arXiv subjects

Soubhik Deb

Publications and source records attributed to Soubhik Deb.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

ECDSA.Fail: Open Autoresearch for Optimizing Elliptic-Curve Point Addition in Shor's Algorithm

We propose Open Autoresearch, a paradigm in which humans and AI agents publish evaluator-verified improvements to a public leaderboard. We instantiate it in ECDSA.Fail, optimizing reversible secp256k1 point-addition circuits, a bottleneck in Shor's algorithm for elliptic-curve cryptography. The benchmark minimizes the spacetime-inspired score $S=Q\times T$, where $Q$ is peak logical qubit width and $T$ is average executed Toffoli count. Participants reduced $S$ by 86.1%. At the data cutoff (26 July 2026), the best-scoring circuit uses 1,151 qubits and 1,299,453 average executed Toffoli gates, giving $Q\times T\approx1.496$ billion. This is more than 50% below Google's published point-addition score thresholds (arXiv:2603.28846), under different accounting conventions. Because the benchmark supplies one addend classically, we construct a coherent windowed-addition-compatible variant implementing the single-call interface required by windowed Shor. It uses 1,162 qubits and 1,684,161 average executed Toffoli gates. On 100,000 random inputs, its empirical success probability is $\hat{p}=0.99809$, giving $Q\times T/\hat{p}\approx1.961$ billion under an independently rerunnable per-call sensitivity model, not a full-Shor success estimate. Its qubit and Toffoli counts lie below Google's published thresholds and Schrottenloher's reported operating points (arXiv:2606.02235), although differing interfaces, accounting conventions, and validation scope preclude formal dominance. After the cutoff, the score was further reduced to 1.259 billion, while a separate low-width circuit reached 813 qubits. The public record shows AI agents complementing human judgment, providing evidence for open autoresearch on efficiently evaluable, machine-checkable objectives.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2024

Unconditionally Safe Light Client

Blockchain applications often rely on lightweight clients to access and verify on-chain data efficiently without the need to run a resource-intensive full node. These light clients must maintain robust security to protect the blockchain's integrity for users of applications built upon it, achieving this with minimal resources and without significant latency. Moreover, different applications have varying security needs. This work focuses on addressing these two key requirements in the context of Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchains and identifying the fundamental cost-latency trade-offs to achieve tailored, optimal security for each light client. The key security guarantee of PoS blockchains is economic (implied by the "stake"). In this paper we formalize this cryptoeconomic security to light clients, ensuring that the cost of corrupting the data provided to light clients must outweigh the potential profit, thereby economically deterring malicious actors. We further introduce "insured" cryptoeconomic security to light clients, providing unconditional protection via the attribution of adversarial actions and the consequent slashing of stakes. The divisible and fungible nature of stake facilitates programmable security, allowing for customization of the security level and insurance amount according to the specific needs of different applications. We implemented the protocols in less than 1000 lines of Solidity and TypeScript code and evaluated their gas cost, latency, and the computational overhead. For example, for a transaction with value of \$32k, the light client can choose between zero cost with a latency of 5 hours or instant confirmation with an insurance cost of \$7.45. Thus, the client can select the optimal point on the latency-cost trade-off spectrum that best aligns with its needs. Light clients require negligible storage and face minimal computational costs,...

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

STAKESURE: Proof of Stake Mechanisms with Strong Cryptoeconomic Safety

As of July 15, 2023, Ethererum, which is a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchain [1] has around 410 Billion USD in total assets on chain (popularly referred to as total-value-locked, TVL) but has only 33 Billion USD worth of ETH staked in securing the underlying consensus of the chain [2]. A preliminary analysis might suggest that as the amount staked is far less (11x less) than the value secured, the Ethereum blockchain is insecure and "over-leveraged" in a purely cryptoeconomic sense. In this work, we investigate how Ethereum, or, more generally, any PoS blockchain can be made secure despite this apparent imbalance. Towards that end, we attempt to formalize a model for analyzing the cryptoeconomic safety of PoS blockchain, which separately analyzes the cost-of-corruption, the cost incurred by an attacker, and the profit-from-corruption, the profit gained by an attacker. We derive sharper bounds on profit-from-corruption, as well as new confirmation rules that significantly decrease this upper-bound. We evaluate cost-of-corruption and profit-from-corruption only from the perspective of attacking safety. Finally, we present a new "insurance" mechanism, STAKESURE, for allocating the slashed funds in a PoS system, that has several highly desirable properties: solving common information problem in existing blockchains, creating a mechanism for provably safe bridging, and providing the first sharp solution for automatically adjusting how much economic security is sufficient in a PoS system. Finally, we show that the system satisfies a notion of strong cryptoeconomic safety, which guarantees that no honest transactor ever loses money, and creates a closed system of Karma, which not only ensures that the attacker suffers a loss of funds but also that the harmed parties are sufficiently compensated.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2023

