arXiv subjects

Smitha Milli

Publications and source records attributed to Smitha Milli.

23 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2019

Literal or Pedagogic Human? Analyzing Human Model Misspecification in Objective Learning

It is incredibly easy for a system designer to misspecify the objective for an autonomous system ("robot''), thus motivating the desire to have the robot learn the objective from human behavior instead. Recent work has suggested that people have an interest in the robot performing well, and will thus behave pedagogically, choosing actions that are informative to the robot. In turn, robots benefit from interpreting the behavior by accounting for this pedagogy. In this work, we focus on misspecification: we argue that robots might not know whether people are being pedagogic or literal and that it is important to ask which assumption is safer to make. We cast objective learning into the more general form of a common-payoff game between the robot and human, and prove that in any such game literal interpretation is more robust to misspecification. Experiments with human data support our theoretical results and point to the sensitivity of the pedagogic assumption.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2018

The Social Cost of Strategic Classification

Consequential decision-making typically incentivizes individuals to behave strategically, tailoring their behavior to the specifics of the decision rule. A long line of work has therefore sought to counteract strategic behavior by designing more conservative decision boundaries in an effort to increase robustness to the effects of strategic covariate shift. We show that these efforts benefit the institutional decision maker at the expense of the individuals being classified. Introducing a notion of social burden, we prove that any increase in institutional utility necessarily leads to a corresponding increase in social burden. Moreover, we show that the negative externalities of strategic classification can disproportionately harm disadvantaged groups in the population. Our results highlight that strategy-robustness must be weighed against considerations of social welfare and fairness.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2018

Model Reconstruction from Model Explanations

We show through theory and experiment that gradient-based explanations of a model quickly reveal the model itself. Our results speak to a tension between the desire to keep a proprietary model secret and the ability to offer model explanations. On the theoretical side, we give an algorithm that provably learns a two-layer ReLU network in a setting where the algorithm may query the gradient of the model with respect to chosen inputs. The number of queries is independent of the dimension and nearly optimal in its dependence on the model size. Of interest not only from a learning-theoretic perspective, this result highlights the power of gradients rather than labels as a learning primitive. Complementing our theory, we give effective heuristics for reconstructing models from gradient explanations that are orders of magnitude more query-efficient than reconstruction attacks relying on prediction interfaces.

stat.ML↗

arXiv2018

Interpretable and Pedagogical Examples

Teachers intentionally pick the most informative examples to show their students. However, if the teacher and student are neural networks, the examples that the teacher network learns to give, although effective at teaching the student, are typically uninterpretable. We show that training the student and teacher iteratively, rather than jointly, can produce interpretable teaching strategies. We evaluate interpretability by (1) measuring the similarity of the teacher's emergent strategies to intuitive strategies in each domain and (2) conducting human experiments to evaluate how effective the teacher's strategies are at teaching humans. We show that the teacher network learns to select or generate interpretable, pedagogical examples to teach rule-based, probabilistic, boolean, and hierarchical concepts.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2017

Should Robots be Obedient?

Intuitively, obedience -- following the order that a human gives -- seems like a good property for a robot to have. But, we humans are not perfect and we may give orders that are not best aligned to our preferences. We show that when a human is not perfectly rational then a robot that tries to infer and act according to the human's underlying preferences can always perform better than a robot that simply follows the human's literal order. Thus, there is a tradeoff between the obedience of a robot and the value it can attain for its owner. We investigate how this tradeoff is impacted by the way the robot infers the human's preferences, showing that some methods err more on the side of obedience than others. We then analyze how performance degrades when the robot has a misspecified model of the features that the human cares about or the level of rationality of the human. Finally, we study how robots can start detecting such model misspecification. Overall, our work suggests that there might be a middle ground in which robots intelligently decide when to obey human orders, but err on the side of obedience.

cs.AI↗