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Syed Rafay Hasan

Publications and source records attributed to Syed Rafay Hasan.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Physical Evaluation of Naturalistic Adversarial Patches for Camera-Based Traffic-Sign Detection

This paper studies how well Naturalistic Adversarial Patches (NAPs) transfer to a physical traffic sign setting when the detector is trained on a customized dataset for an autonomous vehicle (AV) environment. We construct a composite dataset, CompGTSRB (which is customized dataset for AV environment), by pasting traffic sign instances from the German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) onto undistorted backgrounds captured from the target platform. CompGTSRB is used to train a YOLOv5 model and generate patches using a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) with latent space optimization, following existing NAP methods. We carried out a series of experiments on our Quanser QCar testbed utilizing the front CSI camera provided in QCar. Across configurations, NAPs reduce the detector's STOP class confidence. Different configurations include distance, patch sizes, and patch placement. These results along with a detailed step-by-step methodology indicate the utility of CompGTSRB dataset and the proposed systematic physical protocols for credible patch evaluation. The research further motivate researching the defenses that address localized patch corruption in embedded perception pipelines.

cs.CV

Supply Chain Exploitation of Secure ROS 2 Systems: A Proof-of-Concept on Autonomous Platform Compromise via Keystore Exfiltration

This paper presents a proof-of-concept supply chain attack against the Secure ROS 2 (SROS 2) framework, demonstrated on a Quanser QCar2 autonomous vehicle platform. A Trojan-infected Debian package modifies core ROS 2 security commands to exfiltrate newly generated keystore credentials via DNS in base64-encoded chunks to an attacker-controlled nameserver. Possession of these credentials enables the attacker to rejoin the SROS 2 network as an authenticated participant and publish spoofed control or perception messages without triggering authentication failures. We evaluate this capability on a secure ROS 2 Humble testbed configured for a four-stop-sign navigation routine using an Intel RealSense camera for perception. Experimental results show that control-topic injections can cause forced braking, sustained high-speed acceleration, and continuous turning loops, while perception-topic spoofing can induce phantom stop signs or suppress real detections. The attack generalizes to any data distribution service (DDS)-based robotic system using SROS 2, highlighting the need for both supply chain integrity controls and runtime semantic validation to safeguard autonomous systems against insider and impersonation threats.

cs.CR

Mitigation of Camouflaged Adversarial Attacks in Autonomous Vehicles--A Case Study Using CARLA Simulator

Autonomous vehicles (AVs) rely heavily on cameras and artificial intelligence (AI) to make safe and accurate driving decisions. However, since AI is the core enabling technology, this raises serious cyber threats that hinder the large-scale adoption of AVs. Therefore, it becomes crucial to analyze the resilience of AV security systems against sophisticated attacks that manipulate camera inputs, deceiving AI models. In this paper, we develop camera-camouflaged adversarial attacks targeting traffic sign recognition (TSR) in AVs. Specifically, if the attack is initiated by modifying the texture of a stop sign to fool the AV's object detection system, thereby affecting the AV actuators. The attack's effectiveness is tested using the CARLA AV simulator and the results show that such an attack can delay the auto-braking response to the stop sign, resulting in potential safety issues. We conduct extensive experiments under various conditions, confirming that our new attack is effective and robust. Additionally, we address the attack by presenting mitigation strategies. The proposed attack and defense methods are applicable to other end-to-end trained autonomous cyber-physical systems.

cs.CR

SHEATH: Defending Horizontal Collaboration for Distributed CNNs against Adversarial Noise

As edge computing and the Internet of Things (IoT) expand, horizontal collaboration (HC) emerges as a distributed data processing solution for resource-constrained devices. In particular, a convolutional neural network (CNN) model can be deployed on multiple IoT devices, allowing distributed inference execution for image recognition while ensuring model and data privacy. Yet, this distributed architecture remains vulnerable to adversaries who want to make subtle alterations that impact the model, even if they lack access to the entire model. Such vulnerabilities can have severe implications for various sectors, including healthcare, military, and autonomous systems. However, security solutions for these vulnerabilities have not been explored. This paper presents a novel framework for Secure Horizontal Edge with Adversarial Threat Handling (SHEATH) to detect adversarial noise and eliminate its effect on CNN inference by recovering the original feature maps. Specifically, SHEATH aims to address vulnerabilities without requiring complete knowledge of the CNN model in HC edge architectures based on sequential partitioning. It ensures data and model integrity, offering security against adversarial attacks in diverse HC environments. Our evaluations demonstrate SHEATH's adaptability and effectiveness across diverse CNN configurations.

