arXiv subjects

Subhonmesh Bose

Publications and source records attributed to Subhonmesh Bose.

35 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2021

Pricing Economic Dispatch with AC Power Flow via Local Multipliers and Conic Relaxation

We analyze pricing mechanisms in electricity markets with AC power flow equations that define a nonconvex feasible set for the economic dispatch problem. Specifically, we consider two possible pricing schemes. The first among these prices are derived from Lagrange multipliers that satisfy Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for local optimality of the nonconvex market clearing problem. The second is derived from optimal dual multipliers of the convex semidefinite programming (SDP) based relaxation of the market clearing problem. Relationships between these prices, their revenue adequacy and market equilibrium properties are derived and compared. The SDP prices are shown to equal distribution locational marginal prices derived with second-order conic relaxations of power flow equations over radial distribution networks. We illustrate our theoretical findings through numerical experiments.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2021

Centralized Volatility Reduction for Electricity Markets

Increased penetration of wind energy will make electricity market prices more volatile. As a result, market participants will bear increased financial risks, which impact investment decisions and in turn, makes it harder to achieve sustainable energy goals. As a remedy, in this paper, we propose an insurance market that complements any wholesale market design. Our mechanism can be run by any suitable financial entity such as an independent system operator, with the aim of reducing the financial impacts of volatile prices. We provide theoretical guarantees, analytically characterize the outcomes over a copperplate power system example, and numerically explore the same for a modified IEEE 14-bus test system.

math.OC↗

arXiv2021

A Stochastic Primal-Dual Method for Optimization with Conditional Value at Risk Constraints

We study a first-order primal-dual subgradient method to optimize risk-constrained risk-penalized optimization problems, where risk is modeled via the popular conditional value at risk (CVaR) measure. The algorithm processes independent and identically distributed samples from the underlying uncertainty in an online fashion, and produces an $η/\sqrt{K}$-approximately feasible and $η/\sqrt{K}$-approximately optimal point within $K$ iterations with constant step-size, where $η$ increases with tunable risk-parameters of CVaR. We find optimized step sizes using our bounds and precisely characterize the computational cost of risk aversion as revealed by the growth in $η$. Our proposed algorithm makes a simple modification to a typical primal-dual stochastic subgradient algorithm. With this mild change, our analysis surprisingly obviates the need for a priori bounds or complex adaptive bounding schemes for dual variables assumed in many prior works. We also draw interesting parallels in sample complexity with that for chance-constrained programs derived in the literature with a very different solution architecture.

math.OC↗

arXiv2021

Coordinated Transaction Scheduling in Multi-Area Electricity Markets: Equilibrium and Learning

Tie-line scheduling in multi-area power systems in the US largely proceeds through a market-based mechanism called Coordinated Transaction Scheduling (CTS). We analyze this market mechanism through a game-theoretic lens. Our analysis characterizes the effect of market liquidity, market participants' forecasts about inter-area price spreads, transactions fees and coupling of CTS markets with up-to-congestion virtual transactions. Using real data, we empirically verify that CTS bidders can employ simple learning algorithms to discover Nash equilibria that support the conclusions drawn from equilibrium analysis.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Quantifying Market Efficiency Impacts of Aggregated Distributed Energy Resources

We focus on the aggregation of distributed energy resources (DERs) through a profit-maximizing intermediary that enables participation of DERs in wholesale electricity markets. Particularly, we study the market efficiency brought in by the large-scale deployment of DERs and explore to what extent such benefits are offset by the profit-maximizing nature of the aggregator. We deploy a game-theoretic framework to study the strategic interactions between an aggregator and DER owners. The proposed model takes into account the stochastic nature of the DER supply. We explicitly characterize the equilibrium of the game and provide illustrative examples to quantify the efficiency loss due to the strategic incentives of the aggregator. Our numerical experiments illustrate the impact of uncertainty and amount of DER integration on the overall market efficiency.

