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Stavros Anagnou

Publications and source records attributed to Stavros Anagnou.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Normative Feeling: Socially Patterned Affective Mechanisms

Breaking a norm elicits both material and emotional consequences, yet how this coupling arose evolutionarily remains unclear. We investigate this question in light of emerging work suggesting that normativity's building blocks emerged earlier in evolution than previously considered, arguing that normative processes should inform accounts of how even ancient capacities such as mood evolved. Using a definition of normative processes we developed, we created an agent-based model with evolvable affect in a shared resource dilemma, comparing competition (non-normative) versus punishment (normative) conditions. Critically, different mood mechanisms emerge under each condition. Under competition, agents evolve a "bad mood -> consume more" response, creating a tragedy of the commons leading to resource depletion and population collapse. Under punishment, agents evolve a "bad mood -> consume less" mechanism, where negative affect functions as an implicit signal of social sanction, promoting resource conservation. Importantly, once normative logic is imprinted through punishment, it creates an evolutionary pathway for mood-based signalling that operates without costly physical enforcement. Our findings demonstrate how normative processes enable social preferences to emerge in a distributed manner within psychological mechanisms, showing how normative processes reprogram cognitive and physiological systems by embedding cultural patterns into psychological dispositions.

cs.MA

Uncertainty, bias and the institution bootstrapping problem

Institutions play a critical role in enabling communities to manage common-pool resources and avert tragedies of the commons. However, a fundamental issue arises: Individuals typically perceive participation as advantageous only after an institution is established, creating a paradox: How can institutions form if no one will join before a critical mass exists? We term this conundrum the institution bootstrapping problem and propose that misperception, specifically, agents' erroneous belief that an institution already exists, could resolve this paradox. By integrating well-documented psychological phenomena, including cognitive biases, probability distortion, and perceptual noise, into a game-theoretic framework, we demonstrate how these factors collectively mitigate the bootstrapping problem. Notably, unbiased perceptual noise (e.g., noise arising from agents' heterogeneous physical or social contexts) drastically reduces the critical mass of cooperators required for institutional emergence. This effect intensifies with greater diversity of perceptions. We explain this counter-intuitive result through asymmetric boundary conditions: proportional underestimation of low-probability sanctions produces distinct outcomes compared to equivalent overestimation. Furthermore, the type of perceptual distortion, proportional versus absolute, yields qualitatively different evolutionary pathways. These findings challenge conventional assumptions about rationality in institutional design, highlighting how "noisy" cognition can paradoxically enhance cooperation. Finally, we contextualize these insights within broader discussions of multi-agent system design and collective action. Our analysis underscores the importance of incorporating human-like cognitive constraints, not just idealized rationality, into models of institutional emergence and resilience.

cs.MA

The Effect of Noise on the Emergence of Continuous Norms and its Evolutionary Dynamics

We examine the effect of noise on societies of agents using an agent-based model of evolutionary norm emergence. Generally, we see that noisy societies are more selfish, smaller and discontent, and are caught in rounds of perpetual punishment preventing them from flourishing. Surprisingly, despite the effect of noise on the population, it does not seem to evolve away. We carry out further analysis and provide reasons for why this may be the case. Furthermore, we claim that our framework that evolves the noise/ambiguity of norms may be a new way to model the tight/loose framework of norms, suggesting that despite ambiguous norms detrimental effect on society, evolution does not favour clarity.

cs.MA