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Sk Tanzir Mehedi

Publications and source records attributed to Sk Tanzir Mehedi.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Sentra-Guard: A Real-Time Multilingual Defense Against Adversarial LLM Prompts

This paper presents a real-time modular defense system named Sentra-Guard. The system detects and mitigates jailbreak and prompt injection attacks targeting large language models (LLMs). The framework uses a hybrid architecture with FAISS-indexed SBERT embedding representations that capture the semantic meaning of prompts, combined with fine-tuned transformer classifiers, which are machine learning models specialized for distinguishing between benign and adversarial language inputs. It identifies adversarial prompts in both direct and obfuscated attack vectors. A core innovation is the classifier-retriever fusion module, which dynamically computes context-aware risk scores that estimate how likely a prompt is to be adversarial based on its content and context. The framework ensures multilingual resilience with a language-agnostic preprocessing layer. This component automatically translates non-English prompts into English for semantic evaluation, enabling consistent detection across over 100 languages. The system includes a HITL feedback loop, where decisions made by the automated system are reviewed by human experts for continual learning and rapid adaptation under adversarial pressure. Sentra-Guard maintains an evolving dual-labeled knowledge base of benign and malicious prompts, enhancing detection reliability and reducing false positives. Evaluation results show a 99.96% detection rate (AUC = 1.00, F1 = 1.00) and an attack success rate (ASR) of only 0.004%. This outperforms leading baselines such as LlamaGuard-2 (1.3%) and OpenAI Moderation (3.7%). Unlike black-box approaches, Sentra-Guard is transparent, fine-tunable, and compatible with diverse LLM backends. Its modular design supports scalable deployment in both commercial and open-source environments. The system establishes a new state-of-the-art in adversarial LLM defense.

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eDySec: A Deep Learning-based Explainable Dynamic Analysis Framework for Detecting Malicious Packages in PyPI Ecosystem

The security of open-source software repositories is increasingly threatened by next-gen software supply chain attacks. These attacks include multiphase malware execution, remote access activation, and dynamic payload generation. Traditional Machine Learning (ML) detectors struggle to detect these attacks due to the high-dimensional and sparse nature of dynamic behavioral data, including system calls, network traffic, directory access patterns, and dependency logs. As a result, these data characteristics degrade the performance, stability, and explainability of ML models. These challenges have made Deep Learning (DL) a promising alternative, given its success across various domains and its potential for modeling complex patterns. This paper presents eDySec, a DL-based efficient, stable, and explainable framework for dynamic behavioral analysis to detect malicious packages. Using the QUT-DV25 dataset, which captures both install-time and post-installation behaviors of packages, we evaluate DL models and investigate feature sets to identify the most discriminative attributes for enabling efficient malicious package detection. Additionally, model stability analysis and explainable AI techniques are incorporated into the detection pipeline to enable stable, and transparent interpretations of model decisions. Experimental results demonstrate that eDySec significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art frameworks. Specifically, it halves feature dimensionality while lowering false positives by 82% and false negatives by 79%. It also improves accuracy by 3%, achieves near-perfect stability, and maintains an inference latency of 170ms per package. Further analysis reveals that feature and model selection play a critical role, as certain combinations degrade performance. Ultimately, this study advances the understanding of the strengths and limitations of dynamic analysis against next-gen attacks.

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QUT-DV25: A Dataset for Dynamic Analysis of Next-Gen Software Supply Chain Attacks

Securing software supply chains is a growing challenge due to the inadequacy of existing datasets in capturing the complexity of next-gen attacks, such as multiphase malware execution, remote access activation, and dynamic payload generation. Existing datasets, which rely on metadata inspection and static code analysis, are inadequate for detecting such attacks. This creates a critical gap because these datasets do not capture what happens during and after a package is installed. To address this gap, we present QUT-DV25, a dynamic analysis dataset specifically designed to support and advance research on detecting and mitigating supply chain attacks within the Python Package Index (PyPI) ecosystem. This dataset captures install and post-install-time traces from 14,271 Python packages, of which 7,127 are malicious. The packages are executed in an isolated sandbox environment using an extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) kernel and user-level probes. It captures 36 real-time features, that includes system calls, network traffic, resource usages, directory access patterns, dependency logs, and installation behaviors, enabling the study of next-gen attack vectors. ML analysis using the QUT-DV25 dataset identified four malicious PyPI packages previously labeled as benign, each with thousands of downloads. These packages deployed covert remote access and multi-phase payloads, were reported to PyPI maintainers, and subsequently removed. This highlights the practical value of QUT-DV25, as it outperforms reactive, metadata, and static datasets, offering a robust foundation for developing and benchmarking advanced threat detection within the evolving software supply chain ecosystem.

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DySec: A Machine Learning-based Dynamic Analysis for Detecting Malicious Packages in PyPI Ecosystem

Malicious Python packages make software supply chains vulnerable by exploiting trust in open-source repositories like Python Package Index (PyPI). Lack of real-time behavioral monitoring makes metadata inspection and static code analysis inadequate against advanced attack strategies such as typosquatting, covert remote access activation, and dynamic payload generation. To address these challenges, we introduce DySec, a machine learning (ML)-based dynamic analysis framework for PyPI that uses eBPF kernel and user-level probes to monitor behaviors during package installation. By capturing 36 real-time features-including system calls, network traffic, resource usage, directory access, and installation patterns-DySec detects threats like typosquatting, covert remote access activation, dynamic payload generation, and multiphase attack malware. We developed a comprehensive dataset of 14,271 Python packages, including 7,127 malicious sample traces, by executing them in a controlled isolated environment. Experimental results demonstrate that DySec achieves a 95.99\% detection accuracy with a latency of <0.5s, reducing false negatives by 78.65\% compared to static analysis and 82.24\% compared to metadata analysis. During the evaluation, DySec flagged 11 packages that PyPI classified as benign. A manual analysis, including installation behavior inspection, confirmed six of them as malicious. These findings were reported to PyPI maintainers, resulting in the removal of four packages. DySec bridges the gap between reactive traditional methods and proactive, scalable threat mitigation in open-source ecosystems by uniquely detecting malicious install-time behaviors.

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