cs.CR

System Integration of Xilinx DPU and HDMI for Real-Time inference in PYNQ Environment with Image Enhancement

Use of edge computing in application of Computer Vision (CV) is an active field of research. Today, most CV applications make use of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) to inference on and interpret video data. These edge devices are responsible for several CV related tasks, such as gathering, processing and enhancing, inferencing on, and displaying video data. Due to ease of reconfiguration, computation on FPGA fabric is used to achieve such complex computation tasks. Xilinx provides the PYNQ environment as a user-friendly interface that facilitates in Hardware/Software system integration. However, to the best of authors' knowledge there is no end-to-end framework available for the PYNQ environment that allows Hardware/Software system integration and deployment of CNNs for real-time input feed from High Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI) input to HDMI output, along with insertion of customized hardware IPs. In this work we propose an integration of rea\textbf{L}-time image \textbf{E}nancement IP with \textbf{A}I inferencing engine in the \textbf{P}ynq environment (\textbf{LEAP}), that integrates HDMI, AI acceleration, image enhancement in the PYNQ environment for Xilinx's Microprocessor on Chip (MPSoC) platform. We evaluate our methodology with two well know CNN models, Resnet50 and YOLOv3. To validate our proposed methodology, LEAP, a simple image enhancement algorithm, histogram equalization, is designed and integrated in the FPGA fabric along with Xilinx's Deep Processing Unit (DPU). Our results show successful implementation of end-to-end integration using completely open source information.

eess.IV

A Case Study of Image Enhancement Algorithms' Effectiveness of Improving Neural Networks' Performance on Adverse Images

Neural Networks (NNs) have become indispensable for applications of Computer Vision (CV) and their use has been ever-growing. NNs are commonly trained for long periods of time on datasets like ImageNet and COCO that have been carefully created to represent common "real-world" environments. When deployed in the field, such as applications of autonomous vehicles, NNs can encounter adverse scenarios that degrade performance. Using image enhancements algorithms to enhance images before being inferenced on a NN model poses an intriguing alternative to retraining, however, published literature on the effectiveness of this solution is scarce. To fill this knowledge gap, we provide a case study on two popular image enhancement algorithms, Histogram Equalization (HE) and Retinex (RX). We simulate four types of adverse scenarios an autonomous vehicle could encounter, dark, over exposed, foggy, and dark & rainy weather conditions. We evaluate the effectiveness of HE and RX using several well established models:, Resnet, GoogleLeNet, YOLO, and a Vision Transformer.

eess.IV

DeMiST: Detection and Mitigation of Stealthy Analog Hardware Trojans

The global semiconductor supply chain involves design and fabrication at various locations, which leads to multiple security vulnerabilities, e.g., Hardware Trojan (HT) insertion. Although most HTs target digital circuits, HTs can be inserted in analog circuits. Therefore, several techniques have been developed for HT insertions in analog circuits. Capacitance-based Analog Hardware Trojan (AHT) is one of the stealthiest HT that can bypass most existing HT detection techniques because it uses negligible charge accumulation in the capacitor to generate stealthy triggers. To address the charge sharing and accumulation issues, we propose a novel way to detect such capacitance-based AHT in this paper. Secondly, we critically analyzed existing AHTs to highlight their respective limitations. We proposed a stealthier capacitor-based AHT (fortified AHT) that can bypass our novel AHT detection technique by addressing these limitations. Finally, by critically analyzing the proposed fortified AHT and existing AHTs, we developed a robust two-phase framework (DeMiST) in which a synchronous system can mitigate the effects of capacitance-based stealthy AHTs by turning off the triggering capability of AHT. In the first phase, we demonstrate how the synchronous system can avoid the AHT during run-time by controlling the supply voltage of the intermediate combinational circuits. In the second phase, we proposed a supply voltage duty cycle-based validation technique to detect capacitance-based AHTs. Furthermore, DeMiST amplified the switching activity for charge accumulation to such a degree that it can be easily detectable using existing switching activity-based HT detection techniques.

cs.AR

Towards Enabling Dynamic Convolution Neural Network Inference for Edge Intelligence