math.OC↗

arXiv2020

A Scalar Parameterized Mechanism for Two-Sided Markets

We consider a market in which both suppliers and consumers compete for a product via scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Scalar-parameterized offers/bids are appealing due to their modeling simplicity and desirable mathematical properties with the most prominent being bounded efficiency loss and price markup under strategic interactions. Our model incorporates production capacity constraints and minimum inelastic demand requirements. Under perfect competition, the market mechanism yields allocations that maximize social welfare. When market participants are price-anticipating, we show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, and provide an efficient way to compute the resulting market allocation. Moreover, we explicitly characterize the bounds on the welfare loss and prices observed at the Nash equilibrium.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2019

On Privatizing Equilibrium Computation in Aggregate Games over Networks

We propose a distributed algorithm to compute an equilibrium in aggregate games where players communicate over a fixed undirected network. Our algorithm exploits correlated perturbation to obfuscate information shared over the network. We prove that our algorithm does not reveal private information of players to an honest-but-curious adversary who monitors several nodes in the network. In contrast with differential privacy based algorithms, our method does not sacrifice accuracy of equilibrium computation to provide privacy guarantees.

math.OC↗

arXiv2019

On the Role of a Market Maker in Networked Cournot Competition

We study Cournot competition among firms in a networked marketplace that is centrally managed by a market maker. In particular, we study a situation in which a market maker facilitates trade between geographically separate markets via a constrained transport network. Our focus is on understanding the consequences of the design of the market maker and on providing tools for optimal design. To that end we provide a characterization of the equilibrium outcomes of the game between the firms and the market maker. Our results highlight that the equilibrium structure is impacted dramatically by the market maker's objective - depending on the objective there may be a unique equilibrium, multiple equilibria, or no equilibria. Further, the game may be a potential game (as in the case of classical Cournot competition) or not. Beyond characterizing the equilibria of the game, we provide an approach for designing the market maker in order to optimize a design objective (e.g., social welfare) at the equilibrium of the game. Additionally, we use our results to explore the value of transport (trade) and the efficiency of the market maker (as compared to a single, aggregate market).

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

Convergence of the Iterates in Mirror Descent Methods

We consider centralized and distributed mirror descent algorithms over a finite-dimensional Hilbert space, and prove that the problem variables converge to an optimizer of a possibly nonsmooth function when the step sizes are square summable but not summable. Prior literature has focused on the convergence of the function value to its optimum. However, applications from distributed optimization and learning in games require the convergence of the variables to an optimizer, which is generally not guaranteed without assuming strong convexity of the objective function. We provide numerical simulations comparing entropic mirror descent and standard subgradient methods for the robust regression problem.

math.OC↗

arXiv2017

On Robust Tie-line Scheduling in Multi-Area Power Systems

The tie-line scheduling problem in a multi-area power system seeks to optimize tie-line power flows across areas that are independently operated by different system operators (SOs). In this paper, we leverage the theory of multi-parametric linear programming to propose algorithms for optimal tie-line scheduling within a deterministic and a robust optimization framework. Through a coordinator, the proposed algorithms are proved to converge to the optimal schedule within a finite number of iterations. A key feature of the proposed algorithms, besides their finite step convergence, is the privacy of the information exchanges; the SO in an area does not need to reveal its dispatch cost structure, network constraints, or the nature of the uncertainty set to the coordinator. The performance of the algorithms is evaluated using several power system examples.

math.OC↗

arXiv2017

Cash-settled options for wholesale electricity markets

Wholesale electricity market designs in practice do not provide the market participants with adequate mechanisms to hedge their financial risks. Demanders and suppliers will likely face even greater risks with the deepening penetration of variable renewable resources like wind and solar. This paper explores the design of a centralized cash-settled call option market to mitigate such risks. A cash-settled call option is a financial instrument that allows its holder the right to claim a monetary reward equal to the positive difference between the real-time price of an underlying commodity and a pre-negotiated strike price for an upfront fee. Through an example, we illustrate that a bilateral call option can reduce the payment volatility of market participants. Then, we design a centralized clearing mechanism for call options that generalizes the bilateral trade. We illustrate through an example how the centralized clearing mechanism generalizes the bilateral trade. Finally, the effect of risk preference of the market participants, as well as some generalizations are discussed.

