Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Sourya Joyee De

Publications and source records attributed to Sourya Joyee De.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

A Human-LLM Teaming Framework for Privacy Risk Analysis: An Illustration with CBDC-Based Welfare Schemes

Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC)-based welfare schemes may be potentially privacy invasive as they process significant volumes of beneficiary personal data and lead to privacy harms such as surveillance, discrimination and stigmatization. Such welfare delivery schemes involve complex digital ecosystems and large number of stakeholders. Consequently, to examine their privacy risks, privacy risk assessments require extensive information gathering and synthesis, complex reasoning, scenario explorations, contextual evaluation and human judgement. Thus, they present ideal scenarios for human-LLM teaming, where effective integration of complementary human and LLM capabilities can yield an outcome far superior to either human-only or LLM-only assessments. In this paper, we propose a first human-LLM teaming framework for the systematic privacy risk analysis methodology called PRIAM. The framework specifies an iterative collaborative process in which the LLM processes large-scale documentary evidence to produce initial outputs, which are then interpreted and evaluated by human experts who direct their further refinement by the LLM and exercise their judgement to finalize the output. We illustrate the framework on the data characterization activity of PRIAM using a CBDC-based welfare scheme use case. The illustration demonstrates that while LLMs generate the initial data categories and assign initial values to data attributes, human experts evaluate and provide feedback to refine them, distinguishing documented evidence from inferences, identifying information gaps, and flagging unsupported or ambiguous outputs. This framework serves as a foundational contribution towards human-AI teaming for privacy risk assessments.

cs.ET↗

Proposal for Quantum Rational Secret Sharing

A rational secret sharing scheme is a game in which each party responsible for reconstructing a secret tries to maximize his utility by obtaining the secret alone. Quantum secret sharing schemes, either derived from quantum teleportation or from quantum error correcting code, do not succeed when we assume rational participants. This is because all existing quantum secret sharing schemes consider that the secret is reconstructed by a party chosen by the dealer. In this paper, for the first time, we propose a quantum secret sharing scheme which is resistant to rational parties. The proposed scheme is fair (everyone gets the secret), correct and achieves strict Nash equilibrium.

quant-ph↗