Deep learning applications have achieved great success in numerous real-world applications. Deep learning models, especially Convolution Neural Networks (CNN) are often prototyped using FPGA because it offers high power efficiency and reconfigurability. The deployment of CNNs on FPGAs follows a design cycle that requires saving of model parameters in the on-chip memory during High-level synthesis (HLS). Recent advances in edge intelligence require CNN inference on edge network to increase throughput and reduce latency. To provide flexibility, dynamic parameter allocation to different mobile devices is required to implement either a predefined or defined on-the-fly CNN architecture. In this study, we present novel methodologies for dynamically streaming the model parameters at run-time to implement a traditional CNN architecture. We further propose a library-based approach to design scalable and dynamic distributed CNN inference on the fly leveraging partial-reconfiguration techniques, which is particularly suitable for resource-constrained edge devices. The proposed techniques are implemented on the Xilinx PYNQ-Z2 board to prove the concept by utilizing the LeNet-5 CNN model. The results show that the proposed methodologies are effective, with classification accuracy rates of 92%, 86%, and 94% respectively

cs.LG

Security Analysis of Capsule Network Inference using Horizontal Collaboration

The traditional convolution neural networks (CNN) have several drawbacks like the Picasso effect and the loss of information by the pooling layer. The Capsule network (CapsNet) was proposed to address these challenges because its architecture can encode and preserve the spatial orientation of input images. Similar to traditional CNNs, CapsNet is also vulnerable to several malicious attacks, as studied by several researchers in the literature. However, most of these studies focus on single-device-based inference, but horizontally collaborative inference in state-of-the-art systems, like intelligent edge services in self-driving cars, voice controllable systems, and drones, nullify most of these analyses. Horizontal collaboration implies partitioning the trained CNN models or CNN tasks to multiple end devices or edge nodes. Therefore, it is imperative to examine the robustness of the CapsNet against malicious attacks when deployed in horizontally collaborative environments. Towards this, we examine the robustness of the CapsNet when subjected to noise-based inference attacks in a horizontal collaborative environment. In this analysis, we perturbed the feature maps of the different layers of four DNN models, i.e., CapsNet, Mini-VGG, LeNet, and an in-house designed CNN (ConvNet) with the same number of parameters as CapsNet, using two types of noised-based attacks, i.e., Gaussian Noise Attack and FGSM noise attack. The experimental results show that similar to the traditional CNNs, depending upon the access of the attacker to the DNN layer, the classification accuracy of the CapsNet drops significantly. For example, when Gaussian Noise Attack classification is performed at the DigitCap layer of the CapsNet, the maximum classification accuracy drop is approximately 97%.

cs.LG

FeSHI: Feature Map Based Stealthy Hardware Intrinsic Attack

To reduce the time-to-market and access to state-of-the-art techniques, CNN hardware mapping and deployment on embedded accelerators are often outsourced to untrusted third parties, which is going to be more prevalent in futuristic artificial intelligence of things (AIoT) systems. These AIoT systems anticipate horizontal collaboration among different resource-constrained AIoT node devices, where CNN layers are partitioned and these devices collaboratively compute complex CNN tasks. This horizontal collaboration opens another attack surface to the CNN-based application, like inserting the hardware Trojans (HT) into the embedded accelerators designed for the CNN. Therefore, there is a dire need to explore this attack surface for designing secure embedded hardware accelerators for CNNs. Towards this goal, in this paper, we exploited this attack surface to propose an HT-based attack called FeSHI. Since in horizontal collaboration of RC AIoT devices different sections of CNN architectures are outsourced to different untrusted third parties, the attacker may not know the input image, but it has access to the layer-by-layer output feature maps information for the assigned sections of the CNN architecture. This attack exploits the statistical distribution, i.e., Gaussian distribution, of the layer-by-layer feature maps of the CNN to design two triggers for stealthy HT with a very low probability of triggering. Also, three different novel, stealthy and effective trigger designs are proposed.

cs.CR

SoWaF: Shuffling of Weights and Feature Maps: A Novel Hardware Intrinsic Attack (HIA) on Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)

Security of inference phase deployment of Convolutional neural network (CNN) into resource constrained embedded systems (e.g. low end FPGAs) is a growing research area. Using secure practices, third party FPGA designers can be provided with no knowledge of initial and final classification layers. In this work, we demonstrate that hardware intrinsic attack (HIA) in such a "secure" design is still possible. Proposed HIA is inserted inside mathematical operations of individual layers of CNN, which propagates erroneous operations in all the subsequent CNN layers that lead to misclassification. The attack is non-periodic and completely random, hence it becomes difficult to detect. Five different attack scenarios with respect to each CNN layer are designed and evaluated based on the overhead resources and the rate of triggering in comparison to the original implementation. Our results for two CNN architectures show that in all the attack scenarios, additional latency is negligible (<0.61%), increment in DSP, LUT, FF is also less than 2.36%. Three attack scenarios do not require any additional BRAM resources, while in two scenarios BRAM increases, which compensates with the corresponding decrease in FF and LUTs. To the authors' best knowledge this work is the first to address the hardware intrinsic CNN attack with the attacker does not have knowledge of the full CNN.

