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Sujit Gujar

Publications and source records attributed to Sujit Gujar.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Simultaneously Achieving Group Exposure Fairness and Within-Group Meritocracy in Stochastic Bandits

Existing approaches to fairness in stochastic multi-armed bandits (MAB) primarily focus on exposure guarantee to individual arms. When arms are naturally grouped by certain attribute(s), we propose Bi-Level Fairness, which considers two levels of fairness. At the first level, Bi-Level Fairness guarantees a certain minimum exposure to each group. To address the unbalanced allocation of pulls to individual arms within a group, we consider meritocratic fairness at the second level, which ensures that each arm is pulled according to its merit within the group. Our work shows that we can adapt a UCB-based algorithm to achieve a Bi-Level Fairness by providing (i) anytime Group Exposure Fairness guarantees and (ii) ensuring individual-level Meritocratic Fairness within each group. We first show that one can decompose regret bounds into two components: (a) regret due to anytime group exposure fairness and (b) regret due to meritocratic fairness within each group. Our proposed algorithm BF-UCB balances these two regrets optimally to achieve the upper bound of $O(\sqrt{T})$ on regret; $T$ being the stopping time. With the help of simulated experiments, we further show that BF-UCB achieves sub-linear regret; provides better group and individual exposure guarantees compared to existing algorithms; and does not result in a significant drop in reward with respect to UCB algorithm, which does not impose any fairness constraint.

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No Transaction Fees? No Problem! Achieving Fairness in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design

The recently proposed Transaction Fee Mechanism (TFM) literature studies the strategic interaction between the miner of a block and the transaction creators (or users) in a blockchain. In a TFM, the miner includes transactions that maximize its utility while users submit fees for a slot in the block. The existing TFM literature focuses on satisfying standard incentive properties -- which may limit widespread adoption. We argue that a TFM is "fair" to the transaction creators if it satisfies specific notions, namely Zero-fee Transaction Inclusion and Monotonicity. First, we prove that one generally cannot ensure both these properties and prevent a miner's strategic manipulation. We also show that existing TFMs either do not satisfy these notions or do so at a high cost to the miners' utility. As such, we introduce a novel TFM using on-chain randomness -- rTFM. We prove that rTFM guarantees incentive compatibility for miners and users while satisfying our novel fairness constraints.

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Fairness and Privacy Guarantees in Federated Contextual Bandits

This paper considers the contextual multi-armed bandit (CMAB) problem with fairness and privacy guarantees in a federated environment. We consider merit-based exposure as the desired fair outcome, which provides exposure to each action in proportion to the reward associated. We model the algorithm's effectiveness using fairness regret, which captures the difference between fair optimal policy and the policy output by the algorithm. Applying fair CMAB algorithm to each agent individually leads to fairness regret linear in the number of agents. We propose that collaborative -- federated learning can be more effective and provide the algorithm Fed-FairX-LinUCB that also ensures differential privacy. The primary challenge in extending the existing privacy framework is designing the communication protocol for communicating required information across agents. A naive protocol can either lead to weaker privacy guarantees or higher regret. We design a novel communication protocol that allows for (i) Sub-linear theoretical bounds on fairness regret for Fed-FairX-LinUCB and comparable bounds for the private counterpart, Priv-FairX-LinUCB (relative to single-agent learning), (ii) Effective use of privacy budget in Priv-FairX-LinUCB. We demonstrate the efficacy of our proposed algorithm with extensive simulations-based experiments. We show that both Fed-FairX-LinUCB and Priv-FairX-LinUCB achieve near-optimal fairness regret.

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Analyzing Crowdfunding of Public Projects Under Dynamic Beliefs

In the last decade, social planners have used crowdfunding to raise funds for public projects. As these public projects are non-excludable, the beneficiaries may free-ride. Thus, there is a need to design incentive mechanisms for such strategic agents to contribute to the project. The existing mechanisms, like PPR or PPRx, assume that the agent's beliefs about the project getting funded do not change over time, i.e., their beliefs are static. Researchers highlight that unless appropriately incentivized, the agents defer their contributions in static settings, leading to a ``race'' to contribute at the deadline. In this work, we model the evolution of agents' beliefs as a random walk. We study PPRx -- an existing mechanism for the static belief setting -- in this dynamic belief setting and refer to it as PPRx-DB for readability. We prove that in PPRx-DB, the project is funded at equilibrium. More significantly, we prove that under certain conditions on agent's belief evolution, agents will contribute as soon as they arrive at the mechanism. Thus, we believe that by incorporating dynamic belief evolution in analysis, the social planner can mitigate the concern of race conditions in many mechanisms.

