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Steve Keen

Publications and source records attributed to Steve Keen.

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A Bridge Between Climate Science and Economics: OPTiMEM and the Heat Conjecture for Estimation of Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases

We present an entirely new physics founded approach to estimating the social cost of carbon (SCC). For this, we developed our Ocean-Heat-Content Physics and Time Macro Economic Model (OPTiMEM) to estimate future heat content. The heat conjecture assumes that weather damages curves are stochastically proportional to ocean heat increase. We model carbon combustion, validate to datasets for greenhouse gas (GHG), temperature, and ocean heat content (OHC). We show that the social cost of 4 GHGs: CO2, CH4, N2O and halogenated hydrocarbons, cannot be single values, but must be represented by a kind of economic phase space. We propose very long-term carbon bonds to implement real discounting. This obviates the Gordian knot of the descriptivist versus prescriptivist discount disagreement that is unsolvable. Implementing these bonds leads to a new monitoring metric: real-dollar spending and bond discount rates compared to SC-GHG cost with variation on the discount scale, where the discount has no relationship to the pure rate of time preference (PRTP). This heat conjecture is based on OPTiMEM. OPTiMEM initiates from a fossil fuel consumption function to produce CO2, with 18 scenarios implemented to provide the uncertainty range. We provide 1:N year loss risk models (1:10, 1:100, 1:1000) that government, engineers, and actuaries should find useful. A scenario implementing DICE family of models carbon and growth assumptions shows +18{\deg} C is breached by 2210 CE, and +110{\deg} C by 2300 CE -- both of which outcomes are obviously not compatible with the fairly rosy conclusions of DICE models. Concerns are raised about having enough low-cost fossil fuel for conversion to minimal CO$_2$ maximal energy return on energy invested (EROEI) power if nations wait too long, and low EROEI power is questioned because monetary value is dependent on energy.

econ.TH

The Sign of Risk for Present Value of Future Losses

In the ongoing debate over discount rates and climate change, William Nordhaus has championed a higher discount rate to account for risk. Nicholas Stern has championed a lower rate. Here we prove that in the case of a stream of future losses, risk can only be represented by a lower discount rate, never a higher one.

q-fin.GN

Romania in a post-credit crunch world? A cautionary tale from Australia and America

We present data on debt accumulation in Australia and the United States, and tentative data on Romania, to pose the question of whether Romania might experience a credit crunch as a result of the US subprime financial crisis. We develop a model of a credit crunch in a pure credit economy with endogenous money creation, to show how changes in bank lending practices and borrower repayment behaviour can bring about an economic decline.

physics.soc-ph

Profit Maximization, Industry Structure, and Competition: A critique of neoclassical theory

Neoclassical economics has two theories of competition between profit-maximizing firms (Marshallian and Cournot-Nash) that start from different premises about the degree of strategic interaction between firms, yet reach the same result, that market price falls as the number of firms in an industry increases. The Marshallian argument is strictly false. We integrate the different premises, and establish that the optimal level of strategic interaction between competing firms is zero. Simulations support our analysis and reveal intriguing emergent behaviors.

nlin.AO

Emergent Effective Collusion in an Economy of Perfectly Rational Competitors

We consider a simple model of rational agents competing in a single product market described by simple linear demand curve. Contrary to accepted economic theory, the agents' production levels synchronise in the absence of conscious collusion, leading to a downward spiraling of market total production until the monopoly price level is realised. This is in stark contrast to the standard predictions of an ideal rational competitive market. Some form of randomness in the form of agent irrationality, or non-synchronous updates is needed to break this emergent "collusion"

nlin.AO