cs.CR

Dynamic Distribution of Edge Intelligence at the Node Level for Internet of Things

In this paper, dynamic deployment of Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) architecture is proposed utilizing only IoT-level devices. By partitioning and pipelining the CNN, it horizontally distributes the computation load among resource-constrained devices (called horizontal collaboration), which in turn increases the throughput. Through partitioning, we can decrease the computation and energy consumption on individual IoT devices and increase the throughput without sacrificing accuracy. Also, by processing the data at the generation point, data privacy can be achieved. The results show that throughput can be increased by 1.55x to 1.75x for sharing the CNN into two and three resource-constrained devices, respectively.

cs.CV

A Stealthy Hardware Trojan Exploiting the Architectural Vulnerability of Deep Learning Architectures: Input Interception Attack (IIA)

Deep learning architectures (DLA) have shown impressive performance in computer vision, natural language processing and so on. Many DLA make use of cloud computing to achieve classification due to the high computation and memory requirements. Privacy and latency concerns resulting from cloud computing has inspired the deployment of DLA on embedded hardware accelerators. To achieve short time-to-market and have access to global experts, state-of-the-art techniques of DLA deployment on hardware accelerators are outsourced to untrusted third parties. This outsourcing raises security concerns as hardware Trojans can be inserted into the hardware design of the mapped DLA of the hardware accelerator. We argue that existing hardware Trojan attacks highlighted in literature have no qualitative means how definite they are of the triggering of the Trojan. Also, most inserted Trojans show a obvious spike in the number of hardware resources utilized on the accelerator at the time of triggering the Trojan or when the payload is active. In this paper, we introduce a hardware Trojan attack called Input Interception Attack (IIA). In this attack, we make use of the statistical properties of layer-by-layer output to ensure that asides from being stealthy. Our IIA is able to trigger with some measure of definiteness. Moreover, this IIA attack is tested on DLA used to classify MNIST and Cifar-10 data sets. The attacked design utilizes approximately up to 2% more LUTs respectively compared to the un-compromised designs. Finally, this paper discusses potential defensive mechanisms that could be used to combat such hardware Trojans based attack in hardware accelerators for DLA.

cs.CR

A Scalable Multilabel Classification to Deploy Deep Learning Architectures For Edge Devices

Convolution Neural Networks (CNN) have performed well in many applications such as object detection, pattern recognition, video surveillance and so on. CNN carryout feature extraction on labelled data to perform classification. Multi-label classification assigns more than one label to a particular data sample in a data set. In multi-label classification, properties of a data point that are considered to be mutually exclusive are classified. However, existing multi-label classification requires some form of data pre-processing that involves image training data cropping or image tiling. The computation and memory requirement of these multi-label CNN models makes their deployment on edge devices challenging. In this paper, we propose a methodology that solves this problem by extending the capability of existing multi-label classification and provide models with lower latency that requires smaller memory size when deployed on edge devices. We make use of a single CNN model designed with multiple loss layers and multiple accuracy layers. This methodology is tested on state-of-the-art deep learning algorithms such as AlexNet, GoogleNet and SqueezeNet using the Stanford Cars Dataset and deployed on Raspberry Pi3. From the results the proposed methodology achieves comparable accuracy with 1.8x less MACC operation, 0.97x reduction in latency and 0.5x, 0.84x and 0.97x reduction in size for the generated AlexNet, GoogleNet and SqueezeNet CNN models respectively when compared to conventional ways of achieving multi-label classification like hard-coding multi-label instances into single labels. The methodology also yields CNN models that achieve 50\% less MACC operations, 50% reduction in latency and size of generated versions of AlexNet, GoogleNet and SqueezeNet respectively when compared to conventional ways using 2 different single-labelled models to achieve multi-label classification.

cs.LG

MacLeR: Machine Learning-based Run-Time Hardware Trojan Detection in Resource-Constrained IoT Edge Devices