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Designing Redistribution Mechanisms for Reducing Transaction Fees in Blockchains

Blockchains deploy Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) to determine which user transactions to include in blocks and determine their payments (i.e., transaction fees). Increasing demand and scarce block resources have led to high user transaction fees. As these blockchains are a public resource, it may be preferable to reduce these transaction fees. To this end, we introduce Transaction Fee Redistribution Mechanisms (TFRMs) -- redistributing VCG payments collected from such TFM as rebates to minimize transaction fees. Classic redistribution mechanisms (RMs) achieve this while ensuring Allocative Efficiency (AE) and User Incentive Compatibility (UIC). Our first result shows the non-triviality of applying RM in TFMs. More concretely, we prove that it is impossible to reduce transaction fees when (i) transactions that are not confirmed do not receive rebates and (ii) the miner can strategically manipulate the mechanism. Driven by this, we propose \emph{Robust} TFRM (\textsf{R-TFRM}): a mechanism that compromises on an honest miner's individual rationality to guarantee strictly positive rebates to the users. We then introduce \emph{robust} and \emph{rational} TFRM (\textsf{R}$^2$\textsf{-TFRM}) that uses trusted on-chain randomness that additionally guarantees miner's individual rationality (in expectation) and strictly positive rebates. Our results show that TFRMs provide a promising new direction for reducing transaction fees in public blockchains.

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DECENT-BRM: Decentralization through Block Reward Mechanisms

Proof-of-Work is a consensus algorithm where miners solve cryptographic puzzles to mine blocks and obtain a reward through some Block Reward Mechanism (BRM). PoW blockchain faces the problem of centralization due to the formation of mining pools, where miners mine blocks as a group and distribute rewards. The rationale is to reduce the risk (variance) in reward while obtaining the same expected block reward. In this work, we address the problem of centralization due to mining pools in PoW blockchain. We propose a two-player game between the new miner joining the system and the PoW blockchain system. We model the utility for the incoming miner as a combination of (i) expected block reward, (ii) risk, and (iii) cost of switching between different mining pools. With this utility structure, we analyze the equilibrium strategy of the incoming miner for different BRMs: (a) memoryless -- block reward is history independent (e.g., Bitcoin) (b) retentive: block reward is history-dependent (e.g., Fruitchains). For memoryless BRMs, we show that depending on the coefficient of switching cost $c$, the protocol is decentralized when $c = 0$ and centralized when $c > \underline{c}$. In addition, we show the impossibility of constructing a memoryless BRM where solo mining gives a higher payoff than forming/joining mining pools. While retentive BRM in Fruitchains reduces risk in solo mining, the equilibrium strategy for incoming miners is still to join mining pools, leading to centralization. We then propose our novel retentive BRM -- \textsf{Decent-BRM}. We show that under \textsf{Decent-BRM}, incoming miners obtain higher utility in solo mining than joining mining pools. Therefore, no mining pools are formed, and the Pow blockchain using \textsf{Decent-BRM} is decentralized.

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Exploring User Perspectives on ChatGPT: Applications, Perceptions, and Implications for AI-Integrated Education

To foster the development of pedagogically potent and ethically sound AI-integrated learning landscapes, it is pivotal to critically explore the perceptions and experiences of the users immersed in these contexts. In this study, we perform a thorough qualitative content analysis across four key social media platforms. Our goal is to understand the user experience (UX) and views of early adopters of ChatGPT across different educational sectors. The results of our research show that ChatGPT is most commonly used in the domains of higher education, K-12 education, and practical skills training. In social media dialogues, the topics most frequently associated with ChatGPT are productivity, efficiency, and ethics. Early adopters' attitudes towards ChatGPT are multifaceted. On one hand, some users view it as a transformative tool capable of amplifying student self-efficacy and learning motivation. On the other hand, there is a degree of apprehension among concerned users. They worry about a potential overdependence on the AI system, which they fear might encourage superficial learning habits and erode students' social and critical thinking skills. This dichotomy of opinions underscores the complexity of Human-AI Interaction in educational contexts. Our investigation adds depth to this ongoing discourse, providing crowd-sourced insights for educators and learners who are considering incorporating ChatGPT or similar generative AI tools into their pedagogical strategies.