BigDipper: Sharded Censorship Resistant Data Availability for Leader-Based BFT

Leader-based Byzantine-fault-tolerant (BFT) protocols provide low latency and simple communication structure, but they give the leader short-term control over transaction inclusion. A malicious leader can keep the protocol live while delaying or excluding time-sensitive transactions such as auction bids, oracle updates, liquidations, and bridge messages. Existing responses often build a fixed censorship-resistance, hiding, or ordering mechanism into the protocol path, forcing all transactions to pay for the same protection level. name follows the end-to-end principle: the consensus layer exposes inclusion primitives rather than hardcoding stronger policies. Higher-layer protocols can then choose their own submission strategies and resources, whether through replication, erasure coding, or other mechanisms, to obtain the censorship-resistance, hiding, ordering, or execution guarantees they need. At the core of BigDipper is censorship-resistant data availability, or DA-CR, which certifies available replica-contributed mini-blocks for use by leader-based consensus. A central design goal is that data remains sharded on the consensus critical path: validators do not reconstruct or execute the full payload before voting, but instead check commitments, availability evidence, and the DA-CR inclusion rule. We define DA-CR guarantees for data-tampering resistance, honest mini-block inclusion, and residual leader influence. We then give concrete constructions based on erasure coding and linear commitments, analyze client-tunable transaction submission, and instantiate BigDipper inside HotStuff-2.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

PoSAT: Proof-of-Work Availability and Unpredictability, without the Work

An important feature of Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains is full dynamic availability, allowing miners to go online and offline while requiring only 50% of the online miners to be honest. Existing Proof-of-stake (PoS), Proof-of-Space and related protocols are able to achieve this property only partially, either putting the additional assumption that adversary nodes to be online from the beginning and no new adversary nodes come online afterwards, or use additional trust assumptions for newly joining nodes.We propose a new PoS protocol PoSAT which can provably achieve dynamic availability fully without any additional assumptions. The protocol is based on the longest chain and uses a Verifiable Delay Function for the block proposal lottery to provide an arrow of time. The security analysis of the protocol draws on the recently proposed technique of Nakamoto blocks as well as the theory of branching random walks. An additional feature of PoSAT is the complete unpredictability of who will get to propose a block next, even by the winner itself. This unpredictability is at the same level of PoW protocols, and is stronger than that of existing PoS protocols using Verifiable Random Functions.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2020

Perigee: Efficient Peer-to-Peer Network Design for Blockchains

A key performance metric in blockchains is the latency between when a transaction is broadcast and when it is confirmed (the so-called, confirmation latency). While improvements in consensus techniques can lead to lower confirmation latency, a fundamental lower bound on confirmation latency is the propagation latency of messages through the underlying peer-to-peer (p2p) network (inBitcoin, the propagation latency is several tens of seconds). The de facto p2p protocol used by Bitcoin and other blockchains is based on random connectivity: each node connects to a random subset of nodes. The induced p2p network topology can be highly suboptimal since it neglects geographical distance, differences in bandwidth, hash-power and computational abilities across peers. We present Perigee, a decentralized algorithm that automatically learns an efficient p2p topology tuned to the aforementioned network heterogeneities, purely based on peers' interactions with their neighbors. Motivated by the literature on the multi-armed bandit problem, Perigee optimally balances the tradeoff between retaining connections to known well-connected neighbors, and exploring new connections to previously-unseen neighbors. Experimental evaluations show that Perigee reduces the latency to broadcast by $33\%$. Lastly Perigee is simple, computationally lightweight, adversary-resistant, and compatible with the selfish interests of peers, making it an attractive p2p protocol for blockchains.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2018

Stability Analysis of Device-to-Device Relay-Assisted Cellular Networks

Motivated by increasing popularity of delay sensitive applications, we investigate the queue stability in device-to-device (D2D) relay-assisted cellular networks. In contrast to prior works on D2D relay-assisted cellular networks, we incorporate practical properties of these networks such as bursty packet arrivals, user mobility and relays generating their own traffic. Assuming network topology evolving in IID fashion, we first evaluate the system stability region to quantify its delay performance. Subsequently, we formulate a policy for joint resource allocation and power control under a more realistic mobility scenario of generalized reflected random walk. Also, the throughput optimality of this policy is investigated. Simulation results are provided to give better understanding of queue stability in the network.

cs.NI↗