arXiv subjects

Sushmita Gupta

Publications and source records attributed to Sushmita Gupta.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Dominating Set with Quotas: Balancing Coverage and Constraints

We study a natural generalization of the classical \textsc{Dominating Set} problem, called \textsc{Dominating Set with Quotas} (DSQ). In this problem, we are given a graph $ G $, an integer $ k $, and for each vertex $ v \in V(G) $, a lower quota $ \mathrm{lo}_v $ and an upper quota $ \mathrm{up}_v $. The goal is to determine whether there exists a set $ S \subseteq V(G) $ of size at most $ k $ such that for every vertex $ v \in V(G) $, the number of vertices in its closed neighborhood that belong to $ S $, i.e., $ |N[v] \cap S| $, lies within the range $ [\mathrm{lo}_v, \mathrm{up}_v] $. This richer model captures a variety of practical settings where both under- and over-coverage must be avoided -- such as in fault-tolerant infrastructure, load-balanced facility placement, or constrained communication networks. While DS is already known to be computationally hard, we show that the added expressiveness of per-vertex quotas in DSQ introduces additional algorithmic challenges. In particular, we prove that DSQ becomes \W[1]-hard even on structurally sparse graphs -- such as those with degeneracy 2, or excluding $ K_{3,3} $ as a subgraph -- despite these classes admitting FPT algorithms for DS. On the positive side, we show that DSQ is fixed-parameter tractable when parameterized by solution size and treewidth, and more generally, on nowhere dense graph classes. Furthermore, we design a subexponential-time algorithm for DSQ on apex-minor-free graphs using the bidimensionality framework. These results collectively offer a refined view of the algorithmic landscape of DSQ, revealing a sharp contrast with the classical DS problem and identifying the key structural properties that govern tractability.

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arXiv2026

Robust Value Maximization in Challenge the Champ Tournaments with Probabilistic Outcomes

Challenge the Champ is a simple tournament format, where an ordering of the players -- called a seeding -- is decided. The first player in this order is the initial champ, and faces the next player. The outcome of each match decides the current champion, who faces the next player in the order. Each player also has a popularity, and the value of each match is the popularity of the winner. Value maximization in tournaments has been previously studied when each match has a deterministic outcome. However, match outcomes are often probabilistic, rather than deterministic. We study robust value maximization in Challenge the Champ tournaments, when the winner of a match may be probabilistic. That is, we seek to maximize the total value that is obtained, irrespective of the outcome of probabilistic matches. We show that even in simple binary settings, for non-adaptive algorithms, the optimal robust value -- which we term the \textsc{VnaR}, or the value not at risk -- is hard to approximate. However, if we allow adaptive algorithms that determine the order of challengers based on the outcomes of previous matches, or restrict the matches with probabilistic outcomes, we can obtain good approximations to the optimal \textsc{VnaR}.

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arXiv2026

When agents choose bundles autonomously: guarantees beyond discrepancy

We consider the fair division of indivisible items among $n$ agents with additive non-negative normalized valuations, with the goal of obtaining high value guarantees, that is, close to the proportional share for each agent. We prove that partitions where \emph{every} part yields high value for each agent are asymptotically limited by a discrepancy barrier of $\Theta(\sqrt{n})$. Guided by this, our main objective is to overcome this barrier and achieve stronger individual guarantees for each agent in polynomial time. Towards this, we are able to exhibit an exponential improvement over the discrepancy barrier. In particular, we can create partitions on-the-go such that when agents arrive sequentially (representing a previously-agreed priority order) and pick a part autonomously and rationally (i.e., one of highest value), then each is guaranteed a part of value at least $\mathsf{PROP} - \mathcal{O}{(\log n)}$. Moreover, we show even better guarantees for three restricted valuation classes such as those defined by: a common ordering on items, a bound on the multiplicity of values, and a hypergraph with a bound on the \emph{influence} of any agent. Specifically, we study instances where: (1) the agents are ``close'' to unanimity in their relative valuation of the items -- a generalization of the ordered additive setting; (2) the valuation functions do not assign the same positive value to more than $t$ items; and (3) the valuation functions respect a hypergraph, a setting introduced by Christodoulou et al. [EC'23], where agents are vertices and items are hyperedges. While the sizes of the hyperedges and neighborhoods can be arbitrary, the influence of any agent $a$, defined as the number of its neighbors who value at least one item positively that $a$ also values positively, is bounded.