math.OC↗

arXiv2016

The Marginal Value of Networked Energy Storage

We consider the problem of characterizing the locational marginal value of energy storage capacity in electric power networks with stochastic renewable supply and demand. The perspective taken is that of a system operator, whose objective is to minimize the expected cost of firm supply required to balance a stochastic net demand process over a finite horizon, subject to transmission and energy storage constraints. The value of energy storage capacity is defined in terms of the optimal value of the corresponding constrained stochastic control problem. It is shown to be concave and non decreasing in the vector of location-dependent storage capacities -- implying that the greatest marginal value of storage is derived from initial investments in storage capacities. We also provide a characterization of said marginal value, which reveals its explicit dependency on a specific measure of nodal price variation. And, more generally, we derive an upper bound on the locational marginal value of energy storage capacity in terms of the total variation of the corresponding nodal price process, and provide conditions under which this bound is tight.

math.OC↗

arXiv2014

Optimal Placement of Distributed Energy Storage in Power Networks

We formulate the optimal placement, sizing and control of storage devices in a power network to minimize generation costs with the intent of load shifting. We assume deterministic demand, a linearized DC approximated power flow model and a fixed available storage budget. Our main result proves that when the generation costs are convex and nondecreasing, there always exists an optimal storage capacity allocation that places zero storage at generation-only buses that connect to the rest of the network via single links. This holds regardless of the demand profiles, generation capacities, line-flow limits and characteristics of the storage technologies. Through a counterexample, we illustrate that this result is not generally true for generation buses with multiple connections. For specific network topologies, we also characterize the dependence of the optimal generation cost on the available storage budget, generation capacities and flow constraints.

math.OC↗

arXiv2014

The Role of a Market Maker in Networked Cournot Competition

We study the role of a market maker (or market operator) in a transmission constrained electricity market. We model the market as a one-shot networked Cournot competition where generators supply quantity bids and load serving entities provide downward sloping inverse demand functions. This mimics the operation of a spot market in a deregulated market structure. In this paper, we focus on possible mechanisms employed by the market maker to balance demand and supply. In particular, we consider three candidate objective functions that the market maker optimizes - social welfare, residual social welfare, and consumer surplus. We characterize the existence of Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) in this setting and demonstrate that market outcomes at equilibrium can be very different under the candidate objective functions.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2014

Equivalent relaxations of optimal power flow

Several convex relaxations of the optimal power flow (OPF) problem have recently been developed using both bus injection models and branch flow models. In this paper, we prove relations among three convex relaxations: a semidefinite relaxation that computes a full matrix, a chordal relaxation based on a chordal extension of the network graph, and a second-order cone relaxation that computes the smallest partial matrix. We prove a bijection between the feasible sets of the OPF in the bus injection model and the branch flow model, establishing the equivalence of these two models and their second-order cone relaxations. Our results imply that, for radial networks, all these relaxations are equivalent and one should always solve the second-order cone relaxation. For mesh networks, the semidefinite relaxation is tighter than the second-order cone relaxation but requires a heavier computational effort, and the chordal relaxation strikes a good balance. Simulations are used to illustrate these results.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2013

The Cost of an Epidemic over a Complex Network: A Random Matrix Approach

In this paper we quantify the total economic impact of an epidemic over a complex network using tools from random matrix theory. Incorporating the direct and indirect costs of infection, we calculate the disease cost in the large graph limit for an SIS (Susceptible - Infected - Susceptible) infection process. We also give an upper bound on this cost for arbitrary finite graphs and illustrate both calculated costs using extensive simulations on random and real-world networks. We extend these calculations by considering the total social cost of an epidemic, accounting for both the immunization and disease costs for various immunization strategies and determining the optimal immunization. Our work focuses on the transient behavior of the epidemic, in contrast to previous research, which typically focuses on determining the steady-state system equilibrium.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2012

Quadratically constrained quadratic programs on acyclic graphs with application to power flow

This paper proves that non-convex quadratically constrained quadratic programs can be solved in polynomial time when their underlying graph is acyclic, provided the constraints satisfy a certain technical condition. When this condition is not satisfied, we propose a heuristic to obtain a feasible point. We demonstrate this approach on optimal power flow problems over radial networks.

math.OC↗