arXiv subjects

Sudarshan Shyam

Publications and source records attributed to Sudarshan Shyam.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Approximation Preserving Coresets

Clustering in a big data setting is an intensively studied problem, with coresets emerging as one of the important paradigms in this line of work. Given a cost function $\text{cost}(P,S)$ mapping input points $P$ and a solution $S$ to an objective value, a coreset is a typically weighted sketch $Ω\subseteq P$ such that $\text{cost}(Ω,S)\approx \text{cost}(P,S)$. In practice, coreset sizes much smaller than those suggested by theoretical guarantees are often found to be sufficient. In this paper, we offer an explanation for this phenomenon. Smaller coreset sizes suffice if we only wish to preserve the costs of \emph{good} solutions, i.e., solutions with low cost. We define and devise \emph{approximation-preserving coresets}, which provide a weaker guarantee than strong coresets, which apply to all solutions, while providing stronger guarantees than weak coresets, which apply only to the optimum solution. We complement this result by showing that even a very small distortion in the approximation factor cannot admit coresets of this size.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2026

Existence and Computation of Fair Allocations under Constraints

We study fair division of divisible goods under generalized assignment constraints. Here, each good has an agent-specific value and size, and every agent has a budget constraint that limits the total size of the goods she can receive. Since it may not always be feasible to assign all goods to the agents while respecting the budget constraints, we use the construct of charity to accommodate the unassigned goods. In this constrained setting with charity, we obtain several new existential and computational results for feasible envy-freeness (FEF); this fairness notion requires that agents are envy-free, considering only budget-feasible subsets. First, we simplify and extend known existential results for FEF allocations. Then, we show that the space of FEF allocations has a non-convex structure. Next, using a fixed-point argument, we establish a novel guarantee that FEF can always be achieved with Pareto-optimality. Furthermore, we give an alternative proof of the fact that one cannot additionally obtain truthfulness in this context: There does not exist a mechanism that is simultaneously truthful, fair, and Pareto-optimal. On the positive side, we show that truthfulness is compatible with each of FEF and Pareto-optimality, individually.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Simple and Optimal Sublinear Algorithms for Mean Estimation

We study the sublinear multivariate mean estimation problem in $d$-dimensional Euclidean space. Specifically, we aim to find the mean $μ$ of a ground point set $A$, which minimizes the sum of squared Euclidean distances of the points in $A$ to $μ$. We first show that a multiplicative $(1+\varepsilon)$ approximation to $μ$ can be found with probability $1-δ$ using $O(\varepsilon^{-1}\log δ^{-1})$ many independent uniform random samples, and provide a matching lower bound. Furthermore, we give two estimators with optimal sample complexity that can be computed in optimal running time for extracting a suitable approximate mean: 1. The coordinate-wise median of $\log δ^{-1}$ sample means of sample size $\varepsilon^{-1}$. As a corollary, we also show improved convergence rates for this estimator for estimating means of multivariate distributions. 2. The geometric median of $\log δ^{-1}$ sample means of sample size $\varepsilon^{-1}$. To compute a solution efficiently, we design a novel and simple gradient descent algorithm that is significantly faster for our specific setting than all other known algorithms for computing geometric medians. In addition, we propose an order statistics approach that is empirically competitive with these algorithms, has an optimal sample complexity and matches the running time up to lower order terms. We finally provide an extensive experimental evaluation among several estimators which concludes that the geometric-median-of-means-based approach is typically the most competitive in practice.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2025

A new lower bound for multi-color discrepancy with applications to fair division

A classical problem in combinatorics seeks colorings of low discrepancy. More concretely, the goal is to color the elements of a set system so that the number of appearances of any color among the elements in each set is as balanced as possible. We present a new lower bound for multi-color discrepancy, showing that there is a set system with $n$ subsets over a set of elements in which any $k$-coloring of the elements has discrepancy at least $Ω\left(\sqrt{\frac{n}{\ln{k}}}\right)$. This result improves the previously best-known lower bound of $Ω\left(\sqrt{\frac{n}{k}}\right)$ of Doerr and Srivastav [2003] and may have several applications. Here, we explore its implications on the feasibility of fair division concepts for instances with $n$ agents having valuations for a set of indivisible items. The first such concept is known as consensus $1/k$-division up to $d$ items (\cd$d$) and aims to allocate the items into $k$ bundles so that no matter which bundle each agent is assigned to, the allocation is envy-free up to $d$ items. The above lower bound implies that \cd$d$ can be infeasible for $d\in Ω\left(\sqrt{\frac{n}{\ln{k}}}\right)$. We furthermore extend our proof technique to show that there exist instances of the problem of allocating indivisible items to $k$ groups of $n$ agents in total so that envy-freeness and proportionality up to $d$ items are infeasible for $d\in Ω\left(\sqrt{\frac{n}{k\ln{k}}}\right)$ and $d\in Ω\left(\sqrt{\frac{n}{k^3\ln{k}}}\right)$, respectively. The lower bounds for fair division improve the currently best-known ones by Manurangsi and Suksompong [2022].

