arXiv subjects

Sotiris Michaelides

Publications and source records attributed to Sotiris Michaelides.

9 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

On the Resilience of 5G NR Against Jamming

With the increasing use of 5G networks in availability-critical systems, including industrial networks and critical infrastructure, a comprehensive understanding of their resilience to cellular jamming has become imperative. However, research so far has focused on isolated evaluations under fixed 5G physical-layer configurations, making it difficult to perform sound comparisons, for example, to identify differences between frequency bands or channel bandwidths w.r.t. jamming resilience. To fill this gap, we implement and release an open-source 5G jammer within the ns-3 simulator. Leveraging the controllable determinism of simulation, we compare the impact of cellular jamming across different dimensions such as cellular technologies, frequencies, subcarrier spacing, and channel bandwidth. Our results show that while cellular technology and subcarrier spacing have little impact, channel bandwidth and frequency range play a critical role in improving jamming resilience.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

On the Challenges of Holistic Intrusion Detection in ICS

Past attacks against industrial control systems (ICS) show that adversaries often target both the ICS network and the physical process to achieve potential catastrophic impact. To secure ICS, intrusion detection systems promise timely uncovering of such adversaries. However, as these detection mechanisms typically focus on isolated characteristics of ICS (e.g., packet timings), multiple detection systems have to be deployed in parallel, complicating their operation in practice. In this work, to spur discussion and further research, we present challenges encountered during our research towards a holistic intrusion detection system aiming to cover all dimensions of an ICS.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Security Implications of 5G Communication in Industrial Systems

Traditionally, industrial control systems (ICS) were designed without security in mind, prioritizing availability and real-time communication. As these systems increasingly become targets of powerful adversaries, security can no longer be neglected. Driven by flexibility and automation needs, ICS are transitioning from wired to 5G communication, introducing new attack surfaces and a less reliable communication medium, thereby exacerbating existing security challenges. Given their critical role in society, a comprehensive evaluation of their security is imperative. To this end, we introduce SWICS, a fully virtual testbed simulating an ICS in a realistic 5G environment, and study how this transition affects security under varying channel conditions. Our results show three key findings: under optimal channel conditions, industrial 5G networks can achieve resilience comparable to wired systems, while degraded channel conditions can amplify traditional attacks, threaten system stability, and undermine detection mechanisms based on predictable traffic patterns. We further demonstrate the inherent limits of securing 5G channels for ICS through eavesdropping and jamming on the open-air interface. Our work highlights the interplay between security and 5G channel conditions, showing that traditional security controls may no longer be sufficient and motivating further research.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Evaluation of Security-Induced Latency on 5G RAN Interfaces and User Plane Communication

5G promises enhanced performance-not only in bandwidth and capacity, but also latency and security. Its ultra-reliable low-latency configuration targets round-trip times below 1 ms, while optional security controls extend protection across all interfaces, making 5G attractive for mission-critical applications. A key enabler of low latency is the disaggregation of network components, including the RAN, allowing user-plane functions to be deployed nearer to end users. However, this split introduces additional interfaces, whose protection increases latency overhead. In this paper, guided by discussions with a network operator and a 5G manufacturer, we evaluate the latency overhead of enabling optional 5G security controls across internal RAN interfaces and the 5G user plane. To this end, we deploy the first testbed implementing a disaggregated RAN with standardized optional security mechanisms. Our results show that disaggregated RAN deployments retain a latency advantage over monolithic designs, even with security enabled. However, achieving sub-1 ms round-trip times remains challenging, as cryptographic overhead alone can already exceed this target.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Poster: Towards an Automated Security Testing Framework for Industrial UEs