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arXiv2025

A Simple Algorithm for Combinatorial n-Fold ILPs Using the Steinitz Lemma

We present an algorithm for a class of $n$-fold ILPs whose existing algorithms in literature are often either (1) based on the \textit{augmentation framework} where one starts with an arbitrary solution and then iteratively moves towards an optimal solution by solving appropriate programs; or (2) require solving a linear relaxation of the program; or (3) are based on decomposition/proximity based arguments. Combinatorial $n$-fold ILPs is a class of $n$-fold ILPs introduced and studied by Knop et al. [MP2020] that captures several other problems in a variety of domains. We present a simple and direct algorithm that solves combinatorial $n$-fold ILPs with unbounded non-negative variables via an application of the Steinitz lemma. Depending on the structure of the input ILP, we also improve upon the existing algorithms in the literature in terms of the running time, thereby showing an improvement that mirrors the one shown by Rohwedder [ICALP2025] contemporaneously and independently.

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arXiv2025

Tractable Graph Structures in EFX Orientation

Since its introduction, envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) has become a fundamental solution concept in fair division of indivisible goods. Its existence remains elusive -- even for four agents with additive utility functions, it is unknown whether an EFX allocation always exists. Unsurprisingly, restricted settings to delineate tractable and intractable cases have been explored. Christadolou, Fiat et al.[EC'23] introduced the notion of EFX-orientation, where the agents form the vertices of a graph and the items correspond to edges, and an agent values only the items that are incident to it. The goal is to allocate items to one of the adjacent agents while satisfying the EFX condition. Building on the work of Zeng and Mehta'24, which established a sharp complexity threshold based on the structure of the underlying graph -- polynomial-time solvability for bipartite graphs and NP-hardness for graphs with chromatic number at least three -- we further explore the algorithmic landscape of EFX-orientation using parameterized graph algorithms. Specifically, we show that bipartiteness is a surprisingly stringent condition for tractability: EFX orientation is NP-complete even when the valuations are symmetric, binary and the graph is at most two edge-removals away from being bipartite. Moreover, introducing a single non-binary value makes the problem NP-hard even when the graph is only one edge removal away from being bipartite. We further perform a parameterized analysis to examine structures of the underlying graph that enable tractability. In particular, we show that the problem is solvable in linear time on graphs whose treewidth is bounded by a constant and that the complexity of an instance is closely tied to the sizes of acyclic connected components on its one-valued edges.

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arXiv2025

More Efforts Towards Fixed-Parameter Approximability of Multiwinner Rules

Multiwinner Elections have emerged as a prominent area of research with numerous practical applications. We contribute to this area by designing parameterized approximation algorithms and also resolving an open question by Yang and Wang [AAMAS'18]. More formally, given a set of candidates, \mathcal{C}, a set of voters,\mathcal{V}, approving a subset of candidates (called approval set of a voter), and an integer $k$, we consider the problem of selecting a ``good'' committee using Thiele rules. This problem is computationally challenging for most Thiele rules with monotone submodular satisfaction functions, as there is no (1-\frac{1}{e}-\epsilon)\footnote{Here, $e$ denotes the base of the natural logarithm.}-approximation algorithm in f(k)(|\mathcal{C}| + |\mathcal{V}|)^{o(k)} time for any fixed $\epsilon > 0$ and any computable function $f$, and no {\sf PTAS} even when the length of approval set is two. Skowron [WINE'16] designed an approximation scheme running in FPT time parameterized by the combined parameter, size of the approval set and $k$. In this paper, we consider a parameter $d+k$ (no $d$ voters approve the same set of $d$ candidates), where $d$ is upper bounded by the size of the approval set (thus, can be much smaller). With respect to this parameter, we design parameterized approximation schemes, a lossy polynomial-time preprocessing method, and show that an extra committee member suffices to achieve the desired score (i.e., $1$-additive approximation). Additionally, we resolve an open question by Yang and Wang~[AAMAS'18] regarding the fixed-parameter tractability of the problem under the PAV rule with the total score as the parameter, demonstrating that it admits an FPT algorithm.

