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Sudipta Sarangi

Publications and source records attributed to Sudipta Sarangi.

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Network Beliefs and Behavior with Peer Effects

Individuals often act without knowing the full structure of the social network in which they are or will be embedded. We study how an individual's beliefs about their networks shapes their behavior when actions are peer interactive. Agents use what they know about the network to forecast their peers' actions. Those peers' actions depend on their beliefs, which then generate an iterative expression what we call "Iterative Belief Centrality." Agents' beliefs formed based on what they each see of the network are heterogeneous, depend on their network position, and can be correlated across connected agents. The resulting equilibrium behavior nests both complete-information and degree-based models as special cases, but more generally can differ systematically. If people's beliefs about the network satisfy a natural monotonicity condition in how connected they are, then belief iteration (fully rationally) amplifies behavioral differences across the network, increasing actions of more-connected and decreasing actions of less-connected agents relative to situations with homogeneous beliefs. We also show how positive correlation in people's positions in the network even further amplifies the variance of behavior. The framework provides a unified and tractable theory of network-based behavior with implications for many applications.

econ.TH

Consolidating Marginalism and Egalitarianism: A New Value for Transferable Utility Games

In cooperative games with transferable utilities, the Shapley value is an extreme case of marginalism while the Equal Division rule is an extreme case of egalitarianism. The Shapley value does not assign anything to the non-productive players and the Equal Division rule does not concern itself to the relative efficiency of the players in generating a resource. However, in real life situations neither of them is a good fit for the fair distribution of resources as the society is neither devoid of solidarity nor it can be indifferent to rewarding the relatively more productive players. Thus a trade-off between these two extreme cases has caught attention from many researchers. In this paper, we obtain a new value for cooperative games with transferable utilities that adopts egalitarianism in smaller coalitions on one hand and on the other hand takes care of the players' marginal productivity in sufficiently large coalitions. Our value is identical with the Shapley value on one extreme and the Equal Division rule on the other extreme. We provide four characterizations of the value using variants of standard axioms in the literature. We have also developed a strategic implementation mechanism of our value in sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.

econ.TH