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Sushirdeep Narayana

Publications and source records attributed to Sushirdeep Narayana.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Custom Keep-Alive Cache Policies

We study the market design of keep-alive caching policies applicable in serverless computing. Prior work has assumed that the cost of a cache miss (cold start) is uniform across all customer applications. However, the cost of a cache miss depends on the customer's application. We investigate the market design where the customers submit a bid for their cost of a cache miss. We design a cache allocation policy based on online learning from a mixture of fixed allocation experts. We show that our custom cache allocation policy is asymptotically efficient and monotonically non-increasing with respect to the submitted bid. We examine two ways of charging customers to achieve good incentives. In the first payment scheme the customers are charged based on Myerson's theory, whereas in the second payment scheme the customers are charged their externality. We show via a mix of simulations and theory that both schemes have desirable revenue and incentive properties.

cs.GT

Keep-Alive Caching for the Hawkes process

We study the design of caching policies in applications such as serverless computing where there is not a fixed size cache to be filled, but rather there is a cost associated with the time an item stays in the cache. We present a model for such caching policies which captures the trade-off between this cost and the cost of cache misses. We characterize optimal caching policies in general and apply this characterization by deriving a closed form for Hawkes processes. Since optimal policies for Hawkes processes depend on the history of arrivals, we also develop history-independent policies which achieve near-optimal average performance. We evaluate the performances of the optimal policy and approximate polices using simulations and a data trace of Azure Functions, Microsoft's FaaS (Function as a Service) platform for serverless computing.

cs.GT

Fair and Efficient Allocations with Limited Demands

We study the fair division problem of allocating multiple resources among a set of agents with Leontief preferences that are each required to complete a finite amount of work, which we term "limited demands". We examine the behavior of the classic Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF) mechanism in this setting and show it is fair but only weakly Pareto optimal and inefficient in many natural examples. We propose as an alternative the Least Cost Product (LCP) mechanism, a natural adaptation of Maximum Nash Welfare to this setting. We characterize the structure of allocations of the LCP mechanism in this setting, show that it is Pareto efficient, and that it satisfies the relatively weak fairness property of sharing incentives. While we prove it satisfies the stronger fairness property of (expected) envy freeness in some special cases, we provide a counterexample showing it does not do so in general, a striking contrast to the "unreasonable fairness" of Maximum Nash Welfare in other settings. Simulations suggest, however, that these violations of envy freeness are rare in randomly generated examples.

cs.GT