and Egalitarianism in Claims Problems

We study the problem of allocating a finite estate among agents whose total claims exceed the available resources, a standard framework in the theory of claims problems. Two canonical rules embody competing fairness ideals: the Proportional rule allocates in proportion to claims, while the Constrained Equal Awards (CEA) rule equalizes awards as much as possible subject to claim-boundedness. We introduce the P-CEA family of compromise rules, which assigns each agent a fixed baseline award, capped by her claim, and distributes the remaining estate proportionally to residual claims. By varying the baseline parameter, this family generates a continuum of allocation rules that interpolates between the Proportional and CEA benchmarks. We provide an axiomatic characterization based on two threshold-dependent principles: No Advantageous Reallocation, which prevents agents with claims above the threshold from benefiting through coordinated claim redistribution that preserves the threshold condition, and Sustainable Lower Bound, which guarantees each agent at least the minimum of her claim and the threshold. We further develop a dual analysis that reallocates losses instead of awards and characterize the corresponding dual family using the dual versions of our axioms.

econ.TH↗