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Low-Distortion Clustering with Ordinal and Limited Cardinal Information

Motivated by recent work in computational social choice, we extend the metric distortion framework to clustering problems. Given a set of $n$ agents located in an underlying metric space, our goal is to partition them into $k$ clusters, optimizing some social cost objective. The metric space is defined by a distance function $d$ between the agent locations. Information about $d$ is available only implicitly via $n$ rankings, through which each agent ranks all other agents in terms of their distance from her. Still, we would like to evaluate clustering algorithms in terms of social cost objectives that are defined using $d$. This is done using the notion of distortion, which measures how far from optimality a clustering can be, taking into account all underlying metrics that are consistent with the ordinal information available. Unfortunately, the most important clustering objectives do not admit algorithms with finite distortion. To sidestep this disappointing fact, we follow two alternative approaches: We first explore whether resource augmentation can be beneficial. We consider algorithms that use more than $k$ clusters but compare their social cost to that of the optimal $k$-clusterings. We show that using exponentially (in terms of $k$) many clusters, we can get low (constant or logarithmic) distortion for the $k$-center and $k$-median objectives. Interestingly, such an exponential blowup is shown to be necessary. More importantly, we explore whether limited cardinal information can be used to obtain better results. Somewhat surprisingly, for $k$-median and $k$-center, we show that a number of queries that is polynomial in $k$ and only logarithmic in $n$ (i.e., only sublinear in the number of agents for the most relevant scenarios in practice) is enough to get constant distortion.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Guaranteeing Envy-Freeness under Generalized Assignment Constraints

We study fair division of goods under the broad class of generalized assignment constraints. In this constraint framework, the sizes and values of the goods are agent-specific, and one needs to allocate the goods among the agents fairly while further ensuring that each agent receives a bundle of total size at most the corresponding budget of the agent. Since, in such a constraint setting, it may not always be feasible to partition all the goods among the agents, we conform -- as in recent works -- to the construct of charity to designate the set of unassigned goods. For this allocation framework, we obtain existential and computational guarantees for envy-free (appropriately defined) allocation of divisible and indivisible goods, respectively, among agents with individual, additive valuations for the goods. We deem allocations to be fair by evaluating envy only with respect to feasible subsets. In particular, an allocation is said to be feasibly envy-free (FEF) iff each agent prefers its bundle over every (budget) feasible subset within any other agent's bundle (and within the charity). The current work establishes that, for divisible goods, FEF allocations are guaranteed to exist and can be computed efficiently under generalized assignment constraints. In the context of indivisible goods, FEF allocations do not necessarily exist, and hence, we consider the fairness notion of feasible envy-freeness up to any good (FEFx). We show that, under generalized assignment constraints, an FEFx allocation of indivisible goods always exists. In fact, our FEFx result resolves open problems posed in prior works. Further, for indivisible goods and under generalized assignment constraints, we provide a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for computing FEFx allocations, and a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for computing approximate FEFx allocations.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Finding Fair Allocations under Budget Constraints

We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents with identical, additive valuations but individual budget constraints. Here, the indivisible goods--each with a specific size and value--need to be allocated such that the bundle assigned to each agent is of total size at most the agent's budget. Since envy-free allocations do not necessarily exist in the indivisible goods context, compelling relaxations--in particular, the notion of envy-freeness up to $k$ goods (EFk)--have received significant attention in recent years. In an EFk allocation, each agent prefers its own bundle over that of any other agent, up to the removal of $k$ goods, and the agents have similarly bounded envy against the charity (which corresponds to the set of all unallocated goods). Recently, Wu et al. (2021) showed that an allocation that satisfies the budget constraints and maximizes the Nash social welfare is $1/4$-approximately EF1. However, the computation (or even existence) of exact EFk allocations remained an intriguing open problem. We make notable progress towards this by proposing a simple, greedy, polynomial-time algorithm that computes EF2 allocations under budget constraints. Our algorithmic result implies the universal existence of EF2 allocations in this fair division context. The analysis of the algorithm exploits intricate structural properties of envy-freeness. Interestingly, the same algorithm also provides EF1 guarantees for important special cases. Specifically, we settle the existence of EF1 allocations for instances in which: (i) the value of each good is proportional to its size, (ii) all goods have the same size, or (iii) all the goods have the same value. Our EF2 result extends to the setting wherein the goods' sizes are agent specific.

cs.GT↗