arXiv subjects

Steven T. Piantadosi

Publications and source records attributed to Steven T. Piantadosi.

9 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

CogGym: Towards Large-Scale Comparative Evaluation of Human and Machine Cognition

Understanding and modeling human intelligence are parallel goals shared by artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive science. As AI systems grow increasingly capable, in what ways do model responses resemble human responses, and where do they systematically diverge? The sheer breadth and diversity of the tasks humans can perform and think about pose a challenge for scalable and rigorous comparison between humans and models. We introduce CogGym, a scalable, unified framework grounded in cognitive science for systematically comparing model and human behavior on matched experimental trials. CogGym uses a semi-automated, human-in-the-loop pipeline to standardize diverse experimental paradigms into a task-agnostic Experiment Markup Language (EML), enabling reproducible and faithful comparison at scale. For initial release, we curate and standardize 258 cognitive experiments from 100 papers that focuses on human commonsense reasoning, and evaluate 50 large language models against human responses. We find a clear scaling trend where larger and more recent AI models better reproduce human judgments. Yet AI models' improvement on such common reasoning tasks is considerably slower than the gains observed on formal-reasoning benchmarks like math and coding, and model--human fit remains well below human splithalf reliability ($R^2 = 0.93$ on text, $0.95$ on image, and $0.92$ on video) with the best models achieving $R^2 = 0.59$ on text, $0.58$ on image, and $0.43$ on video experiments. We intend for CogGym to provide a living evaluation framework that continually incorporates new cognitive science experiments to characterize where model behavior resembles human behavior, where it systematically diverges, and how those patterns change as models and experiments evolve.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Reliable Reasoning Beyond Natural Language

Despite their linguistic competence, Large Language Models (LLMs) often struggle to reason reliably and flexibly. To identify these shortcomings, we introduce the Non-Linear Reasoning (NLR) dataset, a collection of 55 unique, hand-designed problems that target reasoning bottlenecks arising from the sequential prediction paradigm of LLMs and the inherently linear nature of natural language. NLR tasks require iterative updates, backtracking, and reasoning across multiple parallel chains of thought but only basic arithmetic to solve. To address these limitations, we propose a neurosymbolic reasoning approach that integrates Prolog, a symbolic reasoning engine, into the inference pipeline of LLMs. This division of labor shifts the LLM's task from iterative computations to inferring all information, explicit or implied through common sense, and encoding it as logical code. Our method yields large and robust performance gains across the GSM8k and BIG-bench Navigate benchmarks and achieves near-perfect accuracy on NLR problems, maintaining robustness even as variable interdependence - the number of other variables on which the value of a single variable depends - increases.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

The end of radical concept nativism

Though humans seem to be remarkable learners, arguments in cognitive science and philosophy of mind have long maintained that learning something fundamentally new is impossible. Specifically, Jerry Fodor's arguments for radical concept nativism hold that most, if not all, concepts are innate and that what many call concept learning never actually leads to the acquisition of new concepts. These arguments have deeply affected cognitive science, and many believe that the counterarguments to radical concept nativism have been either unsuccessful or only apply to a narrow class of concepts. This paper first reviews the features and limitations of prior arguments. We then identify three critical points - related to issues of expressive power, conceptual structure, and concept possession - at which the arguments in favor of radical concept nativism diverge from describing actual human cognition. We use ideas from computer science and information theory to formalize the relevant ideas in ways that are arguably more scientifically productive. We conclude that, as a result, there is an important sense in which people do indeed learn new concepts.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2023

Modeling infant object perception as program induction

Infants expect physical objects to be rigid and persist through space and time and in spite of occlusion. Developmentists frequently attribute these expectations to a "core system" for object recognition. However, it is unclear if this move is necessary. If object representations emerge reliably from general inductive learning mechanisms exposed to small amounts of environment data, it could be that infants simply induce these assumptions very early. Here, we demonstrate that a domain general learning system, previously used to model concept learning and language learning, can also induce models of these distinctive "core" properties of objects after exposure to a small number of examples. Across eight micro-worlds inspired by experiments from the developmental literature, our model generates concepts that capture core object properties, including rigidity and object persistence. Our findings suggest infant object perception may rely on a general cognitive process that creates models to maximize the likelihood of observations

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2023

How to enumerate trees from a context-free grammar

I present a simple algorithm for enumerating the trees generated by a Context Free Grammar (CFG). The algorithm uses a pairing function to form a bijection between CFG derivations and natural numbers, so that trees can be uniquely decoded from counting. This provides a general way to number expressions in natural logical languages, and potentially can be extended to other combinatorial problems. I also show how this algorithm may be generalized to more general forms of derivation, including analogs of Lempel-Ziv coding on trees.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2022

Meaning without reference in large language models

The widespread success of large language models (LLMs) has been met with skepticism that they possess anything like human concepts or meanings. Contrary to claims that LLMs possess no meaning whatsoever, we argue that they likely capture important aspects of meaning, and moreover work in a way that approximates a compelling account of human cognition in which meaning arises from conceptual role. Because conceptual role is defined by the relationships between internal representational states, meaning cannot be determined from a model's architecture, training data, or objective function, but only by examination of how its internal states relate to each other. This approach may clarify why and how LLMs are so successful and suggest how they can be made more human-like.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2019

People infer recursive visual concepts from just a few examples

Machine learning has made major advances in categorizing objects in images, yet the best algorithms miss important aspects of how people learn and think about categories. People can learn richer concepts from fewer examples, including causal models that explain how members of a category are formed. Here, we explore the limits of this human ability to infer causal "programs" -- latent generating processes with nontrivial algorithmic properties -- from one, two, or three visual examples. People were asked to extrapolate the programs in several ways, for both classifying and generating new examples. As a theory of these inductive abilities, we present a Bayesian program learning model that searches the space of programs for the best explanation of the observations. Although variable, people's judgments are broadly consistent with the model and inconsistent with several alternatives, including a pre-trained deep neural network for object recognition, indicating that people can learn and reason with rich algorithmic abstractions from sparse input data.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2017

The Natural Stories Corpus

It is now a common practice to compare models of human language processing by predicting participant reactions (such as reading times) to corpora consisting of rich naturalistic linguistic materials. However, many of the corpora used in these studies are based on naturalistic text and thus do not contain many of the low-frequency syntactic constructions that are often required to distinguish processing theories. Here we describe a new corpus consisting of English texts edited to contain many low-frequency syntactic constructions while still sounding fluent to native speakers. The corpus is annotated with hand-corrected parse trees and includes self-paced reading time data. Here we give an overview of the content of the corpus and release the data.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2013

Information content versus word length in natural language: A reply to Ferrer-i-Cancho and Moscoso del Prado Martin [arXiv:1209.1751]

Recently, Ferrer i Cancho and Moscoso del Prado Martin [arXiv:1209.1751] argued that an observed linear relationship between word length and average surprisal (Piantadosi, Tily, & Gibson, 2011) is not evidence for communicative efficiency in human language. We discuss several shortcomings of their approach and critique: their model critically rests on inaccurate assumptions, is incapable of explaining key surprisal patterns in language, and is incompatible with recent behavioral results. More generally, we argue that statistical models must not critically rely on assumptions that are incompatible with the real system under study.

cs.CL↗