arXiv subjects

Sumedh J. Dongare

Publications and source records attributed to Sumedh J. Dongare.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Energy-Aware Two-Sided Learning for Dynamic Matching Games in Mobile Crowdsensing

Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is a promising enabler of Sensing-as-a-Service (SaaS) for next generation networks (NGNs), where sensing, communication, and computing are jointly considered as on-demand services. In MCS, mobile units (MUs) collect and deliver sensing data to data requesters (DRs) via a mobile crowdsensing platform (MCSP) in exchange for monetary incentives. After sensing tasks are announced, MUs strategically select tasks to maximize their long-term utility while accounting for energy and time costs, whereas the MCSP assigns tasks to maximize its own service revenue and data quality. A fundamental challenge arises from the lack of prior knowledge of MUs' sensing qualities and task efforts, as well as the energy limitations of battery-powered devices, which directly impacts service availability and reliability in SaaS for NGNs. To address these challenges, we formulate the interaction between MUs and the MCSP as a dynamic two-sided matching game under incomplete information, explicitly incorporating energy constraints. We propose Energy-aware Two-Sided Learning (ETSL), a fully decentralized and lightweight learning framework in which MUs locally learn task proposal strategies, while the MCSP learns the data quality of participating MUs to devise task assignment strategy. ETSL jointly enables MUs' energy-aware task proposals and MCSP's adaptive task assignment, considering their individual preferences to maximize their net revenues. Simulation results demonstrate that ETSL significantly improves MU and MCSP profits and overall energy efficiency, highlighting its effectiveness as a scalable and sustainable SaaS solution for NGN.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2026

Dynamic Hypergame for Task Assignment in Multi-platform Mobile Crowdsensing Under Incomplete Information

Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is a promising distributed sensing paradigm for future wireless networks, where MCS platforms (MCSPs) recruit mobile units (MUs) through monetary incentives for sensing data collection. While most existing studies assume a single MCSP, practical deployments involve multiple competing MCSPs that simultaneously propose task offers to MUs, and MUs accept offers that maximize their revenue. This interaction gives rise to a two-sided matching game with contracts (MWC), decomposed into two components: (i) task proposal problem of the MCSPs and (ii) task acceptance problem of the MUs. To optimally solve (i), every MCSP requires information about other platforms' preferences and the qualities of the MUs in advance. Similarly, to solve (ii) optimally, the MUs require information about the task execution efforts of all tasks in advance. Such information is unavailable at the MCSPs and at the MUs. To address the challenge of unknown preferences of the other MCSPs, the MWC is posed as a dynamic hypergame, where every MCSP models the unknown preferences through perceptions and refines them over repeated interactions. To solve the dynamic hypergame under incomplete information, we propose PACMAB, a fully decentralized perception-aware two-sided learning framework where, (i) each MCSP learns an adaptive task proposal strategy under competition, and (ii) each MU learns task acceptance policy by estimating task execution efforts. Computational complexity of PACMAB shows that it scales favorably for the MCSPs as well as the MUs. Extensive simulations show that PACMAB consistently outperforms the benchmarks by completing at least 41% more tasks without assuming complete information.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2026

Federated Reinforcement Learning for Efficient Mobile Crowdsensing under Incomplete Information

Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is a distributed sensing architecture that utilizes existing sensors on mobile units (MUs) to perform sensing tasks. A mobile crowdsensing platform (MCSP) publishes the sensing tasks and the MUs decide whether to participate in exchange for money. The MCS system is dynamic: the task requirements, the MUs' availability, and their available resources change over time. The MUs aim to find an efficient task participation strategy to maximize their income while the MCSP focuses on maximizing the number of completed tasks. As optimal strategies require perfect non-causal information about the MCS system, which is unavailable in realistic scenarios, the main challenge is to find an efficient task participation strategy for the MUs under incomplete information. To this end, a novel fully decentralized federated deep reinforcement learning algorithm, FDRL-PPO, is proposed. FDRL-PPO enables every MU to learn its own task participation strategy based on its experiences, available resources, and preferences, without relying on perfect non-causal information about the MCS system. To replenish their batteries, the MUs rely on energy harvesting. As a result, their available energy varies over time, leading to varying availability and fragmented learning experiences. To mitigate these challenges, the proposed approach leverages federated learning, enabling MUs to collaboratively improve their models without sharing private raw data like their own experiences. By exchanging only learned models, MUs collectively compensate for individual limitations, and find more scalable, robust, and efficient task participation strategies. Comprehensive evaluations on both synthetic and real-world datasets show that FDRL-PPO consistently outperforms benchmark algorithms in terms of task completion ratio, fairness in task completion, energy consumption, and number of conflicting proposals.

cs.LG↗