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Stephan Dübler

Publications and source records attributed to Stephan Dübler.

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On Identifying Sound Conditions for Frontrunning Resistance

Blockchains enable decentralized applications through smart contracts---interactive programs executed through consensus. However, the inherently asynchronous nature of blockchain transaction ordering introduces a class of vulnerabilities known as frontrunning attacks, which have caused millions of dollars in losses in major blockchains, such as Ethereum. Frontrunning attacks arise because users interact with smart contracts through transactions, which are added to the blockchain by designated nodes called miners. Miners can exploit their ability to reorder, delay, or insert transactions to gain an advantage over honest users, effectively frontrunning them. Yet, to date, the field lacks a rigorous definition of what it even means for a contract to resist such attacks. Worse, we show that existing dynamic detection approaches are fundamentally inadequate: in a large-scale study comprising 287 smart contract audits, 55% of the 393 reported vulnerabilities identified by leading smart contract auditors fall outside the scope of state-of-the-art detection criteria. To address this gap, we propose the first formal definition of frontrunning vulnerability for smart contracts. Our definition captures a key insight: resistance to frontrunning is not an intrinsic property of a contract alone, but depends critically on how honest users interact with it. Grounded in this observation, we develop a sound algorithm for synthesizing secure interaction conditions, alongside a prototype implementation that we apply to audited real-world contracts---revealing previously undiscovered vulnerabilities in two Ethereum contracts.

cs.CR

Atomic Transfer Graphs: Secure-by-design Protocols for Heterogeneous Blockchain Ecosystems

The heterogeneity of the blockchain landscape has motivated the design of blockchain protocols tailored to specific blockchains and applications that, hence, require custom security proofs. We observe that many blockchain protocols share common security and functionality goals, which can be captured by an atomic transfer graph (ATG) describing the structure of desired transfers. Based on this observation, we contribute a framework for generating secure-by-design protocols that realize these goals. The resulting protocols build upon Conditional Timelock Contracts (CTLCs), a novel minimal smart contract functionality that can be implemented in a large variety of cryptocurrencies with a restricted scripting language (e.g., Bitcoin), and payment channels. We show how ATGs, in addition to enabling novel applications, capture the security and functionality goals of existing applications, including many examples from payment channel networks and complex multi-party cross-currency swaps among Ethereum-style cryptocurrencies. Our framework is the first to provide generic and provably secure protocols for all these use cases while matching or improving the performance of existing use-case-specific protocols.

cs.CR