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Fair Allocation of goods and chores -- Tutorial and Survey of Recent Results

Fair resource allocation is an important problem in many real-world scenarios, where resources such as goods and chores must be allocated among agents. In this survey, we delve into the intricacies of fair allocation, focusing specifically on the challenges associated with indivisible resources. We define fairness and efficiency within this context and thoroughly survey existential results, algorithms, and approximations that satisfy various fairness criteria, including envyfreeness, proportionality, MMS, and their relaxations. Additionally, we discuss algorithms that achieve fairness and efficiency, such as Pareto Optimality and Utilitarian Welfare. We also study the computational complexity of these algorithms, the likelihood of finding fair allocations, and the price of fairness for each fairness notion. We also cover mixed instances of indivisible and divisible items and investigate different valuation and allocation settings. By summarizing the state-of-the-art research, this survey provides valuable insights into fair resource allocation of indivisible goods and chores, highlighting computational complexities, fairness guarantees, and trade-offs between fairness and efficiency. It serves as a foundation for future advancements in this vital field.

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Differentially Private Federated Combinatorial Bandits with Constraints

There is a rapid increase in the cooperative learning paradigm in online learning settings, i.e., federated learning (FL). Unlike most FL settings, there are many situations where the agents are competitive. Each agent would like to learn from others, but the part of the information it shares for others to learn from could be sensitive; thus, it desires its privacy. This work investigates a group of agents working concurrently to solve similar combinatorial bandit problems while maintaining quality constraints. Can these agents collectively learn while keeping their sensitive information confidential by employing differential privacy? We observe that communicating can reduce the regret. However, differential privacy techniques for protecting sensitive information makes the data noisy and may deteriorate than help to improve regret. Hence, we note that it is essential to decide when to communicate and what shared data to learn to strike a functional balance between regret and privacy. For such a federated combinatorial MAB setting, we propose a Privacy-preserving Federated Combinatorial Bandit algorithm, P-FCB. We illustrate the efficacy of P-FCB through simulations. We further show that our algorithm provides an improvement in terms of regret while upholding quality threshold and meaningful privacy guarantees.

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QuickSync: A Quickly Synchronizing PoS-Based Blockchain Protocol

To implement a blockchain, we need a blockchain protocol for all the nodes to follow. To design a blockchain protocol, we need a block publisher selection mechanism and a chain selection rule. In Proof-of-Stake (PoS) based blockchain protocols, block publisher selection mechanism selects the node to publish the next block based on the relative stake held by the node. However, PoS protocols, such as Ouroboros v1, may face vulnerability to fully adaptive corruptions. In this paper, we propose a novel PoS-based blockchain protocol, QuickSync, to achieve security against fully adaptive corruptions while improving on performance. We propose a metric called block power, a value defined for each block, derived from the output of the verifiable random function based on the digital signature of the block publisher. With this metric, we compute chain power, the sum of block powers of all the blocks comprising the chain, for all the valid chains. These metrics are a function of the block publisher's stake to enable the PoS aspect of the protocol. The chain selection rule selects the chain with the highest chain power as the one to extend. This chain selection rule hence determines the selected block publisher of the previous block. When we use metrics to define the chain selection rule, it may lead to vulnerabilities against Sybil attacks. QuickSync uses a Sybil attack resistant function implemented using histogram matching. We prove that QuickSync satisfies common prefix, chain growth, and chain quality properties and hence it is secure. We also show that it is resilient to different types of adversarial attack strategies. Our analysis demonstrates that QuickSync performs better than Bitcoin by an order of magnitude on both transactions per second and time to finality, and better than Ouroboros v1 by a factor of three on time to finality.

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A Novel Demand Response Model and Method for Peak Reduction in Smart Grids -- PowerTAC

One of the widely used peak reduction methods in smart grids is demand response, where one analyzes the shift in customers' (agents') usage patterns in response to the signal from the distribution company. Often, these signals are in the form of incentives offered to agents. This work studies the effect of incentives on the probabilities of accepting such offers in a real-world smart grid simulator, PowerTAC. We first show that there exists a function that depicts the probability of an agent reducing its load as a function of the discounts offered to them. We call it reduction probability (RP). RP function is further parametrized by the rate of reduction (RR), which can differ for each agent. We provide an optimal algorithm, MJS--ExpResponse, that outputs the discounts to each agent by maximizing the expected reduction under a budget constraint. When RRs are unknown, we propose a Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB) based online algorithm, namely MJSUCB--ExpResponse, to learn RRs. Experimentally we show that it exhibits sublinear regret. Finally, we showcase the efficacy of the proposed algorithm in mitigating demand peaks in a real-world smart grid system using the PowerTAC simulator as a test bed.

