Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Solaleh Mohammadi

Publications and source records attributed to Solaleh Mohammadi.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Fictitious Play When Agents Are Not Expected-Utility Maximizers: A Geometric Analysis in $2$-Action Games

Fictitious play (FP) is one of the earliest and most fundamental learning procedures in games, where each agent independently chooses a best response to the empirical distribution of opponents' past actions by maximizing the expected payoff with respect to it. However, learning agents may not always be expected-utility maximizers: they may use nonlinear evaluation functionals to account for the uncertainty induced by the opponents, e.g., via risk measures. In this work, we study nonlinear fictitious play (NL-FP), in which each pure action is evaluated by a general, possibly nonlinear functional of the payoff distribution induced by the opponent's empirical belief. To analyze NL-FP, we first identify a single-crossing property (SCP) of evaluation functionals that preserves the classical geometry of FP in $2\times2$ games. Furthermore, we conduct a novel geometric analysis of the convergence behavior of NL-FP in $2\times2$ games, even when the SCP fails. Beyond $2\times2$ games, we show that the convergence of NL-FP in $2\times n$ ($n\ge3$) games may fail even for continuous-time NL-FP, when the two-action player uses conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) in a $2\times3$ game. In addition, we identify a finite-crossing condition that ensures convergence of the selected continuous-time dynamics and the discrete-time iterates in general $2\times n$ games, which also provides new insights into the global landscape of continuous-time classical FP in such games.

cs.GT↗

Beyond End-to-End Recovery: Towards a Better Understanding of LLM Steganography via Rolewise Decomposition

In large language model (LLM) steganography, an encoder hides a private message in an otherwise ordinary response, as text transmitted to a decoder, who attempts to recover it. The success of this private-message transmission is commonly measured through end-to-end (E2E) recovery, which checks whether the decoder correctly reconstructs the private message. However, E2E recovery cannot distinguish encoding failures from decoding failures or reveal how the private message is represented in the encoder's transmitted text. To address these limitations, we introduce a rolewise decomposition framework that separately examines how private messages are represented in encoder transmitted texts, what decoders recover, and what deterministic verification can establish. Across 7,200 encoder responses, we identify 168 verifiable encodings missed by decoders and 706 responses containing private messages reconstructed through word-length or token-initial patterns not explicitly specified in the encoder's instructions. These findings demonstrate that E2E recovery alone may obscure important distinctions between encoding and decoding, motivating their separate evaluation to better understand and mitigate the safety issues caused by LLM steganography.

cs.CR↗

Entropic Risk-Sensitive Evolutionary Learning and Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games

We study risk-sensitive evolutionary learning dynamics and their long-run equilibrium selection behaviors in coordination games. Agents' risk attitudes enter through the classical entropic risk measure, which evaluates opponent-induced payoff uncertainty and feeds into noisy best responses under two standard revision protocols: best response with mutations and logit choice. We first analyze $2\times 2$ coordination games in both single-population symmetric and two-population asymmetric settings. In the single-population setting, unlike the risk-neutral case where the dynamics are known to favor the risk-dominant equilibrium, we show that risk sensitivity can change the stochastically stable outcome: a greater risk-seeking attitude favors the payoff-dominant equilibrium, while a greater risk-averse attitude favors the maximin equilibrium. Thus, the population's risk attitude may act as a control knob for long-run equilibrium selection. In both population settings, we also identify a robust regime: any super-dominant equilibrium is stochastically stable for all risk attitudes, under both protocols, and across populations. We further extend the single-population analysis to symmetric $k$-action games, which include symmetric $k$-action coordination games as a special case, under risk-sensitive best response with mutations. In this setting, we show that, for sufficiently large populations, sufficiently risk-seeking agents uniquely select the strongly payoff-dominant equilibrium when it exists, whereas sufficiently risk-averse agents uniquely select the strongly maximin equilibrium when it exists. These results show that entropic risk sensitivity may serve as a systematic mechanism for steering equilibrium selection in evolutionary games, beyond the classical risk-neutral benchmark.

eess.SY↗