Traditional learning-based approaches for run-time Hardware Trojan detection require complex and expensive on-chip data acquisition frameworks and thus incur high area and power overhead. To address these challenges, we propose to leverage the power correlation between the executing instructions of a microprocessor to establish a machine learning-based run-time Hardware Trojan (HT) detection framework, called MacLeR. To reduce the overhead of data acquisition, we propose a single power-port current acquisition block using current sensors in time-division multiplexing, which increases accuracy while incurring reduced area overhead. We have implemented a practical solution by analyzing multiple HT benchmarks inserted in the RTL of a system-on-chip (SoC) consisting of four LEON3 processors integrated with other IPs like vga_lcd, RSA, AES, Ethernet, and memory controllers. Our experimental results show that compared to state-of-the-art HT detection techniques, MacLeR achieves 10\% better HT detection accuracy (i.e., 96.256%) while incurring a 7x reduction in area and power overhead (i.e., 0.025% of the area of the SoC and <0.07% of the power of the SoC). In addition, we also analyze the impact of process variation and aging on the extracted power profiles and the HT detection accuracy of MacLeR. Our analysis shows that variations in fine-grained power profiles due to the HTs are significantly higher compared to the variations in fine-grained power profiles caused by the process variations (PV) and aging effects. Moreover, our analysis demonstrates that, on average, the HT detection accuracy drop in MacLeR is less than 1% and 9% when considering only PV and PV with worst-case aging, respectively, which is ~10x less than in the case of the state-of-the-art ML-based HT detection technique.

cs.CR

How Secure is Distributed Convolutional Neural Network on IoT Edge Devices?

Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) has found successful adoption in many applications. The deployment of CNN on resource-constrained edge devices have proved challenging. CNN distributed deployment across different edge devices has been adopted. In this paper, we propose Trojan attacks on CNN deployed across a distributed edge network across different nodes. We propose five stealthy attack scenarios for distributed CNN inference. These attacks are divided into trigger and payload circuitry. These attacks are tested on deep learning models (LeNet, AlexNet). The results show how the degree of vulnerability of individual layers and how critical they are to the final classification.

cs.CV

SIMCom: Statistical Sniffing of Inter-Module Communications for Run-time Hardware Trojan Detection

Timely detection of Hardware Trojans (HTs) has become a major challenge for secure integrated circuits. We present a run-time methodology for HT detection that employs a multi-parameter statistical traffic modeling of the communication channel in a given System-on-Chip (SoC), named as SIMCom. The main idea is to model the communication using multiple side-channel information like the Hurst exponent, the standard deviation of the injection distribution, and the hop distribution jointly to accurately identify HT-based online anomalies (that affects the communication without affecting the protocols or control signals). At design time, our methodology employs a "property specification language" to define and embed assertions in the RTL, specifying the correct communication behavior of a given SoC. At run-time, it monitors the anomalies in the communication behavior by checking the execution patterns against these assertions. For illustration, we evaluate SIMCom for three SoCs, i.e., SoC1 ( four single-core MC8051 and UART modules), SoC2 (four single-core MC8051, AES, ethernet, memctrl, BasicRSA, RS232 modules), and SoC3 (four single-core LEON3 connected with each other and AES, ethernet, memctrl, BasicRSA, RS23s modules microcontrollers). The experimental results show that with the combined analysis of multiple statistical parameters, SIMCom is able to detect all the benchmark Trojans (available on trust-hub) with less than 1% area and power overhead.

cs.CR

2L-3W: 2-Level 3-Way Hardware-Software Co-Verification for the Mapping of Deep Learning Architecture (DLA) onto FPGA Boards

FPGAs have become a popular choice for deploying deep learning architectures (DLA). There are many researchers that have explored the deployment and mapping of DLA on FPGA. However, there has been a growing need to do design-time hardware-software co-verification of these deployments. To the best of our knowledge this is the first work that proposes a 2-Level 3-Way (2L-3W) hardware-software co-verification methodology and provides a step-by-step guide for the successful mapping, deployment and verification of DLA on FPGA boards. The 2-Level verification is to make sure the implementation in each stage (software and hardware) are following the desired behavior. The 3-Way co-verification provides a cross-paradigm (software, design and hardware) layer-by-layer parameter check to assure the correct implementation and mapping of the DLA onto FPGA boards. The proposed 2L-3W co-verification methodology has been evaluated over several test cases. In each case, the prediction and layer-by-layer output of the DLA deployed on PYNQ FPGA board (hardware) alongside with the intermediate design results of the layer-by-layer output of the DLA implemented on Vivado HLS and the prediction and layer-by-layer output of the software level (Caffe deep learning framework) are compared to obtain a layer-by-layer similarity score. The comparison is achieved using a completely automated Python script. The comparison provides a layer-by-layer similarity score that informs us the degree of success of the DLA mapping to the FPGA or help identify in design time the layer to be debugged in the case of unsuccessful mapping. We demonstrated our technique on LeNet DLA and Caffe inspired Cifar-10 DLA and the co-verification results yielded layer-by-layer similarity scores of 99\% accuracy.

cs.LG