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arXiv2024

On Controlling Knockout Tournaments Without Perfect Information

Over the last decade, extensive research has been conducted on the algorithmic aspects of designing single-elimination (SE) tournaments. Addressing natural questions of algorithmic tractability, we identify key properties of input instances that enable the tournament designer to efficiently schedule the tournament in a way that maximizes the chances of a preferred player winning. Much of the prior algorithmic work on this topic focuses on the perfect (complete and deterministic) information scenario, especially in the context of fixed-parameter algorithm design. Our contributions constitute the first fixed-parameter tractability results applicable to more general settings of SE tournament design with potential imperfect information.

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arXiv2024

When far is better: The Chamberlin-Courant approach to obnoxious committee selection

Classical work on metric space based committee selection problem interprets distance as ``near is better''. In this work, motivated by real-life situations, we interpret distance as ``far is better''. Formally stated, we initiate the study of ``obnoxious'' committee scoring rules when the voters' preferences are expressed via a metric space. To this end, we propose a model where large distances imply high satisfaction and study the egalitarian avatar of the well-known Chamberlin-Courant voting rule and some of its generalizations. For a given integer value $1 \le \lambda \le k$, the committee size k, a voter derives satisfaction from only the $\lambda$-th favorite committee member; the goal is to maximize the satisfaction of the least satisfied voter. For the special case of $\lambda = 1$, this yields the egalitarian Chamberlin-Courant rule. In this paper, we consider general metric space and the special case of a $d$-dimensional Euclidean space. We show that when $\lambda$ is $1$ and $k$, the problem is polynomial-time solvable in $\mathbb{R}^2$ and general metric space, respectively. However, for $\lambda = k-1$, it is NP-hard even in $\mathbb{R}^2$. Thus, we have ``double-dichotomy'' in $\mathbb{R}^2$ with respect to the value of {\lambda}, where the extreme cases are solvable in polynomial time but an intermediate case is NP-hard. Furthermore, this phenomenon appears to be ``tight'' for $\mathbb{R}^2$ because the problem is NP-hard for general metric space, even for $\lambda=1$. Consequently, we are motivated to explore the problem in the realm of (parameterized) approximation algorithms and obtain positive results. Interestingly, we note that this generalization of Chamberlin-Courant rules encodes practical constraints that are relevant to solutions for certain facility locations.

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arXiv2024

Conflict and Fairness in Resource Allocation

In the standard model of fair allocation of resources to agents, every agent has some utility for every resource, and the goal is to assign resources to agents so that the agents' welfare is maximized. Motivated by job scheduling, interest in this problem dates back to the work of Deuermeyer et al. [SIAM J. on Algebraic Discrete Methods'82]. Recent works consider the compatibility between resources and assign only mutually compatible resources to an agent. We study a fair allocation problem in which we are given a set of agents, a set of resources, a utility function for every agent over a set of resources, and a {\it conflict graph} on the set of resources (where an edge denotes incompatibility). The goal is to assign resources to the agents such that $(i)$ the set of resources allocated to an agent are compatible with each other, and $(ii)$ the minimum satisfaction of an agent is maximized, where the satisfaction of an agent is the sum of the utility of the assigned resources. Chiarelli et al. [Algorithmica'22] explore this problem from the classical complexity perspective to draw the boundary between the cases that are polynomial-time solvable and those that are \NP-hard. In this article, we study the parameterized complexity of the problem (and its variants) by considering several natural and structural parameters.

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arXiv2024

Quick-Sort Style Approximation Algorithms for Generalizations of Feedback Vertex Set in Tournaments

A feedback vertex set (FVS) in a digraph is a subset of vertices whose removal makes the digraph acyclic. In other words, it hits all cycles in the digraph. Lokshtanov et al. [TALG '21] gave a factor 2 randomized approximation algorithm for finding a minimum weight FVS in tournaments. We generalize the result by presenting a factor $2\alpha$ randomized approximation algorithm for finding a minimum weight FVS in digraphs of independence number $\alpha$; a generalization of tournaments which are digraphs with independence number $1$. Using the same framework, we present a factor $2$ randomized approximation algorithm for finding a minimum weight Subset FVS in tournaments: given a vertex subset $S$ in addition to the graph, find a subset of vertices that hits all cycles containing at least one vertex in $S$. Note that FVS in tournaments is a special case of Subset FVS in tournaments in which $S = V(T)$.

