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Surya Eada

Publications and source records attributed to Surya Eada.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Black-Box Adversarial Example Attacks on Machine Learning based Election Systems

Machine learning models have shown exceptional accuracy for ballot classification in election systems. Recent research has demonstrated that these ballot classification models are vulnerable to adversarial example attacks. This is a critical security issue because a successful attack could alter the outcome of an election and undermine the democratic process. However, all adversarial example attacks in the voting domain have assumed a white-box threat model, where the classifier parameters are known. In this work, we advance the field of machine learning in election systems by analyzing a realistic black-box adversary. We implement and evaluate eleven state-of-the-art black-box attacks: query based attacks ADBA, Square, SurFree, RayS, and SA-MOO. We also test adaptive transfer based black-box attacks with APGD-$l_\infty$, APGD-$l_2$, APGD-$l_1$, PGD $l_0$, PGD $l_0$+$l_\infty$, and PGD $l_0$+$σ$. Our attacks span multiple different norms ($l_\infty$, $l_2$, $l_1$, and $l_0$) and three different black-box adversarial threat models (decision based, score based and transfer based). In addition to digital analyses, we physically print and scan $20,000$ adversarial examples to evaluate the real-world performance of different black-box attacks. Our finding demonstrate an even larger physical-digital robustness gap exists for black-box adversarial examples than for white-box adversarial examples. Lastly, we conduct the first ever adversarial example transferability study in the voting domain and test adversarial training and barrier zones as two possible black-box defense strategies.

cs.CR↗

Analyzing Physical Adversarial Example Threats to Machine Learning in Election Systems

Developments in the machine learning voting domain have shown both promising results and risks. Trained models perform well on ballot classification tasks (> 99% accuracy) but are at risk from adversarial example attacks that cause misclassifications. In this paper, we analyze an attacker who seeks to deploy adversarial examples against machine learning ballot classifiers to compromise a U.S. election. We first derive a probabilistic framework for determining the number of adversarial example ballots that must be printed to flip an election, in terms of the probability of each candidate winning and the total number of ballots cast. Second, it is an open question as to which type of adversarial example is most effective when physically printed in the voting domain. We analyze six different types of adversarial example attacks: l_infinity-APGD, l2-APGD, l1-APGD, l0 PGD, l0 + l_infinity PGD, and l0 + sigma-map PGD. Our experiments include physical realizations of 144,000 adversarial examples through printing and scanning with four different machine learning models. We empirically demonstrate an analysis gap between the physical and digital domains, wherein attacks most effective in the digital domain (l2 and l_infinity) differ from those most effective in the physical domain (l1 and l2, depending on the model). By unifying a probabilistic election framework with digital and physical adversarial example evaluations, we move beyond prior close race analyses to explicitly quantify when and how adversarial ballot manipulation could alter outcomes.

cs.LG↗