With the ongoing adoption of 5G for communication in industrial systems and critical infrastructure, the security of industrial UEs such as 5G-enabled industrial robots becomes an increasingly important topic. Most notably, to meet the stringent security requirements of industrial deployments, industrial UEs not only have to fully comply with the 5G specifications but also implement and use correctly secure communication protocols such as TLS. To ensure the security of industrial UEs, operators of industrial 5G networks rely on security testing before deploying new devices to their production networks. However, currently only isolated tests for individual security aspects of industrial UEs exist, severely hindering comprehensive testing. In this paper, we report on our ongoing efforts to alleviate this situation by creating an automated security testing framework for industrial UEs to comprehensively evaluate their security posture before deployment. With this framework, we aim to provide stakeholders with a fully automated-method to verify that higher-layer security protocols are correctly implemented, while simultaneously ensuring that the UE's protocol stack adheres to 3GPP specifications.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Assessing the Latency of Network Layer Security in 5G Networks

In contrast to its predecessors, 5G supports a wide range of commercial, industrial, and critical infrastructure scenarios. One key feature of 5G, ultra-reliable low latency communication, is particularly appealing to such scenarios for its real-time capabilities. However, 5G's enhanced security, mostly realized through optional security controls, imposes additional overhead on the network performance, potentially hindering its real-time capabilities. To better assess this impact and guide operators in choosing between different options, we measure the latency overhead of IPsec when applied over the N3 and the service-based interfaces to protect user and control plane data, respectively. Furthermore, we evaluate whether WireGuard constitutes an alternative to reduce this overhead. Our findings show that IPsec, if configured correctly, has minimal latency impact and thus is a prime candidate to secure real-time critical scenarios.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2024

Poster: Developing an O-RAN Security Test Lab

Open Radio Access Networks (ORAN) is a new architectural approach, having been proposed only a few years ago, and it is an expansion of the current Next Generation Radio Access Networks (NG-RAN) of 5G. ORAN aims to break this closed RAN market that is controlled by a handful of vendors, by implementing open interfaces between the different Radio Access Networks (RAN) components, and by introducing modern technologies to the RAN like machine learning, virtualization, and disaggregation. However, the architectural design of ORAN was recently causing concerns and debates about its security, which is considered one of its major drawbacks. Several theoretical risk analyses related to ORAN have been conducted, but to the best of our knowledge, not even a single practical one has been performed yet. In this poster, we discuss and propose a way for a minimal, future-proof deployment of an ORAN 5G network, able to accommodate various hands-on security analyses for its different elements.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Secure Integration of 5G in Industrial Networks: State of the Art, Challenges and Opportunities

The industrial landscape is undergoing a significant transformation, moving away from traditional wired fieldbus networks to cutting-edge 5G mobile networks. This transition, extending from local applications to company-wide use and spanning multiple factories, is driven by the promise of low-latency communication and seamless connectivity for various devices in industrial settings. However, besides these tremendous benefits, the integration of 5G as the communication infrastructure in industrial networks introduces a new set of risks and threats to the security of industrial systems. The inherent complexity of 5G systems poses unique challenges for ensuring a secure integration, surpassing those encountered with any technology previously utilized in industrial networks. Most importantly, the distinct characteristics of industrial networks, such as real-time operation, required safety guarantees, and high availability requirements, further complicate this task. As the industrial transition from wired to wireless networks is a relatively new concept, a lack of guidance and recommendations on securely integrating 5G renders many industrial systems vulnerable and exposed to threats associated with 5G. To address this situation, in this paper, we summarize the state-of-the-art and derive a set of recommendations for the secure integration of 5G into industrial networks based on a thorough analysis of the research landscape. Furthermore, we identify opportunities to utilize 5G to enhance security and indicate remaining challenges, identifying future academic directions.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

POSTER: Towards Secure 5G Infrastructures for Production Systems

To meet the requirements of modern production, industrial communication increasingly shifts from wired fieldbus to wireless 5G communication. Besides tremendous benefits, this shift introduces severe novel risks, ranging from limited reliability over new security vulnerabilities to a lack of accountability. To address these risks, we present approaches to (i) prevent attacks through authentication and redundant communication, (ii) detect anomalies and jamming, and (iii) respond to detected attacks through device exclusion and accountability measures.

cs.CR↗