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Coordinating Monetary Contributions in Participatory Budgeting

We formalize a framework for coordinating funding and selecting projects, the costs of which are shared among agents with quasi-linear utility functions and individual budgets. Our model contains the classical discrete participatory budgeting model as a special case, while capturing other useful scenarios. We propose several important axioms and objectives and study how well they can be simultaneously satisfied. We show that whereas welfare maximization admits an FPTAS, welfare maximization subject to a natural and very weak participation requirement leads to a strong inapproximability. This result is bypassed if we consider some natural restricted valuations, namely laminar single-minded valuations and symmetric valuations. Our analysis for the former restriction leads to the discovery of a new class of tractable instances for the Set Union Knapsack problem, a classical problem in combinatorial optimization.

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PRAGTHOS:Practical Game Theoretically Secure Proof-of-Work Blockchain

Security analysis of blockchain technology is an active domain of research. There has been both cryptographic and game-theoretic security analysis of Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains. Prominent work includes the cryptographic security analysis under the Universal Composable framework and Game-theoretic security analysis using Rational Protocol Design. These security analysis models rely on stricter assumptions that might not hold. In this paper, we analyze the security of PoW blockchain protocols. We first show how assumptions made by previous models need not be valid in reality, which attackers can exploit to launch attacks that these models fail to capture. These include Difficulty Alternating Attack, under which forking is possible for an adversary with less than 0.5 mining power, Quick-Fork Attack, a general bound on selfish mining attack and transaction withholding attack. Following this, we argue why previous models for security analysis fail to capture these attacks and propose a more practical framework for security analysis pRPD. We then propose a framework to build PoW blockchains PRAGTHOS, which is secure from the attacks mentioned above. Finally, we argue that PoW blockchains complying with the PRAGTHOS framework are secure against a computationally bounded adversary under certain conditions on the reward scheme.

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Your Favorite Gameplay Speaks Volumes about You: Predicting User Behavior and Hexad Type

In recent years, the gamification research community has widely and frequently questioned the effectiveness of one-size-fits-all gamification schemes. In consequence, personalization seems to be an important part of any successful gamification design. Personalization can be improved by understanding user behavior and Hexad player/user type. This paper comes with an original research idea: It investigates whether users' game-related data (collected via various gamer-archetype surveys) can be used to predict their behavioral characteristics and Hexad user types in non-game (but gamified) contexts. The affinity that exists between the concepts of gamification and gaming provided us with the impetus for running this exploratory research. We conducted an initial survey study with 67 Stack Exchange users (as a case study). We discovered that users' gameplay information could reveal valuable and helpful information about their behavioral characteristics and Hexad user types in a non-gaming (but gamified) environment. The results of testing three gamer archetypes (i.e., Bartle, Big Five, and BrainHex) show that they can all help predict users' most dominant Stack Exchange behavioral characteristics and Hexad user type better than a random labeler's baseline. That said, of all the gamer archetypes analyzed in this paper, BrainHex performs the best. In the end, we introduce a research agenda for future work.

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AVeCQ: Anonymous Verifiable Crowdsourcing with Worker Qualities

In crowdsourcing systems, requesters publish tasks, and interested workers provide answers to get rewards. Worker anonymity motivates participation since it protects their privacy. Anonymity with unlinkability is an enhanced version of anonymity because it makes it impossible to ``link'' workers across the tasks they participate in. Another core feature of crowdsourcing systems is worker quality which expresses a worker's trustworthiness and quantifies their historical performance. Notably, worker quality depends on the participation history, revealing information about it, while unlinkability aims to disassociate the workers' identities from their past activity. In this work, we present AVeCQ, the first crowdsourcing system that reconciles these properties, achieving enhanced anonymity and verifiable worker quality updates. AVeCQ relies on a suite of cryptographic tools, such as zero-knowledge proofs, to (i) guarantee workers' privacy, (ii) prove the correctness of worker quality scores and task answers, and (iii) commensurate payments. AVeCQ is developed modularly, where the requesters and workers communicate over a platform that supports pseudonymity, information logging, and payments. In order to compare AVeCQ with the state-of-the-art, we prototype it over Ethereum. AVeCQ outperforms the state-of-the-art in three popular crowdsourcing tasks (image annotation, average review, and Gallup polls). For instance, for an Average Review task with $5$ choices and $128$ participating workers AVeCQ is 40\% faster (including overhead to compute and verify the necessary proofs and blockchain transaction processing time) with the task's requester consuming 87\% fewer gas units.