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arXiv2024

An Exercise in Tournament Design: When Some Matches Must Be Scheduled

Single-elimination (SE) tournaments are a popular format used in competitive environments and decision making. Algorithms for SE tournament manipulation have been an active topic of research in recent years. In this paper, we initiate the algorithmic study of a novel variant of SE tournament manipulation that aims to model the fact that certain matchups are highly desired in a sporting context, incentivizing an organizer to manipulate the bracket to make such matchups take place. We obtain both hardness and tractability results. We show that while the problem of computing a bracket enforcing a given set of matches in an SE tournament is NP-hard, there are natural restrictions that lead to polynomial-time solvability. In particular, we show polynomial-time solvability if there is a linear ordering on the ability of players with only a constant number of exceptions where a player with lower ability beats a player with higher ability.

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arXiv2024

Budget-feasible Egalitarian Allocation of Conflicting Jobs

Allocating conflicting jobs among individuals while respecting a budget constraint for each individual is an optimization problem that arises in various real-world scenarios. In this paper, we consider the situation where each individual derives some satisfaction from each job. We focus on finding a feasible allocation of conflicting jobs that maximize egalitarian cost, i.e. the satisfaction of the \nc{individual who is worst-off}. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to combine egalitarianism, budget-feasibility, and conflict-freeness in allocations. We provide a systematic study of the computational complexity of finding budget-feasible conflict-free egalitarian allocation and show that our problem generalizes a large number of classical optimization problems. Therefore, unsurprisingly, our problem is \NPH even for two individuals and when there is no conflict between any jobs. We show that the problem admits algorithms when studied in the realm of approximation algorithms and parameterized algorithms with a host of natural parameters that match and in some cases improve upon the running time of known algorithms.

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arXiv2023

How to assign volunteers to tasks compatibly ? A graph theoretic and parameterized approach

In this paper we study a resource allocation problem that encodes correlation between items in terms of \conflict and maximizes the minimum utility of the agents under a conflict free allocation. Admittedly, the problem is computationally hard even under stringent restrictions because it encodes a variant of the {\sc Maximum Weight Independent Set} problem which is one of the canonical hard problems in both classical and parameterized complexity. Recently, this subject was explored by Chiarelli et al.~[Algorithmica'22] from the classical complexity perspective to draw the boundary between {\sf NP}-hardness and tractability for a constant number of agents. The problem was shown to be hard even for small constant number of agents and various other restrictions on the underlying graph. Notwithstanding this computational barrier, we notice that there are several parameters that are worth studying: number of agents, number of items, combinatorial structure that defines the conflict among the items, all of which could well be small under specific circumstancs. Our search rules out several parameters (even when taken together) and takes us towards a characterization of families of input instances that are amenable to polynomial time algorithms when the parameters are constant. In addition to this we give a superior $2^{m}|I|^{\Co{O}(1)}$ algorithm for our problem where $m$ denotes the number of items that significantly beats the exhaustive $\Oh(m^{m})$ algorithm by cleverly using ideas from FFT based fast polynomial multiplication; and we identify simple graph classes relevant to our problem's motivation that admit efficient algorithms.

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arXiv2022

More Effort Towards Multiagent Knapsack

In this paper, we study some multiagent variants of the knapsack problem. Fluschnik et al. [AAAI 2019] considered the model in which every agent assigns some utility to every item. They studied three preference aggregation rules for finding a subset (knapsack) of items: individually best, diverse, and Nash-welfare-based. Informally, diversity is achieved by satisfying as many voters as possible. Motivated by the application of aggregation operators in multiwinner elections, we extend the study from diverse aggregation rule to Median and Best scoring functions. We study the computational and parameterized complexity of the problem with respect to some natural parameters, namely, the number of voters, the number of items, and the distance from an easy instance. We also study the complexity of the problem under domain restrictions. Furthermore, we present significantly faster parameterized algorithms with respect to the number of voters for the diverse aggregation rule.

