arXiv subjects

Steven Yin

Publications and source records attributed to Steven Yin.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

On Learning-Curve Monotonicity for Maximum Likelihood Estimators

The property of learning-curve monotonicity, highlighted in a recent series of work by Loog, Mey and Viering, describes algorithms which only improve in average performance given more data, for any underlying data distribution within a given family. We establish the first nontrivial monotonicity guarantees for the maximum likelihood estimator in a variety of well-specified parametric settings. For sequential prediction with log loss, we show monotonicity (in fact complete monotonicity) of the forward KL divergence for Gaussian vectors with unknown covariance and either known or unknown mean, as well as for Gamma variables with unknown scale parameter. The Gaussian setting was explicitly highlighted as open in the aforementioned works, even in dimension 1. Finally we observe that for reverse KL divergence, a folklore trick yields monotonicity for very general exponential families. All results in this paper were derived by variants of GPT-5.2 Pro. Humans did not provide any proof strategies or intermediate arguments, but only prompted the model to continue developing additional results, and verified and transcribed its proofs.

math.ST↗

arXiv2025

Early science acceleration experiments with GPT-5

AI models like GPT-5 are an increasingly valuable tool for scientists, but many remain unaware of the capabilities of frontier AI. We present a collection of short case studies in which GPT-5 produced new, concrete steps in ongoing research across mathematics, physics, astronomy, computer science, biology, and materials science. In these examples, the authors highlight how AI accelerated their work, and where it fell short; where expert time was saved, and where human input was still key. We document the interactions of the human authors with GPT-5, as guiding examples of fruitful collaboration with AI. Of note, this paper includes four new results in mathematics (carefully verified by the human authors), underscoring how GPT-5 can help human mathematicians settle previously unsolved problems. These contributions are modest in scope but profound in implication, given the rate at which frontier AI is progressing.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2022

Online Allocation and Learning in the Presence of Strategic Agents

We study the problem of allocating $T$ sequentially arriving items among $n$ homogeneous agents under the constraint that each agent must receive a pre-specified fraction of all items, with the objective of maximizing the agents' total valuation of items allocated to them. The agents' valuations for the item in each round are assumed to be i.i.d. but their distribution is a priori unknown to the central planner. Therefore, the central planner needs to implicitly learn these distributions from the observed values in order to pick a good allocation policy. However, an added challenge here is that the agents are strategic with incentives to misreport their valuations in order to receive better allocations. This sets our work apart both from the online auction design settings which typically assume known valuation distributions and/or involve payments, and from the online learning settings that do not consider strategic agents. To that end, our main contribution is an online learning based allocation mechanism that is approximately Bayesian incentive compatible, and when all agents are truthful, guarantees a sublinear regret for individual agents' utility compared to that under the optimal offline allocation policy.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Optimal Efficiency-Envy Trade-Off via Optimal Transport

We consider the problem of allocating a distribution of items to $n$ recipients where each recipient has to be allocated a fixed, prespecified fraction of all items, while ensuring that each recipient does not experience too much envy. We show that this problem can be formulated as a variant of the semi-discrete optimal transport (OT) problem, whose solution structure in this case has a concise representation and a simple geometric interpretation. Unlike existing literature that treats envy-freeness as a hard constraint, our formulation allows us to \emph{optimally} trade off efficiency and envy continuously. Additionally, we study the statistical properties of the space of our OT based allocation policies by showing a polynomial bound on the number of samples needed to approximate the optimal solution from samples. Our approach is suitable for large-scale fair allocation problems such as the blood donation matching problem, and we show numerically that it performs well on a prior realistic data simulator.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

To EVM or Not to EVM: Blockchain Compatibility and Network Effects

We study the competition between blockchains in a \emph{multi-chain} environment, where a dominant EVM-compatible blockchain (e.g., Ethereum) co-exists with an alternative EVM-compatible (e.g., Avalanche) and an EVM-incompatible (e.g., Algorand) blockchain. While EVM compatibility allows existing Ethereum users and developers to migrate more easily over to the alternative layer-1, EVM incompatibility might allow the firms to build more loyal and ``sticky'' user base, and in turn a more robust ecosystem. As such, the choice to be EVM-compatible is not merely a technological decision, but also an important strategic decision. In this paper, we develop a game theoretic model to study this competitive dynamic, and find that at equilibrium, new entrants/developers tend to adopt the dominant blockchain. To avoid adoption failure, the alternative blockchains have to either (1) directly subsidize the new entrant firms or (2) offer better features, which in practice can take form in lower transaction costs, faster finality, or larger network effects. We find that it is easier for EVM-compatible blockchains to attract users through direct subsidy, while it is more efficient for EVM-incompatible blockchains to attract users through offering better features/products.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Dynamic Pricing and Learning under the Bass Model

We consider a novel formulation of the dynamic pricing and demand learning problem, where the evolution of demand in response to posted prices is governed by a stochastic variant of the popular Bass model with parameters $\alpha, \beta$ that are linked to the so-called "innovation" and "imitation" effects. Unlike the more commonly used i.i.d. and contextual demand models, in this model the posted price not only affects the demand and the revenue in the current round but also the future evolution of demand, and hence the fraction of potential market size $m$ that can be ultimately captured. In this paper, we consider the more challenging incomplete information problem where dynamic pricing is applied in conjunction with learning the unknown parameters, with the objective of optimizing the cumulative revenues over a given selling horizon of length $T$. Equivalently, the goal is to minimize the regret which measures the revenue loss of the algorithm relative to the optimal expected revenue achievable under the stochastic Bass model with market size $m$ and time horizon $T$. Our main contribution is the development of an algorithm that satisfies a high probability regret guarantee of order $\tilde O(m^{2/3})$; where the market size $m$ is known a priori. Moreover, we show that no algorithm can incur smaller order of loss by deriving a matching lower bound. Unlike most regret analysis results, in the present problem the market size $m$ is the fundamental driver of the complexity; our lower bound in fact, indicates that for any fixed $\alpha, \beta$, most non-trivial instances of the problem have constant $T$ and large $m$. We believe that this insight sets the problem of dynamic pricing under the Bass model apart from the typical i.i.d. setting and multi-armed bandit based models for dynamic pricing, which typically focus only on the asymptotics with respect to time horizon $T$.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2020

Dominant Resource Fairness with Meta-Types

Inspired by the recent COVID-19 pandemic, we study a generalization of the multi-resource allocation problem with heterogeneous demands and Leontief utilities. Unlike existing settings, we allow each agent to specify requirements to only accept allocations from a subset of the total supply for each resource. These requirements can take form in location constraints (e.g. A hospital can only accept volunteers who live nearby due to commute limitations). This can also model a type of substitution effect where some agents need 1 unit of resource A \emph{or} B, both belonging to the same meta-type. But some agents specifically want A, and others specifically want B. We propose a new mechanism called Dominant Resource Fairness with Meta Types which determines the allocations by solving a small number of linear programs. The proposed method satisfies Pareto optimality, envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, and a notion of sharing incentive for our setting. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study this problem formulation, which improved upon existing work by capturing more constraints that often arise in real life situations. Finally, we show numerically that our method scales better to large problems than alternative approaches.

econ.TH↗