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Combinatorial Civic Crowdfunding with Budgeted Agents: Welfare Optimality at Equilibrium and Optimal Deviation

Civic Crowdfunding (CC) uses the ``power of the crowd'' to garner contributions towards public projects. As these projects are non-excludable, agents may prefer to ``free-ride,'' resulting in the project not being funded. For single project CC, researchers propose to provide refunds to incentivize agents to contribute, thereby guaranteeing the project's funding. These funding guarantees are applicable only when agents have an unlimited budget. This work focuses on a combinatorial setting, where multiple projects are available for CC and agents have a limited budget. We study certain specific conditions where funding can be guaranteed. Further, funding the optimal social welfare subset of projects is desirable when every available project cannot be funded due to budget restrictions. We prove the impossibility of achieving optimal welfare at equilibrium for any monotone refund scheme. We then study different heuristics that the agents can use to contribute to the projects in practice. Through simulations, we demonstrate the heuristics' performance as the average-case trade-off between welfare obtained and agent utility.

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PUPoW: A framework for designing blockchains with practically-useful-proof-of-work & vanitycoin

Bitcoin is the first of its kind, a truly decentralized and anonymous cryptocurrency. To realize it, it has developed blockchain technology using the concept of `Proof of Work' (PoW). The miners, nodes responsible for writing transaction databases, solve a cryptographic puzzle to claim the right to write to the database. Though bitcoin and many other relevant cryptocurrencies, such as ether use revolutionary ideas, the main criticism involves computing resources and energy consumption to solve puzzles that have otherwise no use. There are attempts to use the PoW to do something useful, commonly referred to as Proof-of-Useful-Work (PoUW). In this paper, we attempt to (i) make PoUW more usable -- describe how a central problem setter can crowdsource their work as PoUW and (ii) in the true spirit of blockchains, decentralize the role of problem setter, whom we call puzzlers. We propose a formal framework to do so, namely PUPoW. PUPoW has an inbuilt provision of payments from the puzzler to the miner who solves its puzzle. Additionally, miners have the option to not rely on a continuous feed of the puzzles and instead use original PoW puzzles. We also propose a way to use PUPOW for solving TOR vanity URL generation and bitcoin vanity address generation problems. We call this PUPoW blockchain solving vanity address generation problems as VanityCoin. Both problems require generating public keys from private keys such that resultant addresses are of interest. Such key pairs are found only by a brute-force search. However, there are privacy concerns that miners would know the private keys of the puzzlers. We resolve this by splitting the private keys, and the miners would know only one part of it. In summary, we are proposing how PoW can be made practically helpful, and we believe such an approach is needed for PoW blockchains to survive.

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Interlude: Balancing Chaos And Harmony For Fair and Fast Blockchains

Blockchains lie at the heart of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies that have shown great promise to revolutionize finance and commerce. Although they are gaining increasing popularity, they face technical challenges when it comes to scaling to support greater demand while maintaining their desirable security properties. In an exciting line of recent work, many researchers have proposed various scalable blockchain protocols that demonstrate the potential to solve these challenges. However, many of these protocols come with the assumptions of honest majority and symmetric network access which may not accurately reflect the real world where the participants may be self-interested or rational. Secondly, these works show that their protocol works in an ideal environment where each party has equal access to the network whereas different parties have varying latencies and network speeds. These assumptions may render the protocols susceptible to security threats in the real world, as highlighted by the literature focused on exploring game-theoretic attacks on these protocols. We propose a scalable blockchain protocol, Interlude, which comes with the typical security guarantees while focusing on game-theoretic soundness and network fairness. The novelty of Interlude is that it has a relatively simple design consisting of a sequence of parallel blocks containing disjoint transaction sets that can be mined quickly followed by a series block that is slow to mine and gives the honest parties in the network time to synchronize. Thus, between the chaos of parallel blocks, our blockchain protocol masquerades an interlude moment of harmony in series blocks that synchronize the network.

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