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arXiv2021

Gerrymandering on graphs: Computational complexity and parameterized algorithms

Partitioning a region into districts to favor a particular candidate or a party is commonly known as gerrymandering. In this paper, we investigate the gerrymandering problem in graph theoretic setting as proposed by Cohen-Zemach et al. [AAMAS 2018]. Our contributions in this article are two-fold, conceptual and computational. We first resolve the open question posed by Ito et al. [AAMAS 2019] about the computational complexity of the problem when the input graph is a path. Next, we propose a generalization of their model, where the input consists of a graph on $n$ vertices representing the set of voters, a set of $m$ candidates $\mathcal{C}$, a weight function $w_v: \mathcal{C}\rightarrow {\mathbb Z}^+$ for each voter $v\in V(G)$ representing the preference of the voter over the candidates, a distinguished candidate $p\in \mathcal{C}$, and a positive integer $k$. The objective is to decide if one can partition the vertex set into $k$ pairwise disjoint connected sets (districts) s.t $p$ wins more districts than any other candidate. The problem is known to be NPC even if $k=2$, $m=2$, and $G$ is either a complete bipartite graph (in fact $K_{2,n}$) or a complete graph. This means that in search for FPT algorithms we need to either focus on the parameter $n$, or subclasses of forest. Circumventing these intractable results, we give a deterministic and a randomized algorithms for the problem on paths running in times $2.619^{k}(n+m)^{O(1)}$ and $2^{k}(n+m)^{O(1)}$, respectively. Additionally, we prove that the problem on general graphs is solvable in time $2^n (n+m)^{O(1)}$. Our algorithmic results use sophisticated technical tools such as representative set family and Fast Fourier transform based polynomial multiplication, and their (possibly first) application to problems arising in social choice theory and/or game theory may be of independent interest to the community.

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arXiv2020

On the (Parameterized) Complexity of Almost Stable Marriage

In the Stable Marriage problem. when the preference lists are complete, all agents of the smaller side can be matched. However, this need not be true when preference lists are incomplete. In most real-life situations, where agents participate in the matching market voluntarily and submit their preferences, it is natural to assume that each agent wants to be matched to someone in his/her preference list as opposed to being unmatched. In light of the Rural Hospital Theorem, we have to relax the "no blocking pair" condition for stable matchings in order to match more agents. In this paper, we study the question of matching more agents with fewest possible blocking edges. In particular, we find a matching whose size exceeds that of stable matching in the graph by at least t and has at most k blocking edges. We study this question in the realm of parameterized complexity with respect to several natural parameters, k,t,d, where d is the maximum length of a preference list. Unfortunately, the problem remains intractable even for the combined parameter k+t+d. Thus, we extend our study to the local search variant of this problem, in which we search for a matching that not only fulfills each of the above conditions but is "closest", in terms of its symmetric difference to the given stable matching, and obtain an FPT algorithm.

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arXiv2018

Popular Matching in Roommates Setting is NP-hard

An input to the Popular Matching problem, in the roommates setting, consists of a graph $G$ and each vertex ranks its neighbors in strict order, known as its preference. In the Popular Matching problem the objective is to test whether there exists a matching $M^\star$ such that there is no matching $M$ where more people are happier with $M$ than with $M^\star$. In this paper we settle the computational complexity of the Popular Matching problem in the roommates setting by showing that the problem is NP-complete. Thus, we resolve an open question that has been repeatedly, explicitly asked over the last decade.

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arXiv2017

Balanced Stable Marriage: How Close is Close Enough?

The Balanced Stable Marriage problem is a central optimization version of the classic Stable Marriage problem. Here, the output cannot be an arbitrary stable matching, but one that balances between the dissatisfaction of the two parties, men and women. We study Balanced Stable Marriage from the viewpoint of Parameterized Complexity. Our "above guarantee parameterizations" are arguably the most natural parameterizations of the problem at hand. Indeed, our parameterizations precisely fit the scenario where there exists a stable marriage that both parties would accept, that is, where the satisfaction of each party is "close" to the best it can hope for. Furthermore, our parameterizations accurately draw the line between tractability and intractability with respect to the target value.

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